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Introduction to the Portfolio
This portfolio contains work submitted in partial fulfilment of the PsychD in 
Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology at the University of Surrey. It 
incorporates three dossiers: Academic, Therapeutic Practice and Research. Whilst the 
dossiers and the individual pieces of work contained within them cover a wide range of 
material and aim to demonstrate a range of abilities and competencies, I believe that it is 
the ethically and critically orientated threads running throughout, which binds them into a 
meaningful whole, i.e., the overall development of my professional identity/position and 
approach to practice. Though I acknowledge that the representation of my work is 
necessarily partial and is open to elaboration, revision and critique, it nonetheless 
symbolises my own unique 'rite of passage' into the culture of counselling psychology 
and a professional community of practitioners. This 'rite of passage', i.e., the process of 
constructing and performing my own identity as a counselling psychologist, has been 
conflict ridden, not in a negative or urgent sense (though it felt that way at times) but 
rather as in a transitional period to be negotiated. My struggle to claim or resist certain 
images, modes of practice and ways of being made available to me during the course of 
my training, have gained expression throughout the portfolio most clearly in my 
preference for and use of social constructionist and critical approaches to psychological 
theory, research and practice. As a means of orientating the reader to the contexts and 
conditions giving rise to the work in this portfolio, I will introduce relevant aspects of my 
own experience, including my motivation for undertaking a professional training in 
counselling psychology and my personal and professional experiences prior to and during 
the course.
The ongoing negotiation of my professional identity and reasons for pursuing a career in 
counselling psychology are inseparable from my experiences of personal, familial, social 
and cultural uncertainty. I grew up in a rural farming community, which provided a stable 
and tightly defined community. However, I never felt comfortable with this particular 
way of life or the subject positions and statuses that it offered to me. Consequently my
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experience of growing up was largely characterised by a sense of opposition, difference 
and not belonging.
At eight years of age, what I now know in diagnostic terms is referred to as 'obsessive- 
compulsive disorder' entered my life and held me prisoner until well into early adulthood. 
Thus I experienced first hand what it was like to be afraid, to suffer in silence, to feel 
'abnormal' and to feel ashamed. These experiences were perpetuated during my schooling 
where I was subject to negative evaluations and descriptions, e.g. 'slow learner', 'not 
academically gifted' and so on, which I found to be quite capturing of my identity (I later 
found out that I have a different style of learning, i.e., dyslexia). Though my sporting 
ability provided a necessary foil and allowed me to construct a sense of self worth and 
positive identity, my aspirations of becoming a professional cricketer were cut short 
during my adolescence by a bone infection. I subsequently qualified as a personal trainer 
and aerobics instructor and had a successful career in the health industry. During this 
time, through my own intimate and professional relationships, further uncertainty arose in 
relation to my relatively privileged position and cultural location as a white middle class 
heterosexual man subject to living in male orientated culture. I became disillusioned with 
the health industry's promotion of the 'body beautiful' through the 'male gaze' and my 
own unwitting complicity in the reproduction of stereotypically gendered images of 
'normality' and 'beauty'.
Trying to make sense and create meaning amidst a sea of confusion and uncertainty was a 
key factor that drew me towards the discipline of psychology. I also was drawn to a 
career in psychology because a great deal of my work as a health professional had taken 
on a 'therapeutic' quality. The people I worked with frequently experienced all manner of 
life related difficulties and used our sessions as a safe conversational space in order to 
discuss matters of importance to them. The level of contact I experienced personally and 
within the context of my professional role was something that I found rewarding and 
enriching of my own life and identity. At this point I felt that I wanted to find a career
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that would allow me to work specifically in a therapeutically and psychologically 
orientated way.
I left the health industry and undertook a practitioner training in Neuro-Linguistic 
Programming (NLP), a diploma in Clinical Hypnosis and a Social Sciences module with 
the Open University in order to develop as a person, reconnect with my own learning 
abilities and to get a taste of more psychologically and therapeutically orientated ways of 
being. I realised that the key to my own learning and development was largely dependent 
upon being motivated and passionate about what I was learning/doing. I felt passionate 
about my own and others experiences of life and relationships and psychology seemed to 
provide a structured way forward. I researched different professional pathways, which 
included reading the Handbook of Counselling Psychology (Woolfe & Dryden, 1996) 
and decided that I wanted to embark on a career in counselling psychology. At this point 
I decided to do an undergraduate degree in psychology and counselling with a view to 
going on to postgraduate training. My first degree gave me further insight into the 
discipline of counselling psychology. Not only was I introduced to the major theorists 
and models of psychotherapeutic practice but also to social constructionism, which I 
immediately felt a kinship towards. Participation in an experiential group and experiential 
exercises further developed my own reflective and relational capacities and helped to 
cement my desire to become a therapeutic practitioner.
I opted to study and develop a career specifically in counselling psychology as opposed 
to say clinical psychology or training as a psychotherapist for many reasons. In a very 
concrete sense I saw it as providing a professional home and identity along with the 
privileges that entails, e.g. recognition, status, livelihood etc. However, my ultimate 
motivation was of a much more personal nature. My own experiences of life led me to 
abhor unequal and discriminatoiy practices and the objectification / pathologisation of 
people, which I found to be disrespectful and abusive. This resulted in me developing 
preferred values and ways of being that emphasise equality, mutuality and respect for 
difference. As such I felt a certain affinity with the ethos underpinning counselling
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psychology. The emphasis placed on context, non-pathologising and anti-discriminatory 
practices, the acknowledgement of the co-creation of meaning within relationship and a 
critically reflexive stance, seemed to hold a great deal of creative potential for both 
individual and social life. Perhaps above all else, I was drawn to counselling psychology 
because I understood it to be a site through which meaningful conversation and change 
could take place.
During the course of my training I came to view the discipline as an ethical activity, 
which emphasises concern for one's fellow person/humanity. That said I do not believe 
that either the discipline of counselling psychology or myself as a counselling 
psychologist exist statically in a cultural vacuum or are immune from the possibility of 
reproducing potentially oppressive or pathologising practices. That is why I have 
consistently adopted a deconstructive and critical approach throughout my training, as I 
believe it is only through ongoing critical reflection at the level of self, discipline, and 
culture that such abusive practices and unequal relations can be minimised and the ethos 
and aims of counselling psychology can increasingly be realised as a lived reality and not 
just a philosophical or disciplinary ideal.
This critical stance in no way means that I am 'anti' counselling psychology. On the 
contrary, it matters because counselling psychology and my position as a counselling 
psychologist has a direct bearing on my own life and identity as well as others. My 
critical position means that I care and that I am willing to take a stand. I do not view 
clients' difficulties in terms of 'pathology', with me as a therapist providing a 'cure'. 
Rather I look to our shared humanity and see my own liberation and the creation of a 
better world as being bound up with those 'others' who seek help. It is an attempt to 
appreciate the constitutive and relational nature of lived experience, along with the 
mutual negotiation of difference that lays at the heart of my personal-professional journey 
and which hopefully finds expression and an audience through the work in this portfolio
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Academic Dossier
The academic dossier contains four essays. Each essay adopts a critical and exploratory 
approach to the phenomena being investigated and represents an interplay between my 
experience of learning on a taught course and how I made these learning experiences 
personally relevant and meaningful by forging links with and incorporating what I felt 
interested and passionate about into my academic writing.
The first essay I have presented is entitled 'Constructionist based therapies challenge to 
modernist models o f therapy: The importance o f narrative'. This essay looks at the ways 
in which modernist forms of psychodynamic and cognitive therapy use clients' stories or 
narrative as a means of accessing supposedly more 'foundational' aspects of 
psychological reality, such as 'personality structures' or 'schemas'. This is contrasted with 
social constructionist or narrative based therapies, which place the clients' process of 
narration at the centre of .their work. Some of the potential limitations of modernist 
models are highlighted, and attention is given to the implications these contrasting 
approaches to narrative hold in tenns of the relations of power engendered in the 
therapeutic relationship.
The second essay: 'Empathy - psychotherapeutic interpersonal understanding and the 
therapeutic relationship', considers psychotherapeutic empathy as an aspect of the 
therapeutic relationship with reference to psychodynamic theorising and my own clinical 
observations. By taking a wider view of psychotherapeutic empathy as a relational and 
dialogical phenomenon, I was able to reconcile some of my misgivings about what I 
perceived as the subject/object dualism inherent in traditional forms of psychodynamic 
practice. This in turn helped me to engage with and become more open to the potentially 
useful aspects of psychodynamic work in my clinical practice.
The third essay: 'In cognitive therapy, how would a therapist understand and work with 
difficulties arising in the therapeutic relationship. Illustrate with examples from clinical
practice', looks at some of the historical and conceptual factors pertinent to the areas of 
cognitive therapy and the therapeutic relationship per se before forwarding an account of 
the interdependence of the therapeutic relationship and cognitive therapy. This is 
achieved through reference to relevant literature and my own clinical experiences of 
working with difficulties in the therapeutic relationship.
The final essay included in the academic dossier: 'The therapeutic relationship: An 
integrative aid', was written during my final year of training. It is a result of having been 
encouraged to actively consider the issue of integration in relation to our own personal 
approach to practice. Written to a shorter word count, this essay takes the view that 
human meaning making is constituted through relationship. The therapeutic relationship 
is considered as a framework for integration at the theoretical level and as a personal aid 
to integration at the level o f practice, which is illustrated through a brief reflexive 
example. Within the overall context of my training, this essay reflects my sustained 
engagement with the significance of relationship at the level of theory, research and 
practice.
Therapeutic Practice Dossier
This dossier relates to clinical practice and provides the reader with a brief overview of 
my placements and the client populations I have worked with. It also contains a 'Final 
Clinical Paper', which discusses the ongoing evolution of my personal style and approach 
to practice.
Research Dossier
This dossier presents my research, which developed organically in conjunction with my 
personal and academic interests and clinical experiences. A statement on the 'use of self 
in the research follows each study, which is designed to alert the reader to my 
motivations-for exploring specific topics and my experiences of conducting research
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itself. Each piece adopts a social constructionist and critical framework in order to 
explore issues that I believe are central to the discipline of counselling psychology and 
have a direct bearing on psychotherapeutic practice.
The Year One literature review is entitled: 'Counselling Psychology - Critical Psychology 
in a Postmodern Age? Challenging and Reconstructing Traditional Notions o f  
Psychopathology, Psychiatric Categories and Psycho-Diagnosis'. Having embarked upon 
a career in counselling psychology largely because it rejects the medical model's view of 
mental 'illness', I was keen to explore traditional conceptualisations of'psychopathology' 
and the use of diagnostic classification systems in contrast with the applied discipline of 
counselling psychology. This review helped me to gain a broader historical perspective 
on the discipline of which I was now a part. This was particularly useful for my own 
development because it helped me to maintain a critical stance whilst managing the 
tensions I experienced working clinically as a trainee-counselling psychologist in 
contexts where bio-medical views of'psychopathology' were dominant.
As my literature review had been at a relatively abstract level, I decided to conduct a 
qualitative study in my second year entitled: 'Psycho-Diagnostic Categories,
Psychopathology and Counselling Psychology. A Discourse Analytic Study o f Chartered 
Counselling Psychologist's Talk', in order to look, within the context of a research 
interview, at local instances of how counselling psychologists spoke about and accounted 
for 'psychopathology' and their use or non use of diagnostic categories in their own 
practice. The discourse analytic methodology employed enabled me to explore the 
personal, interpersonal and professional functions served by speakers' accounts in relation 
to the tensions and dilemmas identified in the literature review.
The final piece of research entitled: 'Between the Real and the not Real: 'Knowledge', 
'Truth' and 'Power' and the Creation o f Clinical Realities: A Discourse Analytic Study o f 
Psychotherapeutic Practice', builds upon the social constructionist frameworks employed 
in the first and second years. It examines the discursive relationship between 'knowledge',
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'truth' and 'power' in the context of psychotherapeutic practice and pays attention to the 
implications and effects particular discourses have on therapist/client subjectivities and 
the relations of power made available to them. This piece of research was particularly 
meaningful for me as it reflected issues that I was facing and attempting to work through 
in relation to my own position and preferred approach to practice.
The research dossier also includes a published article entitled: On 'mundane 
heterosexism' (Craven, 2002), which featured in the 'Research in brief section of Lesbian. 
& Gay Psychology Review, 3(2), 62-63. Written during my first year of training, the 
article reviews a research report conducted by Elizabeth Peel (2001) who combined 
discourse analysis with lesbian feminist politics in order to explore what she refers to as 
'mundane heterosexism', i.e., subtle forms of heterosexism in language. The process of 
reviewing and writing about somebody else's work gave me further insight into the 
potentials, as well as drawbacks, of discourse analytic research methods and helped me to 
develop my own research interests during the course of my training.
N.B. The details of individual clients have been changed and pseudonyms have been 
employed throughout this portfolio in order to protect client and research participants' 
confidentiality.
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ACADEMIC DOSSIER
Introduction
This dossier presents four selected essays that were submitted during the Psych.D course. 
The first essay is concerned with the importance of narrative and considers 
psychodynamic and cognitive therapies' traditional use of narrative in contrast to 
constructionist or more explicitly narrative based approaches. The second essay discusses 
the notion of psychotherapeutic empathy as an aspect of the therapeutic relationship, with 
reference to psychodynamic theoiy/concepts and reflections on my own clinical practice. 
The third essay forwards an account that argues for the interdependence of the 
therapeutic relationship and cognitive therapy. Finally, the fourth essay considers how the 
therapeutic relationship can be usefully viewed as an aid to integration at both theoretical 
and personal levels.
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Constructionist based therapies challenge to modernist models of therapy: The 
importance of narrative.
The last several decades of the Twentieth Century saw narrative1 become the subject of 
numerous new investigations. The increasing interest in the study of narrative suggests 
the emergence of another strand to the "new paradigm" movement and a further 
refinement of postpositivist scientific method. What has been called the discursive and 
narrative turn in psychology and other human sciences can be seen as part of larger 
tectonic shifts in the cultural architecture of knowledge following the crisis of the modem 
episteme (Brockmeier & Harre, 1997). The new interest evolves around an 
acknowledgment that the story form, both oral or written, constitutes a fundamental 
linguistic, psychological, cultural, and philosophical framework for our attempts to come 
to terms with our nature and the conditions of existence (e.g. Bakhtin, 1981; Bruner, 
1986; Polkinghome, 1987; Sarbin, 1986). It can be argued that this turn to narrative 
reflects similar developments within philosophy and the social sciences in general and 
that such developments are having a significant impact in the therapeutic field (see 
McNamee & Gergen, 1992).
This paper aims to consider the importance of narrative and the implications it holds 
specifically in relation to clinical practice. In order to achieve this, traditional modernist 
models of therapy shall be set against and contrasted with recent postmodern, 
constructionist informed narrative therapy (e.g. White & Epston, 1990). Harnessing the 
tension between modem and postmodern approaches to therapy serves to provide an 
organising framework in which to consider the respective views of, importance accorded 
to, and ways of working with narrative in clinical practice. With narrative firmly in the 
spotlight this paper aims to provide a snapshot of the impact of postmodernism on 
therapy and the challenge it levels at modernist models of therapy. In doing so a cogent
1 For the purpose of this paper the terms 'narrative' and 'story' are used interchangeably and refer to the way 
people structure experience through story-based accounts.
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argument that views the core of therapy as an arena for the telling of personal stories shall 
be forwarded.
A useful point at which to start is consideration of how the ways and ideas about 
narrative and stories have been employed in therapy. Many theorists, to help make sense 
of therapeutic work, have used the concept of narrative and story; for example, Berne 
(1972) developed the idea of the life script of the,client in his model of transactional 
analysis. Gustafson (1992) identified three types of life stories, which he viewed as 
underlying problems and anxieties clients experience. Due to limitations 6 f  space, only 
two schools of thought shall be considered, which can be located within the modernist 
tradition, namely, psychodynamic and cognitive models.
The psychodynamic and cognitive schools of therapy can be described as foundationalist, 
in that they each utilise narrative (i.e., the stories clients tell) in order to gain access to 
supposedly more ‘foundational’ levels of psychological reality (McLeod, 1997). In the 
psychodynamic tradition therapists do not typically work with the clients' story in its own 
right, but instead use narrative to gain access to 'underlying' psychic and emotional 
structures. Although within the psychodynamic tradition a therapist may start by asking 
to hear the client’s story, the stoiy is not recorded in story form, rather the therapist 
gathers information that is subsequently reduced into conceptual categories, which are 
deemed of particular interest. McLeod (1997) notes how such categories are shaped in 
line with psychodynamic theory, focusing for example on transferential themes, 
developmental issues or triangular relationships. Consequently the client's narrative is 
treated as a source of evidence that supposedly corresponds to underlying ‘personality’ 
structures that are being expressed directly through their story.
In general terms, psychodynamic theory holds to the notion that there is an underlying 
unity to the stories that people tell. Deriving from Freud's original ideas, therapeutic work 
aims to unearth the client's core ‘life story’ (McLeod, 1997). Freud assumed that clients' 
life stories could be understood in terms of the template provided by the Greek story of
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Oedipus Rex. The theme of assuming the existence of a core,, repetitive life-story that is 
evident in psychodynamic theory has not gone unchallenged. For example, Spence 
(1987) notes how this framework can only work if certain elements of what the client 
says are downplayed so that their situation can be fitted to the guiding template or theory. 
Omer (1993) draws our attention to further potentially dangerous implications of this 
approach, stressing how the reduction of a client's life to a core narrative theme may 
reduce, oversimplify and ultimately result in marginalising the complexity and richness 
of the client's lived experience. Within psychodynamic work we find the use of story to 
be viewed as a means to an end with the story itself being deemed of relatively little 
interest to the therapist.
In the cognitive tradition the concept of narrative is typically viewed as a form of 
representation. Cognitive therapists regard stories as a means of gaining access to, and 
facilitating change in, fundamental underlying "scripts" or "schemas". Once again, as 
with psychodynamic theory, we find the goal of therapy to be the attainment of a 
coherent, singular life story. The prescriptive nature of cognitive therapy raises concern 
over the extent to which the client's story is implicitly replaced by the therapist's 
theoretically led story. The client's reality, as expressed through their narrative, is 
understood as an individual, cognitive product; in other words, the social and relational 
dimension is pushed to the periphery. The cause of difficulties, and responsibility for 
change, remains solely with the individual client. Subsequently, the therapist stands 
removed from the client, evaluating and diagnosing their crisis or difficulties by general 
culturally significant criteria. For example, the cognitive approach of Albert Ellis (1962) 
is steeped in the modernist notion of the rational individual, as such therapy evolves 
around the replacement of the clients 'faulty' or 'dysfunctional' life story with a more 
functional one provided by the therapist, where the difference between a good (rational) 
and a dysfunctional (irrational) stoiy is quite explicit. Arguably again, the therapist 
working within a modernist model of therapy may fall into the position of ‘expert’, 
imposing their theoretically driven understanding onto the client's situation.
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Having briefly outlined some of the key features of psychodynamic and cognitive models 
approach and orientation towards working with narrative, we find that both traditions rely 
upon a blueprint or metanarrative (Omer & Strenger 1992). They write that:
...clients come to therapists with their broken narratives, which therapists offer 
to mend... included among the therapist's bench tools are: A metanarrative that [ 
serves as a template into which the client's life narrative is fitted and newly cut 
to size. (Omer & Strenger, 1992, p.256)
When we consider the use of stories in a modernist context, narratives are viewed 
essentially as structures of language. For the modem therapist narratives can function as 
conveyors of objective knowledge. The psychodynamic and cognitive models of therapy 
can be viewed as products of the modem era, and as such, share deeply in the 
assumptions of modernism. Perhaps one of the most central beliefs resulting from the 
modernist context is that the professional therapist should ideally function as a scientist. 
The client's narrative is considered of relatively little value in the understanding of their 
lives, and is viewed as less preferable to the empirically based account of the trained 
scientist. The theories underlying the aforementioned models each contain assumptions 
stemming from their modernist orientation regarding the underlying cause of the problem 
or pathology, which can be understood as being intimately bound and situated within the 
wider medico-scientific narrative of pathology and cure. Secondly, there is an assumption 
that the cause of the problem can be located within the individual. Thirdly, assumptions 
are made concerning the means by which the problem or pathology can be eradicated or 
fixed (see Gergen & Kaye, 1992; Kaye, 1999).
It is this backdrop that establishes the modem therapists posture towards the stories their 
clients tell. Though the client may initially get to tell their story it is the therapist's 
scientific narrative that maintains a privileged position due to its professional 
endorsement. Thus the trained professional enters into work with a client with an existing 
narrative that is not only well-developed but has support within their community of
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fellow practitioners and scientific peers (Gergen & Kaye, 1992). Arguably this makes for 
a skewed imbalance of power in favour of the therapist as they define themselves apart 
from the client with whom they are working. This, in turn, upholds the belief that they are 
the ‘expert’ holding special knowledge that allows them to observe, assess, diagnose, and 
treat the client without being subject to the same processes as the person they are 
interacting with (Weingarten, 1998). In a similar vein Keeney (1983) notes how the 
modem therapist is seen as the observer, that is, as distinct from the client who is the 
observed. From this vantage point it is assumed that the therapist knows and understands 
the client better than they know and understand themselves. Consequently, the 
therapeutic process, regardless of the focus, entails the replacement of the client's story 
with that of the therapist.
The metanarratives employed in these theories essentially provide an image of how the 
person should be, and how they have become the way they are, i.e. ‘faulty’ or 
pathological. It is the perceived image of the fully functioning or good individual that 
guides the therapeutic outcome. Whilst the replacement procedures of modem therapies 
undoubtedly do have some therapeutic benefits it is the potentially injurious 
consequences that are of concern in this paper. Firstly, we find that the therapeutic 
procedure virtually guarantees that the therapist's narrative will not be threatened but 
rather be vindicated as being correct. Spence (1982) has noted how the search space, as 
defined by the therapist, can be continually expanded until the "correct" answer is found. 
In other words, the therapeutic deck is stacked in the therapist's favour, with any potential 
challenges being muted, due to the power accorded by their socially sanctioned status and 
scientifically endorsed narrative.
Lyotard (1984) views the modem search for overarching theories as containing the seeds 
of terror and totalitarianism. The metanarratives employed in the modem models of 
therapy reviewed, at best may replace the problematic narrative with an alternative 
clinical reality, which if accepted may prove beneficial; at worst, the metanarrative can 
demand consensus and conformity. To this extent, they can be viewed as powerful
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ideological systems serving to legitimate the dominant interests of differing therapeutic 
factions, thus maintaining the therapeutic status quo.
It has been noted that modernist approaches to therapy begin with an a priori narrative 
that is justified by its claims to a scientific base. Gergen and Kaye (1992) point out that 
because it is sanctioned as scientific, this narrative is relatively closed to alteration. They 
argue that the therapeutic procedure furnishes the client with a lesson in inferiority 
wherein the client is indirectly informed that they are ignorant and incapable of 
comprehending reality. Clearly then, on this account we see the modem therapist 
positioned as superior to the client, with the subsequent therapeutic interaction being a 
unidirectional one-way flow, as the therapist imposes their theory upon the client's 
situation. To this extent modernist narratives are practically content free as the therapist's 
narrative is an abstract formalisation cut away from the context and circumstance in 
which the client lives. This feature of modernist models of therapy is highly problematic 
as the decontextualised nature of modem narratives, which attempt to help clients by 
replacing their stories with the fixed narrative of the therapist, fail to give due attention to 
the particularities of the context in which the clients experience is embedded.
As we turn now to narrative therapy, as informed by social constructionist thinking, we 
find therapeutic practiceTs based on postmodern premises. Despite modernist therapies 
finding increasing theoretical value jn the concept of narrative, it is only constructionist, 
narrative therapies that fully acknowledge the significance of storytelling by placing the 
client's process of narration centrally in their work (McLeod, 1997). From this 
perspective, there are no "true" stories, no fixed "truths", no master narratives, (Parry & 
Doan, 1994).
Instead, social constructionists and narrative therapists reject the idea of an external 
reality and "grand metanarratives", in favor o f ‘local knowledges’ and the intersubjective 
influences of language, culture and discourse. Rather than the modernist representational- 
referential view of language, this position holds language to be constitutive, as such; the
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problems clients bring to therapy are understood as being constructed in, and through, 
language.
The goal of therapy is to play with different ways of thinking about difficulties clients 
experience, as one kind of story will work in some contexts, or relationships, but not at 
all in others. The form of therapy advocated from this position aims to open clients up to 
a multiplicity of possible personal narratives about the self, their life situations, and to 
free them from the limiting constructions imposed on them in their past (Gergen & Kaye, 
1992). The potentially dangerous power imbalance that is evident in modernist models is 
minimised due to the therapist adopting a position of genuine curiosity, what Anderson 
and Goolishian (1992) call a "not-knowing" approach, towards the client's difficulties. 
The collaborative nature of the therapeutic relationship is further emphasised as the 
therapist attempts to join forces with the client against the problem. This particular view 
and approach towards practice and therapist client relations is embodied in the maxim: 
'The person isn't the problem: The problem is the problem' (Epston, 1989, p.26). Thus the 
therapist is positioned as a 'co-author' rather than an 'expert authority' and therapeutic 
change is construed as the dialogical process of re-authoring the 'dominant' or 'problem' 
story in which alternative knowledges, meanings and counter-plots can be resurrected and 
performed. Anderson and Goolishian, (1987) consider therapeutic change not to be 
merely problem resolution or problem solving, but rather problem dissipation, which they 
see as occurring in the process of "languaging" about a problem. Basically, for them, 
change is the co-evolution of new meaning and this takes place through conversation or 
communicative exchange.
From a narrative vantage point this is best encapsulated in the notion of polyvocal 
collaborations. This is more of an overriding aim and orientation rather than a specific 
technique. Polyvocality emphasizes expanding the number of voices bearing or a 
particular problem. Narrative therapists aim to resist internalising discourses and 
practices, which locate problems within the individual. Instead the aim is to bring many 
voices into the dialogical mix thereby generating new options and possible actions.
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Certainly there are many liberating benefits for the client, most notably; polyvocality may 
enable the client to find plausible alternatives to the situation they find themselves in 
when they present themselves for therapy. In this sense, they become more flexible and 
better able to see alternative ways o f going on. From a postmodern viewpoint, it is 
difficult to find fault with such an approach, however, modernist therapists may argue 
that bringing "non-expert voices" to bare on the situation may have negative and 
potentially damaging consequences for the client.
Having outlined modernist models of therapy's general orientation towards and use of 
narrative, this paper has proceeded to detail the constructionist, narrative approach. 
Attention has been drawn to the potentially injurious consequences of modem approaches 
and their reliance on guiding metanarratives. In particular, their modem heritage has been 
noted and the implications this position holds for the therapeutic relationship. Following 
this, the social constructionist informed narrative approach has been highlighted as 
offering an alternative account of the human condition in which narrative is placed 
centrally in therapeutic work. Finally, in keeping with the postmodern position adopted in 
this paper, I shall refrain from extolling the final word on which approach is best or holds 
the "truth". However, it is hoped that a case has been made for viewing therapy as an 
arena for the telling of personal stories and the potential benefits this position holds.
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Empathy - psychotherapeutic interpersonal understanding and the therapeutic 
relationship
Introduction
The notion of psychotherapeutic empathy is a well-established concept that has been long 
cherished within the therapeutic community. Empathy has been conceived in a number of 
different ways, for example; as a trait, a state of being, an attitude, a form of 
communication, a way of knowing, an awareness, a special kind of relationship, a 
behavioural readiness, and a physiological condition (see Bohart & Greenberg, 1997). 
Though the notion of empathy can be traced to Theodore Lipzi, who in 1897 introduced 
the concept of einfuhlung, which literally means ‘feeling into’, it was Titchener (1909) 
who coined the term empathy, referring to it as a 'process of humanizing objects, of 
reading or feeling ourselves into them'. More recently, Carl Rogers (1975) is credited 
with placing empathy at centre stage in the therapeutic process. It is Roger's powerful and 
often quoted definition of empathy that has frequently served as the basis for 
psychotherapeutic practice. He defines empathy as "entering the private, perceptual world 
of another and becoming thoroughly at home in it" (p.2). However, Sexton and Whiston 
(1994) in reviewing the plethora of literature and research regarding empathy, state, "the 
definition and mechanism of empathy seem unclear" (p.26). Moore, (1990) highlights 
that research has generated little agreement among investigators, and Gladstein (1983) 
concludes that there have been few conclusive research findings. As such, there is 
continued debate regarding the intra-psychic or interpersonal location of empathy and its 
categorisation as a skill, attitude and/or a form of understanding.
One notable distinction that has arisen amongst almost all past and current contributors to 
the extensive literature on psychotherapeutic empathy is between empathy and 
understanding. Some theorists posit a clear separation between empathy and 
understanding, for example, Shlien (1997) views empathy as a form of pre-conceptual 
perceptual attunement with an other that is important for adaptation and survival, but
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different from conceptual understanding or communicating. However, most theorists 
seem to be more ambivalent regarding the distinction between experiencing and 
understanding when conceptualising empathy. For example, Roger's (1959) view of 
empathy includes perceiving both 'emotional components and meanings' (p.210) related 
to the client's conceptions of reality. Similarly, Kohut (1984) regards empathy as a 
'capacity to think and feel oneself into the inner life of another person' (p.82). Greenberg 
and Elliot (1997) draw a distinction between empathy and interpretation, viewing the 
former as 'an affective form of understanding that...differs from conceptual 
understanding...in that it is something that therapists feel rather than just understand 
intellectually'(p. 169).
Other psychoanalytically orientated writers, like Eagle and Wolitzky (1997), consider 
empathy to be the internal experience of sharing in and comprehending the momentary 
psychological state of another person; while interpersonal theorists, such as Stolorow 
(1994), provide a directly methodological focus by portraying empathy as 'a method of 
investigating and illustrating principles that unconsciously organise a patient's experience' 
(p.45). '
Bohart and Greenberg (1997) have provided a comprehensive survey of the relevant 
theoretical formulations and empirical studies associated with the various conceptions of 
psychotherapeutic empathy that evolved during the twentieth century. In attempting to 
integrate various conceptions of psychotherapeutic empathy drawn from differing schools 
of therapy, Bohart and Greenberg (1997) include both experience and attempts to 
understand in their consideration of psychotherapeutic empathy. They make a distinction 
between experience and understanding, extending the latter to include 'more affective, 
perceptual, experiential, or tacit kinds of understanding' (p.420) and argue that
A key therapist skill here is the ability to temporarily suspend one's own 
frame o f reference in service o f taking the role o f the other, as well as being 
able to go beyond this to be able to empathically grasp the larger context in
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which the experience o f both therapist and client in interaction is taking 
place. (Bohart & Greenberg, 1997, p.420)
Bearing the aforementioned distinction between experience and understanding in mind 
the central aim of this paper is to critically consider psychotherapeutic empathy as an 
aspect of the therapeutic relationship in relation to psychodynamic theorising and my 
own clinical observations. By contrasting traditional uses of psychotherapeutic empathy, 
i.e., classical analysis, with more recent relationally orientated psychodynamic 
approaches, I shall attempt to critically appraise the impact each position holds in relation 
to the therapeutic relationship. A second aim is to position psychotherapeutic empathy 
within a broader conceptualisation of interpersonal understanding
Empathy and Psychoanalysis
Within the psychoanalytic literature empathy has been referred to as a developmental 
need, as a mode of listening, as a form of communication, as a curative agent and as a 
method of observation and data gathering (Eagle & Wolitzky, 1997). For Freud, empathy 
was a way for the therapist to know the mind of the client. In classical psychoanalysis the 
primaiy function of empathic listening was to provide clues about the patient's 
unconscious dynamics, which in turn helped facilitate effective interpretations. As the 
therapist's empathic understanding was not shared with the analysand there was no 
attempt, for example, to use empathy to help establish a relationship in which a corrective 
emotional experience could take place. Consequently, empathy is viewed as a 
prerequisite for the therapeutic relationship rather than a direct "curative" agent in 
psychoanalytic treatment. It appears that Freud never intended empathy to be a central 
instrument of analysis. Clearly for traditional psychoanalysts, therapeutic empathy is 
understood to be a method of observation and data gathering. This stance towards 
psychotherapeutic empathy is perhaps more understandable when viewed within the 
context of Freud's (1912/1958) attitude towards the analytic relationship wherein he 
frequently advocated the "blank screen" approach, and, on occasion, that of a surgeon
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who takes an entirely objective attitude towards the patient. Such a therapeutic stance is 
theoretically contingent and positions the therapist as an 'objective' knower or 'expert'. 
This in turn affects the therapist's posture towards empathy and the therapeutic encounter 
more generally. It should be noted that this traditional view of psychoanalysis reflects a 
split between the observing subject and the observed object. In short, the "experience- 
distant" or external perspective characteristic of traditional psychoanalysis leads to the 
client being treated as a behaving object rather than an active subject. Arguably Freud's 
drive theory embodies an outdated nineteenth century philosophy of science, predicated 
upon the possibility of having access to an'objective truth'.
Historically, the notion of empathy was thrust to the centre of the psychodynamic stage 
with the development of Heinz Kohut's (1971) self-psychology. Kohut argued that the 
"experience distant" detached way in which classical analysts understood their patients 
was not helpful. Rather, he emphasised the importance of the therapist trying to 
comprehend what was going on in an "experience near" way. This means that the analyst 
should tiy to place him/herself, through the process of "vicarious introspection" into the 
experience of the client. Kohut's formulations (1971, 1977, 1984) attempt to replace the 
drive as the basic constituent of mind with factors derived from the earliest relationships 
between the child and his/her object world. His depiction of the analytic process wherein 
the therapist actively works with the client rather than imposing their theory on the client 
is consistent with the relational premises underlying his theoretical position. The general 
increase in emphasis on relationships and their role in the development and remediation 
of psychopathology (e.g. Luborsky, 1984; Mitchell, 1988; Watchel, 1993), has led to 
empathy or its lack being seen as an important component in both development and 
psychotherapy. Subsequently, relational theorists (e.g. Stolorow & Atwood, 1992) define 
the therapeutic relationship in terms of an interpersonal field wherein the participation of 
the analyst is essential as opposed to the traditional view of the therapist as a neutral 
observer who interprets drive and defence mechanisms within the client. This directs the 
clinician's attention to ways in which he/she and the client are mutually influencing each 
other.
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Despite the modem emphasis on the importance of therapeutic empathy in 
psychoanalysis, and the implications each perspective holds in terms of the location and 
role of therapeutic empathy, there remain many unresolved questions regarding its role in 
theory and practice, such as, to what extent is it necessary for the therapist to 
experientially identify with the subjective world of the client in order for understanding 
to occur? In what follows, the relationship between the psychodynamic concept of 
projective identification and therapeutic empathy will be used as a platform from which 
to launch a more general inquiry into psychotherapeutic understanding in the analytic 
situation.
Empathy and Projective Identification
Tansey and Burke (1989) assert, "When empathy occurs, projective identification is 
always involved. The experience of empathy on the therapist's part always involves the 
reception and processing of a projective identification transmitted by the patient "(p. 195). 
Projective identification according to these authors is an interactional phenomenon 
whereby one person projects an aspect of the self or internal objects "into" another 
individual, and through interactional pressure,
...unconsciously elicits thoughts, feelings, and experiences within [this other] 
individual which in some way resemble his own...the projector may stir up 
within the therapist an experiential state that to some degree matches or 
compliments the projector's immediate self experience. (Tansey & Burke, 1989, 
p.45)
The basic claim is that projective identification and empathy are inextricably linked. If 
so, then what does projective identification have to do with the process of empathy? 
Tansey and Burke (1989) answer this question as such: "an awareness and examination of 
one's own experiential state - insofar as it is closely related to the projected aspects of the 
patient's inner world (i.e. aspects of the self or internal objects) and has been induced by
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the patient through interactional pressure - becomes the primary "tool" for empathic 
understanding of the patient" (p.201). They argue that the best means of achieving 
empathic understanding is by being aware of and examining one's own experiential state. 
This involves not so much putting oneself in another's place as being in another's place by 
virtue of the other's projection and interactional pressure (i.e., projective identification).
However, there does appear to be the possibility that the therapist's experiential state 
reflects to a large extent his or her own pre-understanding, theoretical preoccupations, 
and so on, and may not, therefore be a direct product of the patient's projections and 
interactional pressures. Critically, I agree from a psychodynamic perspective that the 
therapist's experiential state is, in part, indicative of what is going on in the patient but is 
not necessarily a consequence of projective identification. In my own clinical practice I 
recall a session when I had an impulse to ciy in response to a client's expression of 
sadness. I believe empathic resonance and understanding were achieved responsively in 
relation to one another and that my empathic understanding of the client did not 
necessarily involve the client's projections "into" and interactional pressures on to me.
This conceptualisation of empathy always involving projective identification fits with the 
traditional view of empathy as one separate self trying to infer or intuit itself across the 
gulf separating it from another. Highlighted are wider concerns and dilemmas posed by 
traditional psychoanalytic uses of empathy. The therapist may either intentionally or 
unintentionally impose their theory upon the client's situation. There is a skewed power 
imbalance in favour of the therapist because in classical analysis, the therapist, via their 
detached, neutral therapeutic stance, withdraws themselves from genuine communication, 
whereas the client must probe the details of their psychological history ever more 
thoroughly and radically. As such, there is a monological character to psychoanalysis that 
is problematic. The flow of influence becomes unidirectional and therapeutic empathy 
runs the risk of becoming a form of mind reading or second-guessing the client's 
experience, that is, the therapist operates on the client rather than with the client in 
accordance with a predetermined theoretical model. Consequently, understanding the
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meaning of the client's experience is ascribed by the therapist rather than being jointly 
negotiated. Questions surrounding abuse of power in the therapeutic encounter arise 
forcibly as the concept of therapeutic empathy may become little more than an excuse 
and justification for forcing interpretations onto clients' experiences. Though this view 
and critique of traditional forms of psychoanalysis and its use of empathy may be 
oversimplified, there remains a cogent argument that embodied empathic attunement and 
its validation in the critical dialogical encounter with the client may actually be blocked.
Contrastingly, recent relational psychodynamic models are part of a wider shift in 
understanding that highlights empathy as a situated and process orientated activity. As 
such, therapeutic empathy becomes liberated from egocentric images of two separate 
individuals wherein one - the therapist - attempts to discern something happening within 
the skin of the other - the client. From the outset, static conceptions of empathy, and 
concerns over its "true" nature take a back seat in favour of working with and 
understanding it as an emergent property of the therapeutic relationship.
I have found this stance honours the multi-dimensional nature of the construct, which in 
turn opens up greater space for shared or jointly negotiated meaning between therapist 
and client. One implication of such a move is that power in the therapeutic encounter is 
more evenly distributed and the therapeutic relationship becomes a collaborative and co- 
constructive process. Empathy is no longer a state in which I as the therapist can simply 
‘be’, without reference to another person, namely, the client. It is not possible to actually 
experience what the client experiences, indeed the implication of actually experiencing 
what the client experiences may lead the therapist into the same debilitated state that led 
the client to seek help in the first place. In practice, I experience as I listen to, and interact 
with, the client and attempt to experientially respond in an empathically complementary 
manner. The empathic message that is conveyed is ‘I understand what you are feeling and 
experiencing’, not ‘I am feeling what you are feeling’. It appears to be the understanding 
component of the empathic process that carries the therapeutic gain. Thus, the two-way 
nature of therapeutic empathy is highlighted, as, what the therapist feels or understands is
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irrelevant unless the client also believes and feels his or herself to be understood. In my 
opinion, therapeutic empathy does not emerge or exist, and genuine therapeutic gain does 
not occur without such shared or joint understanding (see Shotter, 1993).
From this perspective, therapeutic empathy is intimately interwoven with action and 
communication, and serves as a basis for therapeutic action. I have found it important to 
actively attempt to pick up and resonate with the client's experience and to communicate 
such empathic involvement to the client. This involves a willingness to be open, 
vulnerable, and present to the client. As has been noted, the goal of therapy is not to 
experience, but to understand experience. Therefore it is meaning and not feeling per se 
that fuels understanding. Such interpersonal understanding that characterizes therapeutic 
empathy more widely emerges when the therapist works with attitudes of self­
criticalness, curiosity, and respectful openness towards their lived encounters with 
clients. In practice I have found that this requires the full dialogic collaboration of 
therapist and client and moves both towards the heightened awareness of previously 
unconscious, unspoken or unconceptualised meaning. The increased sense of reflexivity 
that is produced in the client can only be achieved when the therapist is also reflexively 
aware and concerned. As such, therapeutic empathy and the interpersonal understanding 
that it fosters, functions as an integral part of a collaborative and cooperative relationship. 
It is crucial because it is the process by which the therapist and client dialogue, co- 
discover, and co-create new meaning. Viewed in this respect therapeutic empathy is seen 
as the gradual flow of emergent dialogical understanding between therapist and client. 
Importantly, this includes a contextual appreciation of how an individual client's lived 
experiences relate to the particular socio-cultural, political and interpersonal contexts in 
which they are embedded and evolve as human beings.
The aforementioned contexts, in which both participants are embedded, draw our 
attention to the necessarily perspectival nature of both therapist and client's pre­
understandings and knowledge. It is through the ongoing dialogical journey that both 
come to understand one another. The therapist, that is seriously trying to understand, is
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required to attempt a critical penetration of their own pre-understanding, whilst 
simultaneously remaining open to the understandings of the client. When a therapist 
makes an interpretation they are simultaneously engaging in an interpersonal exchange 
with the client. A "correct" interpretation (i.e., one that is meaningful for the client) 
therefore implies a deep and empathic form of relatedness. Thus, meaningful 
interpretation and deep relationship imply one another. Genuine therapeutic empathy and 
the interpersonal or joint understanding (Shorter, 1993) that it creates can thus be equated 
with dialogical consensus between both participants. The "truth" and subsequent 
• agreement or disagreement of any interpretive act is necessarily perspectival and subject 
to ongoing revision within the therapeutic relationship. Acknowledging and becoming 
aware of the perspectival nature of participants' understandings in the psychotherapeutic 
encounter through critical dialogue is a primary function of therapeutic empathy. 
Conceived of this way the analytic situation becomes a dynamic process of co­
exploration, constant checking and re-checking, which can allow both therapist and client 
to sharpen understanding and converge towards co-constructed new meanings.
Conclusion
Based upon recent developments with the psychodynamic tradition and my own clinical 
experience an account has been forwarded that has argued for understanding 
psychotherapeutic empathy as something that occurs relationally between people, and 
that the therapeutic relationship is the therapy, forming a kind of gestalt that includes 
both parties involved. Furthermore, attending to the distinction and close connection 
between experiencing and understanding at the level of theory and practice, relationally 
orientated psychodynamic models appear congruent with Bohart and Greenberg (1997) 
who identify the most defining feature of empathic understanding in psychotherapy as the 
ability to somehow step outside of one's usual way of perceiving and comprehending, 
combined with the ability of somehow adopting something of the role of the other, in 
further combination with a heightened understanding of the larger contexts within which 
all of this takes place.
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More generally, this shift in focus, from the intrapsychic towards the interpersonal realm, 
fits with recent postmodern thought, which emphasises the primacy of relatedness and the 
multiplicity of different ways humans can construct reality (Mahoney, 1991). Because 
there is no one "objective reality", the therapist's ability to empathise becomes 
particularly important. If reality is multiple and socially constructed then empathy 
becomes the fundamental way of knowing across diverse personal realities.
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In cognitive therapy, how would a therapist understand and work with difficulties 
arising in the therapeutic relationship?
Illustrate with examples from own clinical practice.
Introduction
The principal aim of this paper is to present an informed (albeit selective and interested) 
account of how a therapist would understand and work with difficulties arising in the 
therapeutic relationship whilst conducting cognitive therapy. In order to do this, the paper 
starts by providing a brief excursion through historical and conceptual factors pertinent to 
the areas of cognitive therapy and the therapeutic relationship per se. The intention is to 
broadly situate the areas under consideration in order to elaborate a more detailed account 
of the importance and interdependence of the therapeutic relationship and cognitive 
therapy. This will be achieved through reflection upon relevant literature and reference to 
my own clinical practice and development as a trainee counselling psychologist, currently 
practising from a cognitive perspective. More specifically, how I have conceptualised and 
worked with (utilised) difficulties in the therapeutic relationship. Due to space limitations 
the focus is narrowed to one particular type of 'difficulty' frequently arising in the 
therapeutic relationship, namely, 'ruptures' in the alliance. An argument is forwarded that 
stresses the centrality of the therapeutic relationship as the primary medium through 
which the techniques of cognitive therapy gain maximum impact, thus highlighting the 
therapeutic relationship as a potent site and vehicle for therapeutic change.
Cognitive therapy
Disenchantment with the behavioural tradition is a salient factor that gave rise to 
cognitive therapy in the late 1960's. Aaron T. Beck, who is often regarded as its 
originator, developed cognitive therapy as a relatively short-term and structured
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psychotherapy for depression, which explicitly focused on modifying 'patient's' current 
dysfunctional thoughts and behaviours (Beck, 1967). At the present moment in time it 
features firmly as a mainstream psychotherapeutic model, which according to Smith 
(1982) is widely accepted as one of the most popular intervention formats amongst 
clinical practitioners. In western culture the present socio-political climate is increasingly 
infused by the ideology of professionalisation (House, 1999), which emphasises a 
scientific 'treatment' mentality and being accountable in terms of demonstrating outcomes 
and effectiveness. As such, it is not surprising that the cognitive therapy model, with a 
strong empirical emphasis that lends itself to quantification through its manualised - 
protocol based approach, has become the psychological treatment of choice for many 
Axis I conditions (Roth & Fonagy, 1996).
The theoiy, practice and focus of cognitive therapy have evolved during the years since 
its inception with some theorists (e.g. Perris, 2000; Vallis, 1998) making a distinction 
between first and second-generation approaches. First generation or "traditional" 
approaches are said to be characterised by a focus on 'surface' level structures (e.g. 
automatic thoughts and basic assumptions) and work therapeutically at the level of 
content and symptomology. Contrastingly, more recent second-generation approaches 
emphasise 'schemas' or core beliefs with the therapeutic focus being geared towards 
'deeper' levels of cognition. The development of schema-focused approaches (e.g. 
Padesky, 1994; Young, 1994) partially arose in response to the difficulties encountered in 
working with people experiencing Axis II disorders, i.e., complex personality disorders. 
In spite of there being little evidence to suggest that schema focused work is more 
effective than non-schema focused work, as Jacobson and Gortner (2000) contend, its 
popularity has grown to the point that it is frequently thought of synonymously with 
cognitive therapy and it is increasingly employed in work with Axis I disorders such as 
anxiety and depression.
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In the beginning is the relation. 
Martin Buber
Clarkson (1996) reviews five different kinds of therapeutic relationship of possible 
benefit to the psychotherapeutic venture. These are, the working alliance, the 
transferential / counter-transferential relationship, the reparative / developmentally 
needed relationship, the I-Thou relationship and the transpersonal relationship. Though it 
is not within the scope of this paper to individually review each type of relationship, 
where relevant, elements of these types of relationships will be highlighted when 
considering the therapeutic relationship specifically in relation to cognitive therapy. Of 
key importance at the present moment is that Clarkson's (1996) paper draws our attention 
to the fact that the therapeutic relationship has repeatedly emerged from research as a 
significant factor in therapy. For example, she cites Frank (1979) and Hynan (1981) as 
two researchers, amongst many, who found that the relationship between the client and 
therapist is repeatedly more closely related to outcome than whatever technique has been 
used. As such, it is empirically and anecdotally justified to say that there is somewhat of a 
consensus regarding the crucial importance of the therapeutic relationship, which is 
thought to be common across different types of therapy. From Clarkson's (1996) 
observation that "relationship is the first condition of being human" (p.29) to Kahn's 
(1991) radical statement "the relationship is the therapy" (p.l), the importance of the 
therapeutic relationship cannot be overemphasised.
Cognitive therapy and the therapeutic relationship
Traditionally, it has been within the domain of psychoanalytic theory and practice that the 
transformative potential of the therapeutic relationship has been paid most attention - 
only recently gaining a foothold in the cognitive literature (Jacobson, 1989). However, 
more recently, Clark (1995) notes that a major criticism levelled towards cognitive 
therapy is that, comparatively, the role of the therapeutic relationship in cognitive therapy 
remains poorly defined and researched. Safran and Segal's (1990) stark conclusion is that
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the lack of focus on the therapeutic relationship in cognitive therapy "has had a seriously 
detrimental impact on practice". Historically speaking, it appears that such criticism is 
largely directed towards first generation approaches of cognitive therapy, which were 
goal orientated and consequently paid little attention to the therapeutic alliance. A central 
feature of what has been written about the therapeutic relationship in cognitive therapy 
has been its conceptualisation of therapy as a process of social influence. Traditionally 
such a stance has emphasised the psychology of the client - a "one-person psychology" 
(Kahn, 1996), that is to say, what occurs within the client has been privileged over what 
occurs between the client and therapist.
Whilst not focussing in great detail on the role of the therapeutic relationship in cognitive 
therapy, first generation approaches, such as the one developed by Beck et al (1979), do 
nonetheless stress the importance of "collaborative empiricism", i.e. the requirement of 
therapists to develop collaborative relationships with clients in the spirit of investigation 
in order to test their perceptions and cognitions against 'reality'. Clients are encouraged to 
treat their perceptions as hypotheses, which should be confirmed or disconfirmed in 
accordance with relevant evidence. Broadly speaking, a good therapeutic relationship is 
conceptualised as necessary but not sufficient for good outcome in cognitive therapy. The 
nature or quality of the therapeutic relationship is deemed important, but not central, to 
the treatment or its outcome (Beck et al., 1979). In summary, traditional cognitive 
approaches tend to view the therapeutic relationship as something that is a prerequisite 
for the change process, rather than an integral part of it (Safran & Segal, 1996).
The arrival of second-generation schema-based approaches heralded greater emphasis 
being placed on the therapeutic relationship as an active mediator of change. Given the 
significance placed on clients' past developmental experiences, the necessity for 
therapists to foster a "secure base" (Bowlby, 1988), in the context of the therapeutic 
alliance, has increasingly been emphasised. A prominent theme in recent years has been 
the interest in the therapeutic relationship as an arena in its own right for the exploration 
and modification of client's behaviours and beliefs. Such developments and interest into
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relational intelligibilities possibly parallels wider historical and cultural transformations 
that have seen a tectonic shift from cultural modernism to postmodern culture (see 
Gergen, 1994, 1999; Holzman, 1999; Kvale, 1992) Notions such as 'rationality', 
'objectivity', 'expertise' and the 'self-contained individual' - central to modernist models of 
therapy, such as traditional cognitive therapy, have been challenged by social 
constructionist scholars (e.g. Burr & Butt, 2000; McNamee & Gergen, 1992) and the 
emergence of systemic, narrative and constructionist modes of therapy. These 
developments have seen the concern shift from what occurs within the client (one-person 
psychology) to an emphasis on what occurs between people (therapist and client), an 
intersubjective psychology where the therapist's perspective is acknowledged to impact 
on the client's experience of therapy (Strawbridge, 1992; Wilkinson et al., 1997).
In the domain of cognitive therapy, the work of Safran and Segal (1990) provides one 
example of an increased focus on the role of interpersonal context and environmental 
variables in the formation and maintenance of emotional disorders. They utilise elements 
of interpersonal theory (e.g. Sullivan, 1953) in order to move towards a cognitive- 
interpersonal perspective on how change takes place in therapy, thereby bypassing the 
debate over cognitive versus interpersonal factors. Their stance eschews theoretical 
separation of these two elements preferring to view them as completely interdependent. 
At the heart of their work lies the notion of the interpersonal schema, which is defined by 
Safran (1990) as "a generic cognitive representation of interpersonal events" (p.89). 
Interpersonal exchanges are considered to be governed by Kiesler's (1982) principle of 
"complementarity". That is, people respond accordingly to other's behaviour and are 
"pulled" to act in a complementary manner. For example, when faced by an others 
hostility or dominance, the interpersonal pull is to act in a submissive fashion. Such 
interpersonal relations are believed to operate in a way that confirms and reinforces 
already constituted schemas.
Safran and Segal's (1990) work is particularly relevant in relation to the present paper for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, their work explicitly views the therapeutic relationship as
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central to effective and lasting change. Secondly, in noting the impossibility of the 
therapist capturing a 'neutral' or 'objective' position they emphasise a social 
constructionist, rather than realist, epistemology. What takes place in therapy thus comes 
to be understood in terms of the contributions of both therapist and client with therapeutic 
change taking place through the dialectical engagement between the two. Thirdly, they 
emphasise, in relation to the client, the need for the therapist to track changes in their own 
inner experience in order to gain important clues and insights into the client's 
phenomenological experience. By incorporating elements of interpersonal theory Safran 
and Segal (1990) provoke an expansion of traditional cognitive therapy towards a two- 
person psychology. Such an emphasis promotes more egalitarian or mutual relationships 
as attempts are made to understand clients' psychological distress within the context of 
the therapeutic relationship. This emphasis on the therapeutic relationship, coupled with 
its conceptual integration of cognitive and interpersonal theory, makes it highly 
consistent with the fundamental principles and integrationist focus evident in counselling 
psychology. As such, the cognitive-interpersonal perspective is used as a conceptual 
framework for reflecting upon how the therapist understands and works with difficulties 
arising in the therapeutic relationship.
Difficulties arising in the therapeutic relationship
For the present purposes, the working alliance is viewed as the client's willingness to 
engage in a therapeutic relationship, whereas the therapeutic alliance denotes the 
continually fluctuating quality of the therapeutic relationship. The primary difficulty to be 
addressed in this paper concerns those moments when ruptures occur in the therapeutic 
relationship. Ranging from straightforward misunderstandings to more complex or 
chronic problems, ruptures signal the point in the interaction between the therapist and 
client when the quality of the alliance becomes strained or impaired (Safran & Segal, 
1990).
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An example of a rupture in the therapeutic alliance occurred with Mrs Y a 53-year-old 
woman who presented with chronic anxiety. From the assessment session I had made the 
initial tentative formulation that her core schema was possibly "I'm unlovable" and that 
one of her central (tacit) assumptions was that she needed to subjugate her own needs in 
the service of others in order to maintain interpersonal relatedness, i.e., to ward off the 
possibility of being rejected. Our previous sessions centred on her sense of frustration 
that "people walk all over me", continually feeling responsible for other's happiness and 
that nobody is on her side. In each session Mrs Y appeared anxious speaking rapidly and 
at great length in a high pitched nasally tone of voice. Her general style gave the 
impression of desperation and an intense yearning to be liked. I found it difficult to get a 
word in edgeways and Mrs Y appeared to either dismiss what I had to say or immediately 
start talking over me. I had tried with limited success to empathise with Mrs Y's feelings 
and we had made little progress in terms of looking at the connection between her 
thoughts and feelings. I had felt confused and disappointed that we were unable to 
establish a focus for our sessions. My interventions became increasingly challenging. I 
was aware that in spite of the basic rapport we had established and the client's willingness 
to engage in a therapeutic relationship that the quality of the alliance had become 
increasingly strained. The rupture became explicit and the process of its resolution was 
instigated during our sixth session together. Mrs Y became increasingly irate as I 
challenged (tentatively) the extent to which she had to take responsibility for looking 
after her parents (though elderly they were fit and well). Her voice became louder and 
faster as she gave a list of reasons why she had to do so and demanded an explanation of 
how I could question her before falling silent. In the following moments of silence as I 
tried to compose myself and work out how best to respond I noticed that Mrs Y appeared 
to have visibly shrunken, her anger seemed to have evaporated and she looked upset and 
remorseful. As I asked her what her experience was at the present moment she replied 
that she felt criticised and misunderstood.
This information relating directly to the therapeutic relationship and our interaction was 
of great significance. Following this exchange I was able to conceptualise the rupture in a
number of ways. It alerted me to the fact that my interventions had been theory rather 
than experience driven. As such I had been 'hooked' by Mrs Y's interpersonal pull and 
was participating unwittingly in the interaction (Safran & Segal, 1996). The rupture 
provided an opportunity for me to re-establish the stance of participant-observer, become 
aware of my own feelings and the responses (action tendencies) Mrs Y elicited in me. 
This in turn enabled me to generate hypotheses about the kinds of potential responses she 
might evoke in other people. Having not successfully 'unhooked' from Mrs Y's 
interpersonal pull up until this point I had some theoretical understanding of the cognitive 
process she was engaging in, thus my interventions were based in logical reasoning and 
had failed to connect in an emotionally grounded and alive way that gave her a tangible 
experience of observing her own constructive and interpretive processes. During the 
sessions it had perhaps been easier for me to do this (focus on her cognitions in isolation) 
rather than acknowledge the feelings of anger and frustration that had been evoked in me. 
Having not 'unhooked' I had unwittingly responded in a complementary manner i.e. my 
challenging may have come across as hostile and critical leading her to feel "walked 
over" by me. This may have served to confirm and reinforce her core belief that she is 
unlovable and that if she doesn’t subjugate her own needs to others she will be rejected.
This rupture in the therapeutic relationship was beneficial on several counts in terms of 
subsequent progress made. Firstly it provided a window into Mrs Y's subjective world 
and role-relationship model. This created an emotionally live opportunity for me to 
further understand her particular sensitivities and interpersonal schema. Having gained a 
better conceptual understanding of how we were interacting and the feelings being 
invoked in me, I was able to work with this by meta-communicating in a tentative and 
exploratory manner about the dysfunctional interactional cycle we had become locked in. 
The aim was to help Mrs Y become more aware of the impact she has on others and what 
she is contributing to our interaction. As I spoke to Mrs Y in a non-judgemental way she 
appeared to become more able to explore her internal experience in a more 
psychologically engaged way. This shift seemed to lead to an improvement in the 
therapeutic alliance. I was able to respond more openly and empathically and we were
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able to collaborate in establishing a clearer focus for the therapy. We agreed to. look at 
her automatic thoughts, assumptions, emotional responses and underlying beliefs in the 
context of the therapy and her everyday relationships. Central to the rupture and 
subsequent process of repair seemed to be that we had entered into more of an I-Thou 
relationship (Buber, 1923/1970). My initial over-reliance on theory, technique and lack of 
attention to my own feelings and responses had momentarily blinded me to what was 
happening in the moment for Mrs Y in the context of the therapeutic relationship. What 
had seemed clinically sterile had taken on a more authentic, emotionally alive and 
genuinely collaborative quality bom out of our mutual relationship.
My own experience of trying to make sense of, and work with, difficulties arising in the 
therapeutic relationship is aligned with Safran and Segal's (1996) view that ruptures can 
usefully be viewed as opportunities rather than as something to be avoided. Such 
experiences also warrant the conclusion that the therapeutic relationship provides the 
primary means for attaining effective change. One also becomes aware that the technical 
interventions possible when working from a cognitive therapy perspective have an impact 
on the therapeutic alliance and relationship. Emphasising the context of, and working 
with, the therapeutic relationship appears to ensure that therapy does not become overly 
mechanistic as the human nature of the therapeutic encounter and process of change is 
acknowledged. This leads to a position where the utility of any particular intervention 
comes to be judged in terms of its relational impact and the meaning it generates for the 
client. On a final (personal) note, as a trainee counselling psychologist the therapeutic 
relationship has also provided an overarching context for learning about the practice for 
cognitive therapy. 1 have found it to be within the situated nature of therapeutic practice 
i.e. within the context of the therapeutic relationship, that conceptual understanding of the 
principles and techniques of cognitive therapy gain their meaning.
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The Therapeutic Relationship: An Integrative Aid.
Introduction
One of the defining features of psychology and the psychotherapeutic professions since 
their inception has been conflict between competing schools and their associated views 
and practices. Traditionally characterised by rhetorical exercises in one-upmanship, 
disparate psychotherapeutic schools and models have emphasised their differences in the 
attempt to demonstrate why their particular approach is 'better' than others (Gergen, 
2000). Such conflict between approaches is evident within the domain of counselling 
psychology, which owes much of its theoretical development (as reflected in practice) to 
three contradictory schools of thought beginning in the early 20th century, namely, the 
psychodynamic, behaviourist (cognitive-behavioural) and the humanistic / existential- 
phenomenological traditions (Clarkson, 1996). Nonetheless, as evidenced by the 
emergence of integrationist and eclectic views in the 1980's (Beutler, Harwood & 
Caldwell, 2001), there appears to be increasing convergence among such contrasting 
therapeutic schools and broad recognition of at least one fundamental way in which 
differing schools and models are similar.
The aim of this paper is two-fold. Firstly, a brief discursive travelogue is forwarded, 
locating the integrationist movement as a response to changes and development within 
the psychotherapeutic professions as well as to broader transformations taking place at 
cultural levels. Secondly, given that it can be cogently argued that the 'integration' or 
synthesis of different approaches at the level of practice is an individual endeavour (see 
Clarkson, 1996; Horton, 2000; Skovholt & Ronnestad, 1995), a brief reflective account of 
what has been of assistance in my own efforts to work integratively as a trainee 
counselling psychologist is outlined. In order to position myself responsively in relation 
to the increasing cross fertilisation between different orientations, the therapeutic 
relationship is utilised as a framework for considering integration at a theoretical level 
given that it can be viewed as a common denominator bridging orientations. The view of 
human meaning being constituted through relationships also fits my own view of the
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therapeutic enterprise and epistemological commitments. As such, the therapeutic 
relationship is also used as an aid to personal integration. Clarkson's (1995) 'five 
relationship' model provides a pre-existing conceptual resource and anchor point for the 
present account.
Focusing on the therapeutic relationship and the notion of integration appears particularly 
germane to the field of counselling psychology on two counts. Firstly, the therapeutic 
relationship pulses at the heart of counselling psychology practice. Secondly, the need to 
acknowledge and respect differences is recognised in the requirements of The British 
Psychological Society - counselling psychology's professional body. As such, counselling 
psychology training is not exclusionary; rather it incorporates awareness of a broad range 
of orientations and requires a working knowledge of at least two different models, or 
approaches to therapy, from which trainees are encouraged to develop their own 'unique' 
approach or personal philosophy of practice.
Whilst the primary thrust of this paper is to consider the therapeutic relationship as a 
potent vehicle for integration within and between different models of therapy, it is 
recognised that such analysis cannot stand independent of its context of production. As 
such, the movement towards integration, and the focus on relationship, can be viewed as 
reflecting and being embedded within changes related to large-scale cultural process, 
which are linked to living in late modem or post-modern society.
Integration - making sense of multiplicity
Perhaps the most significant impetus for interest in psychotherapy integration flows from 
the conclusion in a growing body of research that no single school of psychotherapy is 
able to demonstrate consistent superiority over the others (e.g. Seligman, 1995). 
Additionally, the sheer volume of different theories and approaches available for 
therapeutic consumption has led to the conclusion that there is no single 'truth' about 
psychological distress and how to treat it. Whilst additional mutually reinforcing factors
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have been identified as fostering the development of integration (see Norcross & 
Goldfried, 1992) and four systematic views (common factors approach, theoretical 
integrationism, technical eclecticism and strategic eclecticism) have been identified 
within the integrationist movement, as evident in contemporaiy psychotherapeutic 
practice (Beutler et al., 2001). This paper views psychotherapy integration as a 'work in 
progress' rather than an end product or fixed position. From this perspective Clarkson 
(1996), argues that 'it is likely that any good, competent or growing counselling 
psychologist is always integrating themselves whether between or within 'schools’, their 
professional and life experiences or between themselves and the learning they forge in 
the relationship with their clients' (p.260). In a claim somewhat akin to the literary notion 
of 'intertextuality' (the idea that an individual text only gains its meaning in relation to 
other texts), Clarkson (1996) also notes that the integration of therapies is far from being 
a new phenomenon; rather analysis of any particular psychology inevitably reveals some 
borrowed theory, concept or techniques from another model or discipline.
Clearly, from this standpoint psychotherapy integration appears somewhat inimical to 
finite definitions or descriptions, as it takes on different meanings depending on its 
context of usage at various points in history. However, what does seem to be clear is that, 
in spite of the confusion surrounding the different terms used (often interchangeably), 
'integration' is a growing tendency both within and between psychological schools. For 
example, research conducted by Dryden and Norcross (1990) demonstrates that more and 
more practitioners are explicitly identifying with integrative practices and apply brand- 
name psychotherapies in a flexible fashion. More specifically in Britain, a recent survey 
conducted by Hollanders and McLeod (1999) indicated that 87% of the counsellors and 
therapists interviewed regarded their practice as based on a combination of methods and 
approaches, i.e. as being integrative or eclectic, rather than being grounded in a single 
'pure' model. It seems that the use of integrative and eclectic approaches at a grass roots 
level, i.e. the actual situated behaviours of therapists, more accurately reflects a post­
modern epistemology of practice (see Polkinghome, 1992) thus strengthening claims for 
a more flexible, practice-led approach to theorising. Such a position sits favourably with
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Samuels' (1989) contention that psychotherapeutic pluralism compliments the 
psychological diversity of human beings.
Arguably as the various psychotherapeutic orientations have developed across time, there 
has been a substantial shift away from the intra-psychic realm toward the interpersonal 
domain. It is this movement towards understanding human distress and meaning as a 
product of relationship where contrasting schools and models begin to converge. More 
specifically, the therapeutic relationship has become a common ground for different 
perspectives from which mutual acceptance, cross fertilisation and integration have 
begun to occur. This shift has been accelerated by research, which indicates that it is the 
relationship between therapist and client, more than any other factor that determines the 
effectiveness of psychological therapy (e.g. Frank, 1979; Hynan, 1981; O'Malley et al., 
1983; Orlinsky et al., 1994).
On the road to relationship
It is not within the scope of this paper to review in detail how the therapeutic relationship 
is conceptualised and used by the major therapeutic orientations, however, a brief review 
illustrates the increasing emphasis being placed on relationship.
Within the theory of psychoanalysis there has been a clear move away from the 
hegemony of a 'one-person' psychology to a 'two-person' psychology. This is evident, for 
example, in the development of object relational models (e.g. Greenberg & Mitchell, 
1983) and the intersubjective approach (Stolorow et al., 1987). The particular kind of 
therapeutic relationship advocated, is the transference relationship. What occurs between 
the therapist and client is viewed as containing information about the client's normal 
ways of relating in their current life, and as bearing clues about the origins of such 
patterns of relating.
Existential-humanistic thinking (e.g. Buber, 1970; Rogers, 1957) has long emphasised the 
centrality of relationship. The therapeutic relationship is often referred to as the person-
51
to-person or I-Thou relationship and is characterised by 'being with' rather than 'doing to' 
the client. Importantly, Rogers' (1957) formulation of the hypothesis that there are certain 
necessary and sufficient conditions (genuineness, empathy, and unconditional positive 
regard) for therapeutic change, can be viewed as a statement that reaches beyond the 
confines of client-centred therapy. As Bozarth (1997) contends, Rogers' (1957) statement 
is an integrative one, 'referring to conditions which are qualities for all therapists in all 
therapies and for all helpers in all situations...' (p. 17).
Cognitive-behavioural therapy has also taken significant strides towards the interpersonal 
domain. Though previously conceptualising a good therapeutic relationship as necessary 
but not sufficient for a positive therapeutic outcome, contemporary developments have 
seen interest develop in the therapeutic relationship as an arena in its own right for the 
exploration and modification of clients' behaviours and beliefs. For example, Sanders and 
Wills (1999) have pointed out that cognitive therapists, such as Safran and Segal (1990) 
and Young (1994), have developed cognitive interpersonal models of therapeutic 
processes, which focus on 'how to use the relationship as an active ingredient of therapy'
(p. 120).
Encounters of a relational kind
My own experience of the clinical situation is that theory rarely translates neatly into 
practice. I have found that unless the relationship between the client and myself is 
attended to then the rest of the therapeutic work struggles to get off the ground. 
Furthermore, it is within situated practice that cross fertilisation seems to occur in a 
relatively fluid manner. Being relationally responsive within a context of mutuality and 
negotiation has made it possible to move between 'being' and more active 'doing' with 
clients. For example, whilst working with a client who was experiencing chronic anxiety 
from a cognitive-behavioural perspective, it was possible to move between different types 
of therapeutic relationship within the course of therapy. Utilising Rogers' (1957) core 
conditions at the start of therapy created an atmosphere of trust and a sense of genuine
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contact and recognition between the two of us. This sense of togetherness fostered hope 
and a shared appreciation and understanding of the meaning of anxiety to the client. As 
the therapeutic dialogue developed, the client increasingly spoke of both past and present 
interpersonal topics. Awareness of the transference relationship enabled interventions, 
such as interpretations, questions and reflections more typically associated with 
exploratory psychodynamic work, to be incorporated into the sessions. Finally, the 
collaborative nature of the therapeutic relationship also made it possible to negotiate 
space for active 'doing' where more manualised cognitive interventions were carried out 
in relation to the client's presenting difficulty.
This brief illustration highlights how the therapeutic relationship can promote an 
integrative posture and allow flexible use of theoretical knowledge and technical skills. A 
key feature of this integrative process has been developing an ability to reflect in action 
as well as on action (Schon, 1983).
Conclusion
By taking into account that the current cultural reality is multiple and diverse, it seems 
possible that integration (conceived of in its broadest terms) is able to avoid presenting 
itself as an absolute or superordinate theory. The argument that 'knowledge' and human 
meaning is a product of relationship, constituted through discourse and the daily 
interactions between people in the course of social life (Burr, 1995) has had a significant 
impact on the field of therapy (see McNamee & Gergen, 1992). The consciousness of 
construction and appreciation of the multiple 'truths' ushered in by social constructionist 
dialogues, provides a useful lens through which to view the existence of so many 
therapeutic approaches, i.e. as paralleling the pluralism observable in various social and 
cultural movements and the value of difference, particularly as recognised in post-modern 
texts (Feltham, 2000). Gergen (2000) has noted that the move towards pluralism and 
collaboration takes us away from a logic of separate and demarcated domains and 
promotes increased enthusiasm for a both *7 and position wherein 'therapists will
increasingly feel free to create unique confluences, practices that combine and integrate 
elements that have traditionally been separate1 (p.368).
The therapeutic relationship has been presented as one possible means to integration 
within a plurality. As the common thread running across different therapeutic 
orientations, the therapeutic relationship stands out as a distinct and durable feature of the 
process. As such, it may go some way towards fulfilling Norcross and Newman's (1992) 
hope that the integration movement will 'engender an open system of informed pluralism, 
deepening rapprochement, and empirically grounded practice' (p.32).
54
References
Beutler, L.E., Harwood, T.M. & Caldwell, R. (2001). Cognitive-behavioural therapy and 
psychotherapy integration. In. E. Dobson (Ed.), Handbook o f cognitive and behavioural 
therapies. London: Guildford Press.
Bozarth, J.D. (1997). The person centred approach. In C. Feltham (Ed.), Which 
psychotherapy? London: Sage.
Buber, M. (1970). I  and thou. New York: Scribner's.
Burr, V. (1995). An introduction to social constructionism. London: Routledge.
Clarkson, P. (1995). The therapeutic relationship. London: Whurr.
Clarkson, P. (1996). The eclectic and integrative paradigm: Between the scylla of 
confluence and the chaiybdis of confusion. In. R. Woolfe & W. Dryden (Eds.), 
Handbook o f counselling psychology. London: Sage.
Dryden, W. & Norcross, J.C. (Eds.), (1990). Eclecticism and integration in counselling 
and psychotherapy. Loughton, Essex: Gale Centre.
Feltham, C. (2000). Proliferation of approaches. In C. Feltham & I. Horton (Eds.), 
Handbook o f counselling and psychotherapy. London: Sage.
Frank, J.D. (1979). The present status of outcome studies. Journal o f  Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 47, 310-16.
Gergen, K.J. (2000). The coming of creative confluence. Psychotherapy, 37(4), 364-369.
55
Greenberg, J. & Mitchell, S. (1983). Object relations in psychoanalytic theory.
Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.
Horton, I. (2000). Principles and practice of personal integration. In S. Palmer &
R. Woolfe (Eds.), Eclectic and integrative counselling and psychotherapy. London: Sage.
Hollanders, H. & McLeod, J. (1999). Theoretical orientation and reported practice: A 
survey of eclecticism among counsellors in Britain. British Journal o f Guidance and 
Counselling, 27(3), 405-414.
Hynan, M.T. (1981). On the advantages of assuming that the techniques of psychotherapy 
are ineffective. Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice, 18, 81 -4.
McNamee, S. & Gergen, K.J. (1992). Therapy as social construction. London: Sage.
Norcross, J.C. & Goldfried, M.R. (1992). Handbook o f psychotherapy integration.
New York: Basic Books.
Norcross, J.C. & Newman, C.F. (1992). Psychotherapy integration: Setting the context. 
In J.C. Norcross & M.R. Goldfried (Eds.), Handbook o f  psychotherapy integration. New 
York: Basic Books.
O'Malley, S. S., Suh, C. S. & Strupp, H.H. (1983). The Vanderbilt psychotherapy process 
scale: A report on the scale development and a process outcome study. Journal o f  
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 51, 581-6.
Orlinsky, D.E., Grawe, K & Parks, B.K. (1994). Process and outcome in psychotherapy- 
noch einmal. In A.E. Bergin and S.L. Garfield (Eds.), Handbook o f psychotherapy and 
behaviour change (2nd edn., pp. 270-376). New York: Wiley.
56
Polkinghome, D.E. (1992). Postmodern epistemology of practice, In S. Kvale (Ed.), 
Psychology and postmodernism. London: Sage.
Rogers, C.R. (1957). The necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic personality 
change. Journal o f Consulting Psychology, 21, 95-103.
Samuels, A. (1989). The plural psyche: Personality, morality and the father. London: 
Routledge.
Safran, J.D. & Segal, Z. (1990). Interpersonal process in cognitive therapy. New York: 
Basic Books.
Sanders, D. & Wills, F. (1999). The therapeutic relationship in cognitive therapy. In C. 
Feltham (Ed.), Understanding the counselling relationship. London: Sage.
Schon, D. (1983). The reflective practitioner: How professionals think in action. London: 
Maurice Temple Smith.
Skovholt, T. M. & Ronnestad, M. H. (1995). The evolving professional self. Chichester: 
Wiley.
Stolorow, R.D., Brandchaft, B. & Atwood, G.E. (1987). Psychoanalytic treatment: An 
intersubjective approach. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Analytic Press.
Young, J.E. (1994). Cognitive therapy fo r personality disorders: A schema focused  
approach. Sarasota: Professional Resource Press.
57
THERAPEUTIC PRACTICE DOSSIER
Introduction
The therapeutic practice dossier provides a context to my therapeutic practice and 
experience throughout the course. It contains brief descriptions of each of my placements 
including the client populations that I worked with. It also includes the 'Final Clinical 
Paper', which provides an account of some of the factors that I consider influential in the 
evolution of my own therapeutic style and approach towards clinical practice.
As specified in the introduction to the portfolio, all potentially identifying information 
related to clients, including details about placements and supervisors, have been changed 
or omitted in order to maintain confidentiality;
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First-year Clinical Placement: An Employee Assistance Program.
January 2001 - August 2001
My first year placement was within an Employee Assistance Program (EAP), which 
operated as part of a major transportation company's occupational health department 
situated in the South East of England. The EAP provided short-term (typically six 
sessions) psychological assistance and support to employees (clients) who had either 
sought assistance for themselves, or who had been referred to the program via their 
manager and/or the occupational health department's medical doctors. The program was 
available to all employees within the company; however, internal auditing indicated that 
it was primarily used by "ground level" workers rather than people employed in 
managerial or senior positions.
The EAP was managed by a senior counsellor and included a clinical psychologist, six 
therapists/counsellors (both full and part time) working from a variety of theoretical 
orientations, several trainees on placement and a research psychologist. The client group 
attending the program was predominantly male, and varied in terms of age and ethnicity. 
Generally, presenting difficulties were of low to moderate severity and related to issues 
such as, anxiety, depression, relationship difficulties and stress arising from work based 
conflicts. Additionally, a smaller percentage of employees had been involved in work 
based traumatic incidents or had drug/alcohol related problems. Members of the team 
who specialised in trauma or substance misuse attended to these clients wherein long­
term individual and group work was carried out.
My primary responsibilities were to conduct short-term individual therapy sessions with 
selected clients from the waiting list, and to utilise weekly individual supervisoiy 
sessions (primarily influenced by humanist, solution-focused and psychodynamic 
models).
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Second-year Clinical Placements: NHS Primary Care - G.P. Surgery
September 2001 - February 2002
This placement was within a primary care setting (G.P. surgeiy) situated in the South 
East of England. The service provided psychological therapy to adults who had been 
primarily referred by their G.P.s. The client group was predominantly female and was 
varied in terms of age, ethnic background and socio-economic status. Clients presented 
with a variety of generic mental health issues, such as, depression, anxiety, interpersonal 
difficulties and issues arising from life events such as bereavement, divorce, redundancy 
etc. Following referral, clients were seen for assessment and then were placed on a 
waiting list for approximately 2-3 months. If clients were judged to have severe or / and 
enduring mental health issues they were referred on to the appropriate secondary 
psychiatric service for further assessment and treatment. Typically, clients whose 
difficulties were deemed appropriate to be managed within a primary care service were 
offered a contract of ten to fifteen fifty-minute sessions of psychological therapy that was 
psychodynamic in orientation.
My primary responsibility was to conduct individual psychodynamic therapy with 
selected clients from the waiting list, liase with clients' G.P.s or other health professionals 
were appropriate and utilise weekly supervision. This placement was terminated 
prematurely due to a break down in the supervisory relationship.
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NHS Primary Care Counselling Service 
Mental Health Unit
March 2002 - August 2002
The second placement was split between primary and secondary care settings. I spent one 
day a week working for a primary care counselling service that was part of an NHS trusts 
psychology department situated in the South East of England, which employed clinical 
and counselling psychologists, psychotherapists and counsellors within G.P. surgeries. 
The client group was primarily female and was varied in terms of age, ethnic background 
and socio-economic status. Clients were referred by their G.P.s. and presented with 
various mental health issues, for example, depression, anxiety, panic attacks, 
bereavement and interpersonal difficulties. My role was to offer short-term 
psychodynamic therapy (usually twelve weekly sessions) to clients on the waiting list.
The second day was spent working as part of a community mental health team for the 
same NHS trust. The mental health unit was comprised of psychiatrists, social workers, 
clinical psychologists, community psychiatric nurses and three part time 
psychotherapists. The client group was mixed in terms of gender, age, ethnicity, socio­
economic status, and presenting difficulties were usually of a more severe and enduring 
nature. The service provided both short-term cognitive-behavioural therapy and longer- 
term psychodynamic therapy. Given the short duration of this placement, I worked with 
individual clients who were selected on the basis that they could benefit from relatively 
short-term psychodynamic therapy that might lead on to a referral for either long-term 
individual or group therapy.
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Third-year Clinical Placements: An NHS Community Mental Health Team
October 2002 - August 2003
The first clinical placement during my third-year was within a Community Mental Health 
Team (CMHT) situated in a large NHS trust in the South East of England. The team was 
multidisciplinary in nature and was comprised of psychiatrists, approved social workers, 
clinical and counselling psychologists, community psychiatric nurses and support 
workers and had close links with a number of specialist services. The client population 
was mixed in terms of gender, ethnicity, age and socio-economic status. Presenting 
difficulties were usually of a severe and enduring nature, which included chronic 
depression (including suicidal behaviour), anxiety, panic disorder, social anxiety, 
phobias, posttraumatic disorders, eating disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorders, 
somatic complaints and personality disorders. The CMHT was medically led and clients' 
difficulties were managed through a combination of pharmacological and 
psychotherapeutic interventions.
Referrals to the psychology service came from G.P.s. and other members of the team 
involved in clients care. Individual cases were reviewed during weekly interdisciplinary 
meetings in order for service provision decisions to be made. Clients were usually seen 
for assessment within two weeks of referral and were then placed on a waiting list for 
about three months. My responsibilities were to deliver both short and long term 
cognitive-behavioural/integrative therapy to individual clients selected from the waiting 
list, attend monthly psychology meetings and weekly case discussion meetings, and 
utilise weekly individual supervision (integrative focus).
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Additional Final Year Placement 
An NHS Hospital Psychology Department
October 2003 - March 2004
In the final part of my training I undertook a clinical placement within a psychological 
treatment service that was attached to an NHS hospital in the South East of England, 
taking referrals from G.P. practices, the Community Mental health Team and specialist 
services within the Trust. The team was managed by a consultant clinical psychologist 
and included clinical and counselling psychologists (both full and part time), trainee 
clinical and counselling psychologists, and assistant psychologists. The team comprised 
both an adult mental health department and a family therapy service, some working in 
multi-disciplinary teams and others providing therapeutic services directly from the 
waiting list. There was a strong interest and emphasis on narrative and systemic 
approaches within the department, though individual practitioners worked according to a 
variety of psychotherapeutic models (e.g. psychodynamic, cognitive-behavioural, 
humanistic etc). The client group for psychological therapies was mixed in terms of 
gender and socio-economic status and generally had complex difficulties of moderate 
severity. Referrals to the CMHT or specialist services were made if these became 
necessaiy.
Most therapeutic work was individual, though I was involved in doing some joint family 
work with a senior clinician, and I often conducted individual therapy with other 
members of the client's family or support network present. My main responsibilities were 
to carry out individual therapy sessions with selected clients, who had been referred 
directly by their G.P.s., attend fortnightly departmental meetings, utilise weekly 
individual supervision (narrative/integrative focus) and attend a fortnightly 
narrative/systemic group supervision.
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Final Clinical Paper: The uncertain path to Dialogue.
The explicit intention of this paper is to tell the story of my professional evolution as a 
counselling psychologist. In describing and accounting for how my ’position1 has 
developed over time, attention will be given to the ways in which theory; research, 
context and experience have influenced and informed my clinical work with individual 
clients. I also consider it necessary, where possible, to map the ways in which my 
participation in institutional and broader socio-political contexts impacts on my actions, 
in order to give a situated account of this development.
Faced with the task of'putting it all together' in a single written account, has brought me 
face-to-face with many of the leading protagonists that I have engaged with during the 
course of training. The idea or concepts of 'science', 'psychology', 'rationality', 
'objectivity', 'theory', 'method', 'research', 'evidence', 'knowledge', 'truth', 'self 'subject', 
'object', 'human nature/development', 'psychopathology', 'expertise', 'therapy' and so on, 
central as they are to the discipline of modem academic and applied psychology, have 
necessarily had a substantial bearing on my development as a counselling psychologist. 
Crucially, from the initial stages of training, I have been encouraged to reflect upon, and 
question, the 'natural' taken-for-granted status of such notions and the possibilities for 
action they represent. As such, adopting a 'critical' and reflective orientation becomes the 
starting point for the telling of my professional story. This does not mean finding an 
'objectively true' or 'correct' standpoint; rather I view it as the ongoing process of 
understanding how we come to stand where we are (e.g. Griffith & Griffith, 1992; Parker, 
19.99). Thus, what follows is my own particular 'truth', based on, and mediated through, 
my experience of academic, institutional, and applied contexts whilst training. It is 
unavoidably 'local' as it reflects not only my cultural location as a white British middle 
class heterosexual male, but also my personal and political development and proclivities.
Making explicit the 'local' and interested nature of my own account accords with a view 
of 'truth' as being relative (see Gergen, 1994). However, I am not suggesting that simply
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'anything goes' or that I abandon learned skills, theory and research. Rather, I consider the 
ongoing process of reflecting upon my own position, i.e., my epistemological 
commitments, actions, relationships, values, biases and so on, to be a principled activity 
vital to ethical practice.
Having come to view the discipline of psychology as a thoroughly situated and 
performative activity, concerned with socio-moral relations (see Shotter, 1993), rather 
than as a decontextualised body of thought, I accept that power, interests, values and 
context affect what I do as a counselling psychologist. Rejecting the premise that research 
is 'neutral' or that our interventions are unaffected by politics, has enabled me to 
accentuate 'practice' as the site in which psychological theory and research gain their 
intelligibility. Being 'practice^led' enables me to confront the burgeoning array of theories 
and approaches available for therapeutic consumption in a flexible manner, attaining 
pragmatic coherence without losing sight of the psychological diversity of the individuals 
I work with. I also consider that engaging in ongoing 'practical deconstruction' (Parker, 
1999) actively encourages connection between the personal, professional and political 
domains and provides a critical lens through which I am able to describe, account for, 
question and evaluate what I do as a counselling psychologist.
Clearly there is a large part of me that believes in the value of psychological therapy and 
the role of the counselling psychologist in the amelioration of human suffering. However, 
having adopted a 'critical' orientation, I no longer take it for granted that psychology 
simply pursues human welfare in a manner that is just and fair (Prilleltensky & Nelson, 
2002; Rose, 1990, 1996). During the course of my training I have often felt internal 
disquiet in regard to subtle and overt abuses of power and the potentially pathologising 
and normalising effects of traditional conceptions of psychological inquiry and practice 
(see Parker et al., 1995; Pilgrim, 1992). Similarly, in relation to my own practice I have 
felt uneasy with the structural 'povyer' and 'expert' status I am given in relation to clients 
who come to therapy for help with distress, and worried about how my position could
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easily be abused. 1 Thus it is not possible for me to automatically take a benign view of 
my clinical work and practices with clients. Consequently in my endeavours to develop 
my own position, a large part of my training has been spent trying to find ways of 
working with which I feel comfortable personally, professionally and politically.
The advancement of my 'critical' stance has been facilitated by an awareness of post­
modern, post-structural and social constructionist perspectives. The impact of these 
perspectives on the discipline of psychology and the field of therapy are well-documented 
(e.g. Burr, 1995; Fee, 2000; Gergen, 1994, 1999, 2001; Henriques et al., 1984; Holzman 
& Morrs, 2000; Kvale, 1992; McNamee & Gergen, 1992, 1999; Nightingale & Cromby, 
1999; Parker et al., 1995; Parker, 1997 1999; Prilleltensky & Nelson, 2002; Proctor, 
2002; Riikonen & Smith, 1997; Shotter, 1993; White & Epston, 1990). Acquainting 
myself with these perspectives destabilised my personal world, and prompted radical 
shifts in my understanding and approach towards psychological theory, research and 
practice. Though no single description adequately captures the different lines of thought 
and practice identified with these perspectives, Burr (1995) has described social 
constructionism as a critical and counter intuitive approach, that renders problematic that 
which we usually take for granted. Appreciating the significance of the 'turn to language' 
(Parker, 1992), i.e., the social constructionist view that language actively constructs 
social and clinical realities rather than reflecting an independent reality, led me to jettison 
the idea of a knowable external reality and grand meta-narratives in favour of 'local 
knowledges' and the intersubjective influences of language, culture and discourse. From 
this constructionist informed vantage point, relationship takes priority over the individual. 
Consequently, I view clients' expressions of life and identity and the problems for which 
they seek help with, as being constituted between people in the realm of social discourse 
rather than within the person, as is the often the case in many traditional ways theorising, 
researching and practising psychology.
1 My position has developed in conjunction with my research interests where I have qualitatively explored 
the use o f use o f diagnostic categories in counselling psychology practice and 'power-relations' in the 
therapeutic relationship.
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Viewing psychological theories and models of therapeutic practice as discourses that 
systematically form the objects of which they speak (Foucault, 1980) on the one hand, 
and structure subjectivity on the other, has reinforced my view that there is no single 
'truth' about psychological distress and how to treat it. Nonetheless, as discourses can be 
both enabling and constraining (Martin & Sugarman, 1999), I try to avoid listening and 
acting in exclusionary terms with clients. Instead, I attempt to maintain a curious stance 
(Anderson & Goolishian, 1992), and to hear and speak from within different discourses 
in order to join with clients in resourceful dialogue. The move to a relational 
intelligibility and focus on action and its sense (meaning-making) rather than behaviour 
and its determinants, has led my work increasingly to be informed by the narrative 
metaphor. To this end I attempt to facilitate a safe space and atmosphere through being 
open and present. I see my role as one of 'co-author' and attempt to provide a 
conversational context that contributes to clients' explorations of alternative narratives of 
identity and preferred ways of living, thinking, and being.
The development of my personal position and approach to practice was greatly facilitated 
by two contrasting experiences during my training. Firstly, I found that my own personal 
therapy helped me to learn about and experience the struggles and dilemmas encountered 
on the uncertain road to dialogue, within the context of a therapeutic relationship. Though 
I sometimes felt that my therapist did not understand where I was 'coming from', I was 
moved by her acceptance of me as a person of value in my own right, and her willingness 
to 'talk' with me as a fellow human being, which included her disclosing her own 
thoughts, feelings and experiences of therapy and life. This sense of equality, and the 
two-way nature of therapy, was something that I experienced positively as we mutually 
recognised and negotiated our difference and generated meaning between us.
Contrastingly, I had a clinical supervisory experience at the beginning of my second year 
where I experienced first hand what it was like to be negatively positioned and evaluated 
and to have my motives pathologised. This was a very distressing and anxiety provoking 
experience, which was resolved by prematurely terminating this particular placement.
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Though I am aware that this was a supervisory and not a therapeutic relationship, the 
power differential between my supervisor and myself meant that I found it difficult to 
resist such enforced positioning. The one-way nature of this relationship led me to feel 
dis-empowered and question my own knowledgeableness and identity. Combined, these 
experiences helped to reinforce my personal and professional values and have moved me 
to work as transparently as possible in order to form strong working alliances with 
clients, rooted in our shared humanity.
Though my preferred position has often felt 'at odds' with mainstream psychology, the 
pluralism and diversity of the theoretical, research and practice base of counselling 
psychology, which has moved beyond the narrow constraints of a positivist philosophy of 
science, provides a means of holding and working with the tensions between mainstream 
scientific and critical perspectives. Whilst there remain areas of conflict, it has helped me 
to work towards inhabiting a 'both/and' position where modernist models of therapy and 
my preferred social constructionist approach can co-exist and compliment each other, as 
evident in my work synthesising cognitive and narrative approaches. The ongoing 
challenge, as I see it, is to develop further ways of synthesising empirically supported 
psychological models and techniques with critical perspectives in the context of lived 
human experience in which clinical practice occurs (Lamer, 2001).
Having described some of the key areas and experiences that have influenced my 
preferred position and approach towards theory, research and practice, I will now offer an 
account of my therapeutic work with clients during the course of the training. The aim is 
to provide the reader with an account of the development of my practice, which reflects 
on the learnings, implications, consequences and effects of working in particular ways. 
Central to this account is the process of learning through experience, including the 
dilemmas and struggles I have faced attempting to honour and develop my own preferred 
approach, whilst engaging with the mainstream models of therapy taught on the course. 
Though this continues to be a demanding task, 1 believe my exposure to these models has
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been a necessary and ultimately rewarding experience, that has enriched my personal and 
professional life.
For the sake of clarity, I have adopted a chronological structure to describe how my 
exposure to, and experience of, practicing from within different models has influenced 
and shaped my preferred approach to practice. In order to protect client confidentiality 
details of individual clients have been changed and pseudonyms have been employed 
throughout.
Year One: Core model - Humanistic
Woolfe (1996) has drawn attention to the humanistic value base, i.e., a focus on well­
being and potential rather than sickness and cure, underpinning the discipline of 
counselling psychology. Carl Rogers' (1951) implicit statement of person-centred values, 
which emphasises respect for the person as an individual having dignity and worth in 
their own right, has been influential and largely matches my own developing approach to 
practice. However, whilst I agree with Rogers' emphasis on warmth and respect for the 
individual, I do not hold the person-centred view that there exists a permanent essential 
self and an objective entity called human nature (Meams & Thorne, 1999). Rather I see 
the 'self and 'human nature' as socially constructed and believe that agency, values and 
goals (what Rogers refers to as 'self direction') are culturally and relationally contingent. 
Thus, whilst maintaining respect for the individual client, I nonetheless view what occurs 
in therapy as being co-constructed between the client and myself.
In spite of diverging from the essentialism inherent in traditional models of humanistic 
therapy concerning the nature of the 'self, I have nonetheless found the 'core conditions' 
(i.e., warmth, empathy, 'unconditional' positive regard and congruence), along with the 
primacy accorded to the client-therapist relationship, to be of up most importance.
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During my first years practice I worked in an organisational setting (Employee 
Assistance Program), which operated a short-term policy (maximum six sessions). This 
provided a suitable context for me to put into practice my interest in constructionist 
approaches (in this instance a solution-focused approach) whilst developing core 
humanistic skills. Though not aware of it at the time, this represented an early foray or 
attempt at synthesis, as pragmatically the work I conducted incorporated cognitive, 
humanistic, experiential and behavioural elements. Furthermore, attempting to help 
clients reconnect with their own resources in order to build a firm sense of personal 
agency and the solution-focused question, "how can I best help this particular client?" 
(O'Connell, 1998), resonates with Rogers' hypothesis, "how can I provide a relationship 
which this person may use for [his^er] own personal growth?" (Rogers, 1961, p.32).
Perhaps most significantly, the efficacy of the humanist approach and value of the 
therapeutic relationship 'hit home' as a result of actually 'doing' therapy and noticing that 
it was the quality of the relationship between myself and the client, rather than my ability 
to apply a particular theory or technique, that appeared to be meaningful and which led to 
a positive therapeutic outcome. The value of this approach became increasingly apparent 
to me when working with Mr C, a 32-year-old man who presented with a long history of 
anxiety and symptoms of depression following the death of his father a few months prior 
to his referral. The dilemma I experienced centred on my level of input or directiveness 
within therapy, i.e., between a more theoretically led 'doing to' as opposed to a more non­
directive 'being with' the client. Though I don't believe it is possible to not be directive as 
a therapist, as all ways of acting in the context of therapy (regardless of theoretical 
orientation) value and invite certain ways of being over others, I nonetheless gained a 
palpable sense of the value in trying not to 'get ahead' of the client, i.e., staying a 'step 
behind', creating space for the client to think and speak, remaining curious about their 
'lived experience' and allowing meaning to emerge conversationally. Thus, I found that 
when I was technically less 'active' and embodied the core relational conditions of 
empathy, positive regard and congruence through being open and transparent about 
therapy, and myself that Mr C was able to explore and give meaning to his experience in
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a more engaged manner. The discursive practices of asking questions conversationally 
and responsively, reflecting back, summarising, clarifying, along with conveying warmth 
and respect, helped to establish an atmosphere in which he could give voice to an 
increasing range of his thoughts and feelings without fear of being shamed or humiliated. 
As I attempted to 'direct' process rather than content (Greenberg, et al., 1993) and to hear 
and validate the client's subjective experience and perceptions, he was able to gain a 
heightened awareness of the incongruence between his sense of who he is ('self), 
including his current actions and ways of being, and the person he believes himself to 
capable of being ('ideal self). Further to this, the sense of genuine contact and working 
together against the problem helped Mr C to feel understood. This in turn had the 
desirable effect of facilitating his sense of agency. Having made it explicit that therapy 
was dependent on feedback from Mr C, I intermittently checked out how he was 
experiencing therapy. Consequently he was able to take an active stance and say what 
was relevant to him and what he was finding helpful or unhelpful.
In my experience there is a good degree of fit between solution-focused and humanistic 
models. Both approaches emphasise respect for the individual and the importance of 
relational and emotional aspects of therapy. As a naive therapist the solution focused 
approach provided a structure and direction to the therapy, which was enhanced through 
an appreciation of the humanistic conception of the therapeutic relationship as being 
empowering and healing in its own right (McLeod, 1996). Also of note, the solution- 
focused use of scaling questions lent itself to explicit forms of evaluation, which 
complemented the CORE pre and post therapy questionnaires used in this setting.
Year Two: Core model - Psychodynamic
I approached the second year training with some trepidation. The challenge I faced, in 
terms of practice, was to set aside my theoretical reservations and biases and to engage 
with the model openly and sensitively in order to experience and learn about working 
within this approach. I was mindful that no discourse is inherently liberating or
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oppressive (Sawicki, 1991) and felt I could relate to psychodynamic theory and practice 
as a linguistic discipline concerned with meaning and interpretation rather than 
mechanism and explanation (e.g. Rycroft, 1985; Spence, 1982). Given that my preferred 
social constructionist approach foregrounds a relational rather than individual ontology, I 
found myself drawn to attachment theoiy (e.g. Bowlby, 1988; Holmes 2001) and object 
relational theorists (e.g. Balint, 1957; Bion, 1962; Fairbaim, 1952; Guntrip, 1961; Klein, 
1952; Winnicott, 1965, 1971) who emphasise the vicissitudes of early development, and 
the role of parenting, in the formation of a sense of self and others. Though still 
acknowledging the role intra-psychic conflicts, I found the attention given to 
interpersonal aspects of psychological functioning, along with attempts to understand the 
individual as embedded within social and relational contexts, fitted more closely my own 
preferred movement away from a biologically deterministic viewpoint. However, rather 
than rigid adherence to any one psychodynamic approach, I aimed to work in a pragmatic 
fashion resisting dogmatic certainty with the aim of understanding theory through 
experience.
During my second year I had two clinical placements in primary care settings, one of 
which incorporated one day working in a mental health unit. As was the case in my first 
year of training, the therapeutic relationship became the site where 'meaning making' 
occurred and theoiy came to life. Given the constraints of the setting (therapeutic 
contracts were limited to between ten and fifteen sessions), I aimed to achieve a balance 
between supportive work and more exploratory interventions. I found Mann's (1973) 
approach emphasising the importance of time and issues of loss and separation as central 
features of short-term clinical work, helped to provide a framework for thinking about, 
and working with, clients in this these particular settings.
My work with Mrs M, a 39-year-old married Portuguese woman who was referred for 
panic attacks, provides an example of how I engaged with some of the discursive, 
relational and knowledge practices associated with the psychodynamic approach. Having 
been left with her grandparents in Portugal at the age of six for a period of one year
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whilst her parents came to England to find work and a new home, themes of separation 
and abandonment made up a substantial part of Mrs M's narrative. Her sense of being 
abandoned was repeated in her adult life when her parents returned to live in Portugal 
whilst she was pregnant with her third child. The onset of her panic attacks coincided 
with her return to England having holidayed at her parent's home in Portugal the previous 
summer.
In consultation with my supervisor I had hypothesised that Mrs M's experiences of 
feeling abandoned and rejected had created an insecure attachment style and that her 
current difficulties could be understood in terms of the conflict between her longing for 
the love and attention of her parents, and 'repressed' feelings of anger and pain associated 
with the rejecting aspect of her relationship with them. In light of her experiences, Mrs M 
appeared to use 'splitting' (Klein, 1952) and 'denial' as defensive mechanisms in order to 
regulate internal states, and avoid painful or unmanageable aspects of her experience.
With this dynamic story in mind, a crucial part of therapy was establishing a sense of 
trust and a secure enough base in order for Mrs M to address what Hinshelwood (1995) 
refers to as the 'maximum point of pain', i.e., her experience of feeling abandoned and 
rejected by her parents. As with other clients', this involved building a working alliance 
through the use of active listening, reflecting and empathy. I also engaged in practices of 
interpretation in order to draw attention to, and make links between, her past and present 
experiences. This appeared to have some effect as she increasingly became able to 
acknowledge and give voice to her anger towards her parents for having left her.
As we moved towards the 'ending' phase of therapy Mrs M became increasingly 
disillusioned and angry with me. I had experienced her as alternatively clinging to, then 
rejecting me. This seemed to represent her fear of ambivalence and separation, which was 
being enacted between us. In terms of 'transference' I appeared to have been positioned 
as the abandoning parent. Though I experienced concordant feelings of guilt, I was 
mindful of Bion (1962), who suggested that rather than trying to make up for what the
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client has suffered in the past we should offer to repeat the failure to love them enough 
and then share with and help them to work through feelings about this failure. In order to 
assist Mrs M to re-work abandonment issues and negotiate a 'new ending' in the context 
of therapy, I was careful to try and provide a 'holding environment' (Winnicott, 1965) for 
her anxiety and anger without becoming defensive or rejecting in response to the 
interactional pressure she placed me under. This helped her to begin to verbalise the 
anger that had been 'split off and 'denied' and we were able to work towards separation in 
a good relationship wherein she could see the mother (me in the transference) as a 
separate object of love and hate (Winnicot, 1971). By the last session, Mrs M's anger 
towards me had subsided and she reported feeling "sad" that therapy was ending. She 
also indicated that therapy had helped her to "make sense" of the "panics", which had 
reduced in frequency and intensity, and that she no longer felt overwhelmed by the anger 
and pain around the rejecting aspects of her relationship with her parents.
Year 3: Core model - Cognitive-behavioural
My final year of training represents a more purposeful development of my own position 
and preferred approach to practice. Whilst attending to the course requirement that third 
year placements have a cognitive-behavioural focus, the setting (community mental 
health team) and my supervisor, allowed considerable flexibility for me to work 
integratively. I was also presented with the opportunity to gain experience of long-term 
work (up to ten months) with more complex and enduring cases. My practice and 
professional communication was further enhanced through working alongside, and 
collaborating with, other mental health professionals.
Theoretically I found contemporary developments such as Safran and Segal's (1996) 
refinement of cognitive therapy in light of interpersonal theory, the use of attachment 
perspectives (e.g. Bowlby, 1988) and Young's (1994) Schema-focused approach, helped 
to redress traditional CBT models' (e.g. Beck, 1976) lack of attention to the 
developmental origins of clients' difficulties. Though these developments place greater
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emphasis on the therapeutic relationship (in keeping with the evidence base and the ethos 
of counselling psychology), I still found the language practices, for example, the rhetoric 
of 'collaboration' and 'equality', to be muddled with the idea of compliance (see Proctor, 
2002), thus largely obscuring the power differential between client and therapist. 
Likewise the internal focus on cognitions and schemas (viewed as the property of 
individual minds) seemed to mask the socio-political conditions and contexts that are 
constitutive of clients' identities and experience of psychological distress.
Without disputing that certain approaches such as cognitive-behavioural therapy are 
efficacious with certain clinical presentations of anxiety and depression (see Gilbert, 
2000; Roth & Fonagy, 1996), I nonetheless found that incorporating narrative ideas and 
practices (e.g. White & Epston, 1990) helped me to achieve a higher degree of 
congruence in my work through attaining a greater sense of integration between my 
personal, professional and political selves. I used narrative practices to deconstruct 
'therapy' and the medicalised context in which it was taking place. I found this helped to 
strengthen the working alliance, particularly with clients 1 worked with who had been in 
the mental health system for a long time and who reported feeling de-humanised through 
having been labelled.
My work with Mr A, a 58-year-old man, who was referred with chronic anxiety and an 
"inability to cope" following a "breakdown" at work, provides an illustration of how 
paying attention to prevalent cultural discourses along with the interpersonal and 
structural power relations (both inside and outside of the mental health service and 
therapeutic context) enriched cognitive-behavioural therapy.
From the outset of therapy Mr A had difficulty in expressing thoughts, emotions and 
needs in an open or direct manner and seemed suspicious of my role. Though we 
established a rational for cognitive-behavioural work and a tentative working alliance 
through talking openly about the structure and process of 'therapy', it quickly became 
apparent, on account of his ambivalent stance towards his difficulties and me, that
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therapy was unlikely to be straightforward. Initial attempts aimed at identifying and 
modifying self-defeating patterns of thinking and behaviour were unsuccessful. In 
supervision I hypothesised that a great deal of Mr A's psychological distress related to his 
interpersonal schema i.e., a generic cognitive representation of interpersonal events 
(Safran, 1990). This included engaging in actions linked to the belief that he has to 
suppress or defer his own opinions, thoughts, feelings, emotions and needs to others 
(initially his father and subsequently to other authority figures, e.g. teacher, employer, 
therapist etc) in order to maintain interpersonal relatedness.
My own reading and research interests had alerted me to the potential for modernist 
forms of therapy to reproduce the subject/object dualism that is so pervasive in the 
structuring of power relations in Western society. Given that a substantial part of Mr A's 
difficulties related to the conflict he experiences between complying with authority 
figures on the one hand and a more assertive position where he is able to get his own 
needs met on the other, I made the decision to conceptualise his experience and current 
symptoms within a discourse of power. This seemed particularly relevant given his 
historical experiences of power relations and the inevitable structural inequality in roles 
between therapist (helper) and client (helped). Also, I had noticed that Mr A appeared to 
be experiencing 'transference' in relation to me. Whilst it might have been viable to work 
with the 'transference relationship' in order for Mr A to work though issues of personal 
authority, I had become sensitised, through my ongoing discomfort with traditional 
psychodynamic conceptions of the therapeutic relationship, that what is termed 
'transference' is usually experienced most strongly by people in hierarchical situations 
where they are in junior or subject positions (White, 2000). Without disregarding the 
significance of, or link between, Mr A's past/current relationships and the therapeutic 
relationship, reading what was occurring between us as a trace of very present power- 
relations was pivotal in the therapy. As we began to attend to and deconstruct the 
interactional politics that were generative of such phenomena, I made a concerted effort 
to situate my comments, thoughts and interventions in the context of my own 
experiences, training, intentional states and theoretical allegiances - what White (1997)
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terms the condition of 'transparency'. Though this did not 'do away with' power, I believe 
it helped to minimise the structural hierarchy between us. Not only did this call into 
question the idea that I had all the answers and would decide what was best for him but 
also it seemed to offer a different experience of power-relations. This led to a more two- 
way process, one that invited reciprocity and mutual exchange rather than a sense of 
indebtedness.
Having acknowledged the reality of Mr A's experiences of such inequality (including the 
structural inequality between us), he began to exercise more choice (personal power) and 
responsibility. Whereas initially any form of challenge or empathic confrontation on my 
part had been met with suspicion and hostility, Mr A began to act more openly and 
congruently as the 'expert' on his own life rather than feeling he had to defer to a 
perceived authority figure. For example, he began to openly voice his opinions and 
negotiate the direction of the sessions. Though there remained upsets and ruptures in our 
relationship we seemed to have entered into what Clarkson (1995) refers to as a 'person to 
person' or 'real' relationship. From this position Mr A was able to take an active stance 
and made an informed decision to engage with cognitive-behavioural work, notably 
looking at and challenging the distorted aspects of his cognitive and interpretive 
processes.
Mr A's self-report indicated that he had felt competent and honoured by this approach. By 
the end of therapy he had gained an increased awareness of the historical and relational 
contexts and conditions that had shaped his taken-for-granted beliefs, thinking and 
behaviours, and he indicated that he was more in control and able to manage his emotions 
and mood. It was the focus on the meaning of his lived experience in the everyday 
context of his life and not just cognition or behaviour that was the variable of focus. The 
therapeutic relationship appeared to provide experiential disconfirmation of his 
interpersonal schema and opened a space for him to generate alternative beliefs and ways 
of relating to himself and others that reflected his preferred identity.
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By the end of my third year placement I had not gained the required 450 clinical contact 
hours due to not finding a suitable placement straight away in the first year and through 
clinical hours lost following the breakdown of my first placement during the second year. 
As such, I seized the opportunity to undertake a further six-month placement working 
with primary care referrals explicitly from a narrative perspective. Along with gaining 
experience of individual and group narrative supervision, this placement provided 
freedom to further develop my preferred position in an environment where the narrative 
metaphor and approach to therapy held the same status as more mainstream models. In 
particular, I developed the narrative attitude of viewing the problems that clients bring to 
therapy as being something affecting the person, rather than as characteristics or qualities 
intrinsic to them. Overall, I found the experience of working in this setting from this 
particular approach was sustaining and invigorating of my identity and helped to augment 
the existing resources and skills I had developed in other models.
In summary, this paper has attempted to demonstrate how I practice as a counselling 
psychologist. I am keenly aware that a paper such as this can only provide a fleeting 
glimpse of my work. I hope that what I have included has demonstrated ethical and 
effective practice whilst persevering the richness and complexity of the stories clients' 
have shared with me. My training has provided a solid foundation and has facilitated the 
development of my professional story, which continues to unfold and thicken as I gain 
further experience.
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RESEARCH DOSSIER
Introduction to research dossier
This dossier consists of a literature review, two qualitative pieces of research and a 
published article. The literature review explores traditional conceptualisations of 
'psychopathology' and the use of diagnostic classification systems in contrast with the 
applied discipline of counselling psychology. The second paper explores Chartered 
Counselling Psychologists talk about psycho-diagnostic categories, 'psychopathology' 
and counselling psychology practice. The third paper examines the discursive 
relationship between 'knowledge', 'truth' and 'power' in the context of psychotherapeutic 
practice. The published article is in the form of a review of a research article.
Reflective commentary on the 'use of self during the research process is included at the 
end of each piece of research.
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Counselling Psychology - Critical Psychology in a Postmodern Age? Challenging 
and Reconstructing Traditional Notions of Psychopathology, Psychiatric Categories 
and Psycho-Diagnosis.
Abstract
This paper reviews how mainstream psychology traditionally conceptualises and 
accounts for 'psychopathology' as evident in selected abnormal psychology textbooks. 
Present day understandings of 'psychopathology' were located historically within 
modernism and its particular view of science. The primary theme uniting the reviewed 
literature was a common search for the causes of 'psychopathology', which evolved 
around competing organic and psychological explanations. A deconstructive stance was 
adopted in order to examine the assumptions underpinning mainstream psychology's 
view of 'psychopathology' and its approach to categorising and diagnosing it as the 
correct point for treatment. The implications of mainstream psychology's view of 
psychopathology in regard to modern therapeutic practice were noted and contrasted with 
the applied discipline of counselling psychology. Two dimensions were used to 
differentiate counselling psychology from traditional psychology and therapeutic 
practice, i.e., attention to 'little narratives' or local meanings and understandings and a 
relational focus. These dimensions were used to compare the traditional use of psycho­
diagnosis and psychiatric categories with counselling psychology's contextual use of 
psychological formulation in applied practice. Counselling psychology's potential to 
challenge the status quo and offset some of the potentially normalising and pathologising 
effects associated with modem forms of therapy were discussed.
Introduction
In contemporary Western society, terms such as ‘psychopathology’, ‘abnormal’ 
functioning, mental illness/disorder, schizophrenia, anorexia, therapy, diagnosis etc, 
abound within the abnormal psychology literature and have become part and parcel of 
eveiyday discourse. The daily usage of such terms is evident in the ways in which some 
people become marked out as not ‘normal’ or different. Alongside the increasing 
"discovery" and categorisation of these problems / disorders is the parallel increase in the 
provision of counselling and therapy. The proliferation of named syndromes and 
pathologies, it is argued, is part of the more general phenomenon of the pathologisation 
of everyday life (Burr and Butt, 2000).
Arguably, this is a time when biomedical and reductionist explanations and 
understandings of psychopathology are dominant in both scientific and applied 
psychotherapeutic worldviews and practices (Fee, 2000). The terms and the means of 
classification that have penetrated our culture and the mental health profession in so 
many ways stem most recently from science's attempt to provide a system that can 
‘objectively’ identify and thereby classify the different types of disorders which fall 
under the rubric of ‘abnormality’. This present position highlights how we have inherited 
the legacy of the eighteenth century when madness became an "object", a thing-in-itself, 
discoverable by dispassionate positivist inquiiy (Foucault, 1965). As such, this viewpoint 
holds that the only way ‘psychopathology’ can be recognised as ‘real’ and thus worthy of 
rigorous study and funded research, is when it is rooted in the medicalised language of 
bio-physiology or some other deep-seated individual factor (Fee, 2000).
The current review can be located as part of the "gathering storm" of movements that are 
confronting expert knowledge in the mental sciences (McNamee & Gergen, 1992). It is 
indebted to and derived in part from the efforts of the anti-psychiatry movement of the 
1960s and 70s, where the likes of Thomas Szasz and R.D. Laing contested psychiatric 
authority. However, following the ‘turn to language’ (Parker, 1992) in the social sciences
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and humanities, attention is directed towards the discursive or textual underpinnings of 
mental life and their role in the study of psychopathology (e.g. Parker, Georgaca, Harper, 
McLaughlin & Stowell-Smith, 1995; Rose, 1989; Shotter, 1992)
The wellspring of unrest that questions the concept and utility of scientific psychology as 
developed during the modem age is associated with the wave of critical thought and 
philosophy that seeks to "deconstruct or question modernist beliefs about truth, 
knowledge, power, individualism and language ...Postmodern philosophers challenge the 
assumption that reason alone can provide an objective and universal foundation fo r  
knowledge or that a knowledge based on reason will be socially beneficial and ensure 
progress", (Collier, Minton & Reynolds, 1991, p.87). Instead, psychopathology and 
psychological knowledge are re-cast as being constructed socially and linguistically via 
the negotiated socio-cultural meanings that are historically prevalent.
Whilst there exists no single or unified postmodern philosophy, there is nonetheless a 
range of thinkers who focus on different aspects of the postmodern condition, for 
example, Lyotard's (1984) suspicion of self-justified meta-narratives, especially those 
viewed as scientific; Derrida's (1974) view of language as unstable, partial and anti­
metaphysical; and Foucault's (1977, 1980) work that paid attention to the relationship 
between power, knowledge and the self in his historical analyses.
So that the first aim of critically examining the notion of ‘psychopathology’ can be 
fulfilled, nine major US and UK abnormal psychology textbooks aimed at undergraduate 
and postgraduates were reviewed as a starting point to gain a ‘flavour’ of how 
mainstream psychology accounts for psychopathology. The texts reviewed are Bootzin 
and Acocella (1993), Comer (1992), Davison and Neal (1996), Halgin and Whitboume 
(1993), Holmes (1998), Kendall and Hammen (1998), Oltmans and Emery (1998), 
Rosenhan and Seligman (1995) and Sarason and Sarason (1993). Each text was readily 
available in a British university libraiy; as such, they are considered to give a reasonable 
representation of both British and American approaches to abnormal psychology. Texts
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are considered that were published during the 1990s so as to give a relatively up-to-date 
view. Whilst it is acknowledged from the outset that a variety of different accounts and 
explanations of psychopathology could be offered, consideration of these texts allows us 
to see how psychopathology is being spoken about and constructed in mainstream 
psychological discourse, whilst taking into account and questioning the extent to which it 
overlaps with psychiatric discourse. Equally, it affords us the raw materials from which a 
critical and deconstructive analysis can be built.
Whilst reviewing this literature, attention will be given to, and an attempt made to locate, 
contemporaiy understandings of ‘psychopathology’ within the modem world-view 
generally, and within the context of abnormal psychology more locally. Following this, 
the postmodern strategy of undermining ’’totalising" knowledges shall be evoked in 
relation to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder, fourth edition, the 
primary text for classifying Psychiatric disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 
1994) by highlighting the modernist assumptions underpinning its use and their 
implications. Our concern is with how these assumptions shape current understandings 
and makes it possible for mental health professionals to diagnose and locate people in 
psychiatric categories by reducing experiential and behavioural variations to fixed pre­
emptive constructs.
In essence, the first aim of the review is to employ postmodern thinking in order to 
highlight what has been taken for granted in the traditional literature concerning 
psychopathology and mainstream psychology's approach to categorising / diagnosing it 
as the correct starting point for treatment.
Whilst deconstructive critique at the abstract level of theory is not in itself particularly 
new or radical, it is deemed necessary as the second part of the review aims to move 
towards the applied arena thereby considering the interplay between theory and practice. 
The reason for this stems from the contention that there is a strong tension between 
academic and professional/applied psychology, in part due to the entrenchment of
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psychological theory in modernity, whereas professional practice, on the other hand, has 
to face human life in a postmodern age (Polkinghome, 1992).
The review shall start by presenting a brief and selective overview of the explanations of 
‘psychopathology’ that have prevailed historically.
Historical overview
Each of the nine texts reviewed (Bootzin & Acocella 1993; Comer 1992; Davison & Neal 
1996; Halgin & Whitboume 1993; Holmes 1998, Kendall & Hammen 1998; Oltmans & 
Emery 1998; Rosenhan & Seligman 1995; Sarason & Sarason 1993) considers the 
changing historical views of psychopathology or psychological abnormality. Each text 
refers to demonology as the earliest explanation for psychopathology - that is, a belief in 
possession by evil spirits or demons as the cause of mental disturbance.
The focus then shifts towards the mythological writings of the Greeks, which are 
considered to be a rich source of descriptions as to what was looked upon as mental 
disorder in very early times. There is consensus amongst the reviewed texts that it was 
during the classical era in Greek history that we began to see the evolution of a
naturalistic approach to abnormal behaviour. Each text makes reference to Hippocrate's
•\
who considered psychological abnormality a disease caused in some ways as other bodily 
illness. His greatest contribution is considered to be his insistence that all illness or 
mental disorder should be explained on the basis of natural causes. The Greek era is also 
considered to have been a time when curiosity developed about physical and 
psychological functioning. The use of ‘scientific method’ i.e., the application of 
rationality to what they observed, was a clear break away from earlier beliefs that evil 
spirits caused psychopathology. It is notable in the texts reviewed that current Western 
views of psychopathology trace their heritage to classical Greek and Roman origins. The 
notable exception is Kendal and Hammen (1998) who acknowledge the contribution of 
Asian and African cultures to our current views.
92
The next historical period is referred to as the middle or "dark" ages wherein no scientific 
or medical advances were deemed to have occurred beyond those made earlier by 
Hippocrates and Galen. This period is also widely associated with the resurgence of 
primitive beliefs regarding spiritual possession. It is argued, that following the fall of the 
Roman Empire, people were grasping desperately for security, with a great number 
finding it in supernatural explanations of phenomena that were distressing or difficult to 
comprehend rationally. This crystallised around a religious sect, Christianity, which had 
grown rapidly from a persecuted minority to the official Empire religion by the fourth 
centuiy A.D. The church's position was one of belief in the supernatural. As such, their 
position ran against the grain of rationalism that was essential to science. The legacy of 
rationality that the middle ages had inherited from the Greek philosophers was soon 
abandoned as demonology, and superstition gained renewed importance, becoming the 
"psychiatry" of the day.
The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are referred to as the age o f reason and the 
Enlightenment because reason and scientific method came to replace religious faith and 
dogma as ways of understanding the natural world. Two primary views were competing 
at the time that mirror current debates in the field, namely, organic versus psychological 
explanations of psychopathology. Despite the tension between the two, consensus was 
reached in the rejection of supernatural forces as the cause of abnormal behaviour. By the 
end of the eighteenth centuiy superstition had been replaced with a commitment to 
rationality and scientific observation.
The beginnings of modem thought and practice are attributed to the nineteenth centuiy 
physician William 'Griesinger (1817-1868) who revised Hippocrates' theoiy of mental 
diseases advocating that every mental illness has a physical cause. Following this, Emil 
Kraepelin furnished a classification of mental diseases in terms of their organic bases in 
1883. The enduring nature of Kraepelin's scheme can still be seen as it forms the basis of 
present day classification schemes. The reviewed material comes up to date by 
acknowledging the continued dominance of the medical model into the twentieth century.
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This is set against the psychological approach where leading figures such as Anton 
Mesmer (1733-1815), Jean Charcot (1825-1893), Pierre Janet (1859-1947), Joeseph 
Breuer (1842-1925) and Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) were considering psychological 
factors in the explanation and treatment of psychopathology. This tension between 
organic and psychological explanations of psychopathology continues in the present day.
Modernism and the rise of science
The deconstructive stance taken in this review prohibits us from accepting these historical 
accounts at face value as ‘objective’ or ‘true’. Instead it helps us to examine and locate 
current understandings and explanations of psychopathology with the parallel 
development and rise of modem science. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were 
highlighted historically as being particularly important periods of development. The 
intellectual movement of the eighteenth century known as the "Enlightenment" gave 
definition to the idea of "modernity" and birth to a range of disciplines, including those 
we now call the social sciences that have shaped the modem conception of "knowledge". 
Enlightenment thinkers engaged in energetic critique of all forms of traditional and 
religious authority - for example, superstitious or magical beliefs. In their place was 
substituted a belief in progress, reason and science. What has become known as the 
"project" of modernity and of the Enlightenment proposed a vision of the world that 
valued material progress, prosperity, individual freedom and social justice founded on 
rational rather than religious or magical principles (Billington, Hockey & Strawbridge, 
1998). This fits with Foucault's (1965) contention that it was during the Enlightenment 
that "madness" became an "object", a thing-in-itself, discoverable by dispassionate 
positivist inquiry.
Psychology - "Child of Modernity”
Psychology is one of the academic disciplines that has its beginnings in the last half of 
the nineteenth century when the principles of modem science were applied to the study of
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human beings (Giorgi, 1986). Modem science had effectively developed descriptions of 
the regularities that held in the natural realm. As such, it was believed that application of 
naturalistic methods to the human realm would produce a body of knowledge that would 
make possible the prediction and control of human behaviour. Danziger (1979) notes 
modernism's emancipatory intentions, assuming that gathering such information would 
allow for the efficient education of children, the reform of prisoners and most importantly 
for the purposes of the current review - to c u re ‘mental illness’. Clearly then by this 
account the discipline of psychology adopted the modernist notion or belief in underlying 
fundamentals or basic essences. For Gergen (1992) who views there to be four 
overarching presumptions from modernism giving rise to the discipline of psychology, at 
the heart of the modem enterprise lies the belief in a knowable world. From this belief 
stems the general premise that there is a basic subject matter to be elucidated. He argues 
that by presuming a knowable subject, modem psychology is shaped by a belief in 
universal properties. Abnormal psychology exemplifies these beliefs as it attempts to 
study psychopathology by categorising it, thereby gaining principles and possibly laws 
that can be discovered and generalised to other instances across time, situations and 
persons. Additionally, the logical empiricist philosophy driving modem psychology and 
abnormal psychology is dedicated to a belief in ‘truth through method’. It is here we find 
the belief that through the scientific method obdurate truths can be discovered about what 
‘psychopathology’ is and what causes it. There is continued faith in the increasingly 
contested belief that such methods are impersonal and prohibit the entry of ideology and 
values when describing and explaining psychopathology. Finally, there is a belief in the 
progressive nature of the research enterprise. The application of empirical methods to the 
subject matter of psychology is believed to illuminate its fundamental character 
increasingly: the goal being to establish reliable, value-neutral "truths" (Gergen, 1992,
1994).
The primary theme uniting the reviewed literature is a common search for the causes of 
psychopathology. The advent of modem science shifted theories of cause from mythical 
or supernatural to organic and psychological explanations. Scientifically accounting for
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psychopathology as in evidence in the reviewed literature shows a clear commitment to 
the explanatory as the primary mode of human understanding. Newman (2000) notes 
how during the modem era the scientific model has been of unprecedented value in 
helping us to understand the nature of so-called "physical reality" However, he goes on to 
argue that this particular scientific story, wherein the scientific model is a key feature, has 
come to be more than just a means to understanding the physical world but also has 
achieved paramount status as the universal definition of understanding itself. Importantly, 
he highlights how the efforts of twentieth-century positivism have led to the scientising 
of history and all human understanding by attempting to make it fully explanatory.
The explanatory and/or predictive mode of understanding, which has come to dominate 
science and is rooted in the capacity to derive deductively a characterisation or a definite 
description of a specific phenomenon, is clearly in evidence in the reviewed texts and 
their focus on explaining what psychopathology is and what causes it. When we consider 
how abnormal psychology is defined in the reviewed texts their wholesale allegiance to 
this modernist derived view of science becomes clear. For example, Comer (1992) 
defines abnormal psychology as a field devoted to the scientific study of abnormal 
behaviour wherein scientists and clinicians systematically gather information so that they 
may describe, predict, explain and exert some control over the phenomena they study. 
Similarly, Oltmans and Emery (1998) define abnormal psychology as the application of 
psychological science to the study of mental disorders, and Davison and Neale (1996) 
refer to abnormal psychology as an area of scientific study, where the goal is to observe, 
systematically acquire and evaluate information, and then develop general theories that 
explain the information.
To date, this review has located present day understandings of psychopathology more 
widely within modernism and its particular view of science, and more locally within the 
current context of abnormal psychology. The focus will now shift to a more detailed 
examination of some of the central assumptions underpinning current conceptualisations 
of psychopathology and their implications.
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Throughout the reviewed texts the influence of modernism is at its clearest in the united 
assumption that psychopathology / mental illness exists as the starting point for both 
theory and practice. Distilled to its basest element, this assumption holds that there is 
something - a discrete entity - that actually exists (ontological surety) and that through the 
correct method (i.e., the scientific method) can be discovered, observed and described. As 
the historical . periods are constructed as being characterised by uniformity and 
homogeneity we can read this as an attempt to classify and categorise psychopathology. 
As such, the notion of categorisation as exemplified by the starring role given to the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in all the reviewed texts 
shall be focused upon and critically examined.
Describing and categorising behaviour and experience
The power o f psychology lay in its promise to provide inscription devices that 
would individualise such troublesome subjects, rendering the human soul 
into thought in the form o f calculable traces. Its contribution lay in the 
invention o f diagnostic categories, evaluations, assessments and tests that 
constructed the subjective in a form in which it could be represented in 
classifications, in figures and quotients. The psychological test was the first 
such device. (Rose, 1990, p. 109)
As was noted earlier, the historical development of classification systems includes 
Hippocrates' development of a medical model of madness in ancient Greece during the 
fourth century B.C., and Emil Kraepelin's organically based classification system o f 
mental disease in the nineteenth century. These approaches rejected the dominant notion 
that illness was of sacred or divine origin. Thus science triumphed over religion and it 
was thought that psychopathology could be classified alongside physical illness. What is 
of importance, within the context of this investigation, is that the rise of the scientific 
tradition in Western society led inexorably, it seems, to the systematic categorisation of
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forms of mental illness or disorder, and that all ensuing developments drew upon the 
medical model.
Psychiatric taxonomy has evolved currently into the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f  
Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, commonly referred to as (DSM-IV) published by the 
American Psychiatric Association (1994). One perspective on the DSM-IV classification 
system is that it provides a convenient and scientific shorthand for describing clinical 
issues faced by mental health professionals. Schwartz and Wiggins (1986) note that from 
a modernist perspective, in which empirical science is capable of providing 'objective' 
truths, the DSM approach to understanding, explaining and treating mental problems that 
human beings face makes compelling sense. Establishing its initial credibility as an 
outgrowth of medicine, the DSM-IV has developed in the same manner as other 
biological classification systems. As with diagnosis in medicine, the assumption is that a 
DSM diagnosis should provide an established reference point from which standardised 
modalities of treatment could begin. By logical extension, conferring a DSM diagnosis 
should confer the same sense of understanding and sense of deliverance from disease that 
occurs in medical diagnosis.
However, unlike other biomedical classifications of pathology, psychiatric explanations 
of the aetiologies of "psychopathology / mental disorders" have been a constant source of 
conflict (e.g. Grob, 1985; Klerman, Valliant, Spitzer & Michels, 1984). Consequently, 
the DSM-IV has adopted a descriptive and apparently non-aetiologically based approach 
to classifying psychopathology. In spite of this stance, it is still based on the 
presupposition that such disorders are inherently biomedical in their aetiology (see 
American Psychiatric Association, 1987), and that eventually the cause and course of 
such disorders will be scientifically discovered. Bound with the hegemony of discovery, 
of knowing, of science and modem epistemology, the DSM-IV is underpinned with the a 
priori demand that it be part of a scientific explanatory system wherein mental problems 
can be classified and treated as scientifically agreed upon mental disorders.
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As noted earlier the case for the importance of classification makes sense when viewed 
from within the dominant or received view. However, once we begin to unpack and 
deconstruct its underlying assumptions and concepts we find that it is both problematic 
and resting upon shaky foundations. At the base of this foundation lies the modernist 
view of science within which diagnostic classification finds itself situated. Such a view 
holds that there is a ‘knowable’ world and that through progressive scientific rational 
discovery we can uncover the nature of the external world and the interior of individual 
people's minds. A general issue then with classification systems like the DSM-IV (1994) 
is the underlying assumption that each disorder that is classified is a distinct entity, i.e., 
that psychopathology is a "thing in itself'. This realist assumption is challenged by the 
alternative notion that ‘abnormal’ functioning or any mental illnesses (however defined 
by the DSM-IV, 1994) are social constructions rather than actual "things" (McNamee & 
■Gergen, 1992).
Furthermore, the DSM-IV's concern is with ‘abnormal’ functioning. We have seen how 
this is central to the field of abnormal psychology, yet in order for us to make sense of it, 
the notion of ‘abnormal’ requires a description of what is ‘normal’ to make sense. In 
essence, one pole is dependent on the other for its meaning - it could not exist without the 
opposite that defines it. Within the context of abnormal psychology, definitions of 
psychopathology are based on the assumption that a "norm" exists. For example Oltmans 
and Emery (1998) and Haigin and Whitboume (1993) use the criteria of statistical 
deviation from the norm to define abnormality. Similarly, Bootzin and Acocella (1993), 
Davison and Neale (1996) and Rosenham and Seligman (1995) use the criteria of 
violation of norms to define abnormality.
Looking at the ‘normal/abnormal’ opposition, which is central to mainstream abnormal 
psychology, in a wider historical frame, we find that this category simply reconstitutes 
the opposition between ‘sane’ and finsane’ or between ‘healthy’ and ‘sick’ (Parker et al.,
1995). The uses of the DSM-IV (1994) to classify categories of ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ 
functioning therefore define ideals of behaviour. It reflects and reinforces the current
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ideologies and cultural themes. In this sense the dominant meanings that are associated 
with what it is to be ‘normal’ or ‘abnormal’ not only constrain and influence people's 
behaviour, but also, as Hare-Mustin and Marecek, (1990) note, serve to maintain the 
status quo and justify existing hierarchies of power and status. For example, until its 
revision in 1980, homosexuality was included in the DSM as a category of mental 
disorder, which served to reaffirm the moral and cultural sanctions against non­
heterosexual behaviour. Tlie declassification of homosexuality as a disorder resulted from 
the emergence of the gay liberation movement and political activism. Kutchins and Kirk 
(1997) argue that science was not the key factor in deciding whether or not to include or 
exclude a particular diagnosis in the DSM; the dispute over the inclusion of 
homosexuality was not about research findings or scientific 'fact' - it was a 20-year debate 
about beliefs and values. This adds weight to social constructionist claims that 
classification systems such as the DSM-IV (1994) and their use to classify ‘abnormal’ 
functioning are products of their time and place. The decision to regard any set of 
behaviours or experience (e.g. homosexuality) as ‘abnormal’ is not then, a scientifically 
'objective' fact; rather it is a political and moral decision that is grounded culturally in. 
which types of behaviour are deemed acceptable or unacceptable at a particular historical 
point.
Although the DSM-IV holds each category to be a pure pathology, it runs into further 
problems when we consider the huge gap between theory and practice. The clinician or 
practitioner who attempts interventions with a person who has been classified as 
‘abnormal’, that is, someone who behaves outside of the culturally constrained ‘norms’, 
is often confronted with problems which instead of being neat, orderly and scientific as in 
the DSM-IV, are messy and ambiguous in the everyday world. It would seem then that 
the search for generalized, abstract rules and the use of the DSM-IV to classify 
‘abnormal’ functioning, in spite of its constant revision and improvements (see Kutchins 
& Kirk, 1997) in practice might not be appropriate to human difficulties.
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The role of language - discourse creating its object of inquiry.
Understanding the role of language, and the institutions in which it is used, becomes 
crucial to a critical and evaluative account of the use of the DSM-IV to classify 
‘psychopathology’ and ‘abnormal’ functioning- As the DSM-IV is located within 
psychiatric discourse, aspiring to mimic the natural sciences, it appears to have 
succumbed to the belief that in order to help a complaint, you have to describe it and 
name it. As the DSM-IV adopts the medical model as its frame of reference and seeks to 
understand psychological disorders in the same way that medicine understands physical 
disorders, both the style and the language of the manual have therefore become more 
medicalised.
Arguably then, the language and modernist use of the DSM-IV have played a significant 
role in shaping both professional and lay conceptions of "clinical reality" with respect to 
the problems brought before mental health professionals. Gergen (1990) in his 
provocatively entitled article "therapeutic professions and the diffusion of deficit" warned 
of the danger of reifying a language of mental states:
The mental health professions operate largely so as to objectify a language o f  
mental deficit. In spite o f  their humane intentions, by constructing a reality o f  
mental deficit the professions contribute to hierarchies o f privilege, reducing 
natural interdependencies within the culture, and lend themselves to s e lf  
enfeeblement. This infirmirig o f  the culture is progressive, such that when 
common actions are translated into a professionalized language o f mental 
deficit, and this language is disseminated, the culture comes to construct 
itself in these terms. (Gergen, 1990, p.353)
Repudiating the notion of correspondence between language and "reality", as postmodern 
constructionist intelligibilities do, renders problematic the discursive repertoire of
'objective' and decontextualised assessment, diagnosis and intervention, the use of
(
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classificatory systems, and the very status of theory informed by the metaphor of 
scientific discovery (Lowe, 1999). If  we replace the representational-referential view of 
language associated with the DSM-IV with a relationally and rhetorically responsive, 
view (e.g. Shorter, 1993), the realities created by diagnostic classifications are no longer 
seen as actual states of being, but instead as historically situated ways of talking that have 
constitutive effects. To this end the DSM-IV (1994) can be regarded as a system of 
statements about the world that creates lived realities. This paves the way for us to see 
diagnostic categories as discursive complexes, that through a set of statements are able to 
construct objects and a variety of subject positions.
Having taken a critical look at the notion of categorisation and the DSM-IV classification 
system, suspicion has been levelled at the modernist presumption that there are universals 
of behaviour that transcend history, culture and context. In addition to highlighting 
classification as being central to and derived from modernist beliefs, the constitutive, as 
opposed to merely descriptive, nature of language and how this is inextricably linked to 
the attribution of meaning and practices of power, has also been brought into view.
The review will now take forward some of the considerations that have arisen regarding 
how psychopathology is conceptualised and understood traditionally alongside its use of 
diagnostic classification systems, and consider this explicitly in relation to the applied 
discipline of counselling psychology. The guiding question for this part of the review is 
what is counselling psychology's relationship with ‘psychopathology’, i.e. how does it 
view (conceptualise) and work with (treat) it? Whilst hoping to answer this question, 
albeit tentatively, given the new and evolving nature of counselling psychology, greater 
emphasis is placed upon exploring its potential for challenging the status quo and for 
formulating new knowledge and improved practices, thus contributing towards, and 
widening, constructive dialogue. This exploratory stance allows us to question whether 
counselling psychology's underlying philosophy; value base, status and epistemology 
mark it out as a potential postmodern response to the difficulties associated with
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modernism. And if so, is it able to offer increasingly more appropriate ways of viewing 
and working with the psychological ‘abnormality’ clients bring to therapy?
In order to examine this relationship the primary source of literature to be reviewed 
comes from Woolfe and Dryden's (1996) Handbook o f Counselling Psychology, the most 
recent British textbook available to date, which offers a detailed portrait of the history, 
philosophy, theory, methodology and practice of counselling psychology in Britain. 
Counselling psychology will be considered as it has developed and been defined within 
the British Psychological Society, which established a Counselling Psychology Section in 
1982, which gained Divisional status in 1994. Additional material relating to counselling 
psychology's ongoing evolution in the United Kingdom will come from Counselling 
Psychology Review>, the academic journal published by the British Psychological 
Society's Division of Counselling Psychology .
Counselling Psychology
Counselling psychology is a relatively new and innovative branch of applied professional 
psychology concerned with the integration of psychological theory and research with 
therapeutic practice. Woolfe (1996) defines counselling psychology as the application of 
psychological knowledge to the practice of counselling. Although the empiricist 
paradigm has always been the dominant or influential discourse within mental health (see 
Parker et al., 1995) counselling psychology can be viewed as a departure from this 
traditional position. Most notably, this departure and difference stems from its 
phenomenological base and humanistic value system (Clarkson, 1998; Woolfe, 1996), 
which views human beings as free and autonomous individuals. This value system is 
reflected in reactions against the medical model of professional - client relationships and 
a move towards focussing on facilitating well-being rather than on responding to sickness 
and pathology. In turn, Woolfe (1996) locates counselling psychology ''in a pivotal 
position between narrow scientism on the one hand and a failure to take sufficient 
account of any scientific method on the other" (p.l 1). Considering this position in terms
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of the modem/postmodem divide that has been evoked to date, Woolfe's 
conceptualisation of counselling psychology seems similar to House's depiction of what a 
postmodern practice should be like:
Perhaps postmodernism is a kind o f "reaction formation" against the 
excesses o f soulless scientism o f modernity; and it seems to me that the fields 
o f counselling and psychotherapy are in a unique position to develop an 
embodied, humanistic approach to research that transcends the ideology o f  
objectivism and which honours both our need fo r communicable 
intersubjective knowledge about the world and core humanistic principles, 
which elevate the values o f holism and human meaning above those o f  
mechanism and quantifiability. (House, 1997 p.59)
Whilst the criticisms that have been levelled at the notion of psychopathology and the use 
of classifications systems cannot easily be discarded, neither can the "reality" of the pain 
nor suffering that clients present to mental health professionals with. Ussher (1991) aptly 
noted that the critics of psychiatry "can become captivated by their own mesmerising 
arguments, moved or thrilled by the shocking horror of the extremes they portray, 
forgetting the essential reality and unglamorous actuality of madness as it is for the 
majority" (p.221). Clearly, the palpable signs of pain and suffering in practice cannot be 
dismissed purely as social constructions.
The remainder of the review will start by outlining traditional modernist approaches to 
therapeutic practice and some of their normalising and pathologising implications. By 
contrasting explicitly with counselling psychology, some preliminary responses will be 
offered regarding the use of psychiatric diagnostic categories; a question that is currently 
being considered by the discipline (see Strawbridge & James 2001). In order to achieve 
this, two dimensions will be used to differentiate counselling psychology from traditional 
psychology and practice; namely: Tittle narratives’ - local meanings and understandings; 
and ‘from within to between’ - a relational focus. More specifically, these dimensions
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will be used to compare the traditional use of psycho-diagnosis, and psychiatric 
categories, with counselling psychology's use of psychological formulation in applied 
practice.
Traditional applied practice
Kaye (1999) notes how modernist models of applied therapeutic practice both treat the 
individual as the locus of pathology (thereby diverting attention from the role played by 
socio-cultural factors in the genesis of psychological distress) and are informed by 
assumptions of: 1) An underlying cause or basis of pathology 2) The location of this 
cause within the individual 3) The ability to diagnose the problem 4) Treatability via a 
specifically designed set of techniques. Implicit in these suppositions are the concepts of 
normality and abnormality, the normatively good or bad and the presumption of a "true" 
root cause, which can be objectively established, known and remediated. Thus, when 
practitioners are confronted with a client who is experiencing psychological distress and 
they use diagnostic categories like those found in the DSM-IV, they are (often 
unwittingly) entering a medical discourse. As Pilgrim (2000) notes: "Diagnosis is a 
medical task which creates a simple dichotomy between the sick and the well" (p. 302). 
From this viewpoint, therapy can be seen as an instrumental practice consisting of the 
treatment of what is judged to be psychopathology and abnormal or dysfunctional 
behaviour. Practitioners working within these parameters attempt to bring about a 
restructuring or reprogramming of behaviour in individuals against some criterion of the 
‘normal’. Therefore, modernist therapy is concerned with altering behaviour patterns and 
belief systems with the establishment of alternative, more functional, or more socially 
normative patterns.
In the first part of the review we saw how the DSM-IV (1994) is used to classify 
categories of "normal" and "abnormal" functioning, which define ideals of behaviour and 
reinforce current ideologies. Modernist models of applied practice appear to extend this 
stance. The act of helping becomes problematic as modernist models incorporate a theory
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of function and dysfunction as well as an associated set of activities whereby it is 
assumed that change can be induced in another by the specially trained and accredited. 
This conceptualisation perpetuates the concept of the therapist as having privileged 
knowledge, a socially accredited expert who can provide a diagnosis, an authoritative and 
"true" version of a problem and act according to a set of prescribed activities to correct it 
(Kaye, 1996).
As such, modernist conceptualisations of therapy, in punctuating therapists as objective 
knowers or experts, ensure that the modem therapist enters the therapeutic arena with a 
well developed narrative (culturally dominant narrative of pathology/cure) for which 
there is abundant support within the community of scientific peers. It is this background 
that establishes the therapist's posture towards the client's difficulties. A clear 
demarcation can be seen between the client's narrative, which is viewed as made up of the 
insubstantial stuff of daily life - replete with distorted memories and wishful thinking. 
Contrastingly, the scientific narrative has the seal of professional approval. Consequently, 
the client's narrative is either incorporated or is replaced by the professional account 
(Gergen & Kaye, 1992). This process of replacing the client's story with the therapists 
metanarrative is in evidence in psychoanalysis where the client's account is transformed 
by the therapist into a tale of family romance (i.e., the Freudian Oedipal story). In 
Rogerian therapy, the humanist odyssey of self-fulfilment encourages the client to accept 
their 'real self and become more whole. The cognitive-behavioural story centres on 
reason and educates clients in more 'correct' or 'rational' ways of thinking and acting. 
Thus, the therapeutic metanarrative provided by therapists serve as organising 
frameworks, which simultaneously provide inbuilt solutions to clients problems (see 
Omer& Strenger, 1992).
However, such modernist derived therapeutic metanarratives suffer from a rigidity of 
narrative formulations and are relatively closed to alteration. Despite all the different 
possible modes of acting in the world, the client is set on a course that emphasises; ego 
autonomy, self-actualisation, rational appraisal etc., depending on the type of therapy
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selected. As an abstract formalisation the therapist's narrative is cut away from particular 
cultural and historical circumstances. That is to say, modernist narratives are non­
specific, by attempting to diagnose and categorise they aspire towards universality, 
consequently they are left with very little to say about particular circumstances. In this 
sense they are insensitive, and arguably fail to register the particularities of the client's 
life engagements.
As such, traditional modernist approaches have major shortcomings: when people are 
approached as objects about which therapist's know truths, their experience is often one 
of being de-humanised. The ‘objectivity’ of the modernist worldview often ignores the 
specific, localised meanings of individual people. When people are treated as objects they 
are invited into a relationship in which they are passive, powerless recipients of the 
knowledge and expertise of the therapist. It favours a form of person blame and is often 
blind to the social conditions in which problems develop. Practitioners working from a 
modem perspective overlook their inevitably reflexive role in creating, via their 
questioning, the version they think they perceive. At best, these versions fit for the client, 
or draw distinctions, which help them to generate new, less problematic, possibilities for 
themselves; at their worst, they represent a circular activity in which the therapist finds 
the ‘disorder’ that they hypothesise to be there and attempts to impose these on the client 
- a form of intellectual colonialism (Hoffman, 1993; McCarthy & Byrne, 1988). One 
major consequence of modem therapists' strict adherence to, and reliance upon, psycho­
diagnosis and psychiatric categories, is that it may lead to a fixity or stereotype of 
thinking and discourse that may potentially limit the client's opportunity to forge 
alternative meanings, solutions and narratives in relation to their psychological distress.
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"Little Narratives” - local meanings and understandings.
Lyotard (1984) refers to all overarching theories and beliefs systems, including those of 
the social science, as "grand or meta-narratives" and describes the postmodern condition 
as one that abandons the search for these. He argues that in social science as well as 
everyday life, it is the small-scale theories and accounts that should claim our attention, 
"the little narrative remains the quintessential form of imaginative invention" (p.60). In 
contrast to the modem search for such overarching theories, counselling psychology 
seeks local understandings of people, informed by their subjective accounts of the world 
and experience (Woolfe, 1996, p.7) it points to the significance of what Lyotard calls 
"little narratives" that steer us away from potentially dangerous conformity and 
consensus and introduces greater fluidity and appreciation of context and difference. 
Rather than the pursuit of an "objectively discoverable truth'" (Strawbridge & Woolfe, 
1996, p.619), its discipline gives primacy to exploring the ways in which individuals 
perceive and attribute particular meanings to their phenomenological realities (Van 
Deurzen-Smith, 1990).
McLeod (1996), for example, considers that attempts to impose diagnostic labels on 
clients, risk obscuring the inevitable ambiguities that compromise individuals' unique 
perspectives. Counselling psychology's use of client and context specific formulation 
minimises this risk as it emphasises evaluating emotional and mental health with respect 
to a person's position in the life cycle, along with their lifestyle and relationships 
(Woolfe, 1996, p. 8). Rather than attempting to categorise clients and their distress, 
counselling psychology pays attention to the particular, i.e. the "little narratives" which 
locate clients' behaviour and experience in its biographical and social context.
"From within to between” - a relational focus."
Counselling psychologists' use of psychological formulation in contrast to relying upon 
diagnosis and psychiatric categories also goes some way towards addressing and
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redistributing power within the therapeutic relationship. Rather than attempting to 
‘objectively’ diagnose from a privileged and expert position thus attempting to answer 
the psychiatric question "is this person suffering from a mental disorder or not?" The 
helping relationship, which forms an integral part of counselling psychology's practice- 
led discipline (see Woolfe, 1996) is characterised by its system of "cooperative inquiry". 
This involves developing a shared understanding between client and therapist to address 
the client's concerns. This approach is characteristically postmodern in that it represents a 
move away from emphasising the psychology of the client - a "one-person psychology" 
(Kahn, 1996), to a focus on what occurs between people, i.e. an intersubjective 
psychology, where the therapist's perspective is acknowledged to impact on the client's 
experience of therapy (Strawbridge, 1992; Wilkinson, Campbell, Coyle, Jordan & 
Milton, 1997). Indeed The British Psychological Society now formally recognises the 
values of practice-led counselling psychology, of phenomenological practice and inquiry, 
including respect for subjectivity and intersubjectivity (BPS, 1998). This stance appears 
to be a move beyond the technical rationality inherent in modernist approaches attempts 
to objectify clients, and their psychological distress, towards what Schon (1983) refers to 
as "reflective practice" whereby the subjective horizons of both client and therapist can 
meet.
Earlier it was noted that traditional approaches adopt a medical knowledge base and 
assume a direct correspondence between language and ‘reality’ wherein the mental health 
professional acts as an ‘expert’ and is able to diagnose a ‘true’ account of the problem in 
accordance with descriptive categories. However, Rogers and Pilgrim (1997) note that 
psychiatric classification systems hold no definitive advantage over ordinary or lay 
descriptions of psychopathology. They argue that ordinary people know that these aspects 
of experience come in all shapes and sizes, and that they can offer a rich range- of lay 
theories about their development and amelioration. Instead of using supposedly 
"objective" categorical descriptions, which are more reductionist, impersonal and 
stigmatising, counselling psychologists' use of psychological formulation works with, 
rather than on, the client. It is more responsive to clients' own descriptions and
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understandings of their difficulties. As such it is more sensitive to the psychosocial 
context of everyday behaviour, experience and language thus avoiding technicalising and 
pathologising ordinary judgments.
Such context-specific formulations are at odds with the notion of diagnosis and entail 
what Kaye (1993) refers to as a "receptive stance" toward the therapeutic encounter. 
Rather than buying into objectivist truth discourses that focus on pathology, the receptive 
stance views the individual as an agent rather than an object; as such, it implies a 
receptiveness and curiosity about the client's construction of experience, together with an 
active search for negotiated meanings, rather than a reductive reframing of the others 
presenting concerns in accordance with predetermined psychiatric diagnostic categories.
The primacy afforded to the therapeutic relationship in counselling psychology is 
congruent with postmodern practices. Resting on a form of relational practice between 
therapist and client, counselling psychology seeks to reach "joint understanding" (Shorter, 
1993) wherein local meanings and understandings are collaboratively reached, rather than 
imposed or prescribed as in modern models of applied practice. This approach helps 
ensure that ordinary human distress e.g. developmental difficulties, traumatic 
experiences, context related stress and so on, are not turned into pathology or sickness 
akin to physical disease. This relational focus attends to situational factors thereby bye- 
passing the notion of "disorder" which locates the difficulty within the person. 
Additionally, formulation remains tentative in contrast to using descriptive categories that 
can be presented as scientific and objective. In line with its phenomenological and 
humanistic value system, "healing" can be seen to occur as a result of "being with" the 
client rather than "doing" a diagnosis and/or fixing what traditionally would be 
objectified as "the disorder/problem". This relational focus and use of context-specific 
formulation creates therapeutic space for the exploration, negotiation and transformation 
of local meanings - i.e. the little narratives.
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Conclusion
In this paper, I have sought to deconstruct traditional understandings of psychopathology 
by unearthing their modernist assumptions and orientation. Particular attention has been 
given to the notion of categorisation and how this binds psychological theoiy and 
explanations of psychopathology to the modern world-view. Having questioned the 
impact of.this traditional stance, the focus shifted towards applied practice. Counselling 
psychology's general approach and orientation towards psychopathology was considered. 
More specifically, counselling psychology's use of psychological formulation was 
contrasted with the traditional use of psycho-diagnosis. Whilst the aim has not been to 
reach any definitive answers (a modernist endeavour), this paper has attempted to address 
and contribute towards furthering constructive dialogue regarding the issue of 
understanding and working with psychological difference. Whilst not explicitly 
constructionist in its epistemology and orientation, it is my own contention that 
counselling psychology is a vital part of the "gathering storm" challenging traditional 
knowledge in the mental sciences.
Strawbridge and Woolfe's (1996) contention that "counselling psychology is not just a 
psychological activity but is also a cultural enterprise" (p. 606) reflexively questioning its 
relevance to society and role in maintaining and/or challenging the existing social 
structure, mark it out as a critical form of psychology with the potential to challenge the 
existing status quo, formulate new knowledges and improve practice. Wide scale, this is 
exemplified in counselling psychology's phenomenological and humanistic value base, its 
reaction against the medical model of professional-client relationships and its emphasis 
on well-being rather than pathology. More specifically this has been illustrated by 
counselling psychology's use of psychological formulation, which brings into question 
the traditional use of the diagnostic approaches, and at the same time forwards a non­
pathology orientated means of assessing and working with psychological difference and 
abnormality. Most notably, it provides a mode of practice that collaboratively negotiates 
between therapist and client the meaning of psychological ‘abnormality’ and
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psychological distress. Thus, contrary to traditional psychology which tends to 
decontextualise clients' distress, viewing psychopathology as internal or within the client, 
counselling psychologists encourage clients to distinguish between internal/psychological 
and external/social aspects of the issues they are dealing with and find appropriate 
strategies for both. In this way, the client is not blamed but recognised and validated in 
their struggle, and thus empowered to find social and personal solutions to their 
psychological distress.
Whilst having to address and acknowledge the fact that counselling psychology draws its 
roots from modernist approaches and models that essentially began a century ago, it 
nonetheless appears to be evolving and modifying itself in light of the changing cultural 
context within which it is situated. It has developed models of practice and inquiry that 
are at odds with the dominant view of science within the discipline (Strawbridge & 
Woolfe, 1996) and according to Clarkson (1995) is uniquely placed to "evaluate and 
implement theories which are used as tools, as metaphors as Witgensteinian ladders 
rather than as laws set in tablets of stone, unresponsive to changing conditions, unaware 
of the interrelatedness of all our explanatory theoretical nets." Its "methodological 
pluralism" (Barkham, 1990) and eclectic approach to practice seems open to diversity 
(Gelso et al, 1988) and 'confluence' (Clarkson, 1996) of theories and techniques to 
generate understanding and acceptance among the innumerable 'local' meanings and 
interactions of human activity. Arguably, embracing a pluralistic outlook bodes well for 
its ongoing development as a discipline.
Finally, this paper has used the modernist / postmodernist dichotomy to clarify and 
critique modernity's influence in regards to the notion of psychopathology and associated 
applied practices. However, perhaps the most revolutionary and exciting aspect of 
counselling psychology is that it replaces this binary either/or logic with a both/and 
position. Counselling psychology is not part of the postmodern reaction that radically 
rejects the possibility of knowledge, celebrating the diverse and ephemeral; rather it 
represents a critical recognition of the limits and excesses of modernism, yet a
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willingness to continue to seek understanding without the certainties of modernist 
assumptions. As a corollary, the counselling psychologist is invited to conjoin the 
personal, professional and the political. It is to be hoped that mental health professionals 
will be stimulated to enter the debate by considering their own responsibility to challenge 
and expose the shortcomings of traditional modernist forms of psychological inquiry and 
practice, and their potentially normalising and pathologising influence, whilst continually 
developing more liberatory notions of psychological difference and emancipatory forms 
of applied practice.
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Use of Self
Many different experiences, both personal and professional have motivated me to explore 
the psychological literature on 'psychopathology' and the use of diagnostic classification 
systems. Having personally lived with 'obsessive compulsive disorder' (undiagnosed) for 
a large part of my life and also having witnessed the dehumanising effects of diagnostic 
categories on somebody close to me when they were 'diagnosed' with a psychological 
'disorder', I felt both interested and duty bound to become more informed about the 
discipline of psychology's conceptualisation and approach towards psychological 
'abnormality' and distress. Also, having specifically opted to study counselling 
psychology largely on account of its reaction against the medical model I wanted to see 
where it stood and what its relationship was with 'psychopathology'. This felt particularly 
important, as I was becoming increasingly aware of the tension between theory and 
practice in my own training. I liked the critical focus and conceptual tools provided by 
social constructionist perspectives, which I felt were vital for reflective and ethical 
practice. At the same time I was looking to explore and find ways of making theory 
meaningful at the level of practice, which was my primary concern given that I had 
started working clinically with people who were experiencing very 'real' psychological 
distress that could not be simply dismissed as a 'social construction'.
The process of conducting the review was a challenging task. The complexity of the area 
and level of debate surrounding the issue of 'psychopathology' and the use of diagnostic 
classification systems was difficult to hold in mind. It was especially difficult trying not 
to privilege one account over another, which included trying not to privilege a social 
constructionist account. As I found the areas being reviewed were so emotive, impacting 
on me personally as well as professionally, I recognised that it was not possible to 
forward an account that wasn't interested. As such the challenge I faced was to try and 
say something that I believed in, without just dismissing others' views on purely personal 
grounds, i.e., taking the view that whilst 'psychopathology' and psychological 
'abnormality' are socially constructed and that the 'truth' of different perspectives is
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relative, our ways of conceptualising 'psychopathology' nonetheless have 'real' effects and 
consequences, some of which are preferable to others. This tension was a large part of the 
process and helped me to make further sense of my own personal and professional 
relationship with the areas being reviewed. One of the positive effects of having 
conducted the review was that it helped to ensure that my developing position and 
preferred approach towards conceptualising and working with 'psychological 
abnormality' was an informed one. Engaging with the areas under review during my first 
year was also relevant given the context (Employee Assistance Program) I was working 
in during my first year clinical placement. Here, there was an implicit tension between 
practitioners, many of whom were opposed to the use of diagnostic categories, and the 
service providers, who required practitioners to use diagnostic categories in order to 
make decisions about employees work status. Having conducted the review and 
experienced first hand some of the ongoing tensions and debate at the level of theory and 
practice, I became aware that there weren't any easy or definite answers. Nonetheless it 
affirmed my belief that it is important to keep asking questions about the consequences 
and effects of what is often taken-for-granted.
I very much enjoyed exploring this topic, which has been brought to life through my 
experience of working clinically with people who are experiencing psychological 
distress. Having engaged with the literature I am now looking forward to conducting 
research aligned with these areas.
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Psycho-Diagnostic Categories, ’Psychopathology’ and Counselling Psychology: A 
Discourse Analytic Study of Chartered Counselling Psychologists’ Talk.
Abstract
This study set out to examine talk about ’psychopathology', diagnostic categories, and 
counselling psychology practice from a social constructionist perspective and used a 
discourse analytic methodology. A total of eight Chartered Counselling Psychologists 
were interviewed. The interviews were audio taped and transcribed in detail in order to 
attend to both micro and macro discursive features. The constructions offered were 
situated within two interpretive repertoires ('empiricist' and 'contingent'). Particular 
attention was paid to The rhetorical effects and functions of their discursive practices. 
Analysis suggested that speakers used the available discursive resources flexibly in their 
accounts to achieve a variety of personal, interpersonal and professional functions. The 
oppositional nature of the available discourses meant that speakers were positioned in 
dilemmatic ways in relation to their professional identity. The way in which they deal 
with such dilemmas via agentive positioning in practice is considered. The potential 
application of these finding are discussed.
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Introduction
This discursive study is intended as a piece of sustained critical engagement with (and a 
contribution to) ongoing transdiciplinary dialogues and challenges stemming from 
various quarters of the humanities and sciences. Such dialogues have served to locate 
psychological science as a by-product of what Gergen (1994) has been termed "cultural 
modernism" and have questioned and challenged modernist concepts pivotal to the 
common practices of psychology such as 'truth', 'rationality', 'objectivity', 'expertise' and 
'scientific progress'. The present research can therefore be located as part of the wider 
historical and cultural transformations that have created what Curt (1994) refers to as a 
"climate of problematisation" where there is a 'disenchantment' with the established view 
that it is possible to gain direct access to the 'truth' through the correct (scientific) method 
and thus 'solutions' to the 'problems' (e.g. to 'cure' mental 'illness') that beset society and 
individuals.
Traditionally, at the level of theory and research biomedical and reductionist explanations 
have dominated scientific and psychotherapeutic worldviews with regard to 
'psychopathology' (Fee, 2000). Psychological disorders and distress have been 
conceptualised as residing in individuals who are seen as pathological or irrational in 
some way. The ontological and epistemological basis for traditional conceptualisations 
differs from discursive approaches in being 'realist'. A representational view of language 
holds precedence so that terms such as 'psychopathology', mental 'illness' and 
'schizophrenia' are assumed to 'represent' or denote actual distinct mental entities or states 
as things-in-themselves, which can be identified, measured, categorised and treated. As 
such, theory and research findings are taken to express 'facts' that have been 'discovered' 
about certain phenomena independent of ideology, values, context or interpretation, i.e. 
stand independent from processes of social construction. However following the 'turn to 
language' (Parker, 1992) in the social sciences and humanities, attention has been 
directed towards the discursive or textual underpinnings of mental life and their role in 
the study of psychopathology (see Parker et al. 1995; Rose, 1989; Shorter, 1993). A
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constructionist informed intelligibility gives primacy to a view , of language as 
constructive and constitutive of reality rather than merely as a representational medium 
(Burman & Parker, 1993; Gergen, 1994; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 'Psychopathology' 
(however defined and categorised) and psychological knowledge are recast as social 
constructions rather than 'actual things' (McNamee & Gergen, 1992), which are 
linguistically negotiated via the socio-cultural meanings that are historically prevalent 
(see Gergen, 1985, 1994).
Burr (1995) notes that the idea of language being structured into a number of discourses 
has been taken up by a variety of writers (e.g. Foucault, 1972, 1976; Hollway, 1984; 
Parker, 1992) along with the notion that the meaning of a 'signifier' (for example, 
'psychopathology') is dependent upon the context of the discourse in which it is used. 
This brings into focus the role of discourses in wider social processes since they make 
possible and credible particular ways of seeing and acting in the world. As such, the ways 
in which discourses are interwoven with institutional structures and practices highlights 
their role in the process of legitimation and the exercise of power. However, whilst a 
particular discourse may come to dominate or become the 'common sense' of the time, it 
is the nature of discourses that they are always being implicitly contested by other 
discourses. That is to say, alternative constructions or counter-discourses can and do 
emerge (Willig, 2001). Central to the current investigation is Foucault's (1979) view that 
power-knowledge and power-resistance are always operating together. In Curt's (1994) 
terms, "human science knowledge is not an ideologically neutral telling-it-how-it-is, 
rather, it is the use of knowledge to monger power - the power to construct particular 
versions of events". Billig et al's (1988) discursive approach is useful here as it stresses 
the 'dilemmatic' aspects of ideology and of thinking generally. Participants are seen to 
possess contrary linguistic repertoires (ideologically infused discourses) for talking about 
their professional worlds and practices. The oppositional nature of the themes allow 
participants to discuss, deliberate, conform, resist and argue over such issues as 
'psychopathology', diagnostic categories and counselling psychology practice.
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In addition to constructing objects, discourses also construct subjects. They make 
available positions within networks of meaning (e.g. professional communities of 
practice) that speakers can take up as well as resist. A subject position within discourse 
identifies 'a location for persons within the structure of rights and duties for those who 
use that repertoire* (Davies & Harre, 1990). The concept of'positioning* is useful in the 
context of the present study, as it provides a useful way to characterise the shifting 
responsibilities and interactive involvements of members of a community of practice as it 
encompasses the emergence of the actor and an institutional order. Embedded within 
historically and ideologically constituted discourses participants' understandings of their 
communities of practice may have deterministic effects with regard to their actions and 
conduct. However, this is not absolute as the existence of quandaries and contradictory 
options in dynamic interactions enables the possibility of acting agentically when faced 
with particular dilemmas (Linehan & McCarthy, 2000).
The result of this constructionist approach is that the dilemmatic and rhetorical nature of 
accounts, along with issues of the 'good' arid the 'real' and personal, professional 
(institutional) accountability and responsibility take centre stage. Analysis therefore 
attends to the discursive practices of particular participants, i.e. the situated and 
interested nature of discursive constructions and action orientation of talk, and also to the 
discursive resources, i.e. the wider cultural and institutional frameworks of meanings and 
practices, within which they are produced. This eclectic approach advocated by Wetherell
(1998), pays attention to both micro and macro levels of analysis. Such a 'twin focus' has 
the potential to examine the interrelationship between the production of knowledge, the 
exercise of power and situated discursive practices - by considering how, and to what 
ends, 'psychopathology', diagnostic categories and counselling psychology practice are 
constructed by speakers in and through discourse. Furthermore, the construction and 
management of'professional identity' becomes a site of great discursive interest, in that it 
highlights the dilemmatic nature of the relationship between 'psychopathology', 
diagnostic categories and counselling psychology practice. Such research seems timely 
given the ideological push towards professionalisation (House, 1999), current debates
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within the discipline of counselling psychology regarding the use of diagnostic categories 
(see Strawbridge & James, 2001), and more general debates between traditional (realist) 
and constructionist conceptions of psychological science and the nature of 
'psychopathology'. Thus, a discursive approach enters the fray by conjoining the 
professional and the political. By highlighting the textual and interested nature of 
psychological theory and practice, the 'objective' existence of modernist terms such as 
'psychopathology' and 'schizophrenia' are challenged along with the taken for granted and 
potentially harmful (e.g. pathologising / normalising) aspects of their use. Problematising 
the modernist foundations underpinning counselling psychology's use of diagnostic 
categories moves us to reflexively ask questions regarding its relevance to society and its 
role in maintaining and / or challenging existing social-institutional structures and 
practices.
Method
Participants
Ethical approval was gained from the University of Surrey's Advisory Committee on 
Ethics before recruiting participants (see Appendix A). In order to allow for diversity 
within and across the accounts to emerge, data was collected through individual 
interviews with eight Chartered Counselling Psychologists. Four had recently qualified 
(within the past five years), whilst the other four had achieved chartered status via the 
'grand-parenting' scheme. They had a range of clinical experience in private, primary, 
secondary, and tertiary settings and are identified by pseudonyms only.
Interviews
Interviews were conducted either in the participants' own home, at their place of work or 
within a University in the South of England. Each participant was given an information 
sheet and informed consent form that outlined the study and what their involvement
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entailed (see Appendix B and C). In order not to overly constrain participants' accounts I 
followed a semi-structured format during the interviews covering three broad themes: 1) 
their personal / professional view or understanding of 'psychopathology', 2) counselling 
psychology practice and, 3) use of psychiatric diagnostic categories (see Appendix D for 
interview schedule). Open-ended questions were supplemented by reflections upon the 
content of their responses and requests for elaboration of points made. Potter and 
Wetherell (1987) have noted that interviewees' responses are shaped responsively by their 
expectations of the interview. This was present during the interviews as I appeared to be 
placed in a number of different positions, for example, as an interested student / colleague 
as participants were aware that I am a trainee counselling psychologist.
Method o f Analysis
Each interview was audiotaped and transcribed (see Appendix F for a copy of a 
transcript) by the researcher using a basic version of the notation scheme proposed by 
Atkinson and Heritage (1984), (see Appendix E). The data was analysed largely 
following Potter and Wetherell's (1987) guidelines and adapted by Coyle (2000). 
Interviews were read line by line at least two times to identify and note recurring themes 
whilst attending to the questions "why is this particular utterance here?" "what are the 
possible functions of this particular utterance?" and "what discourses are being invoked 
in this utterance?" The coding procedure was a preliminary to analysis itself and entailed 
finding analytically interesting and relevant portions of text (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1992). 
These extracts were then coded in accordance to their relevance to a set of inclusive 
categories, i.e. 'psychopathology', counselling psychology practice and the use of 
diagnostic categories.
The analytic process involved a sustained engagement between the researcher and text, 
which entailed further reading and rereading of extracts in order to formulate hypotheses 
or interpretations. The analytic focus moved recursively between on the one hand, micro 
level discursive practices wherein attention was paid to the rhetorical functions, and
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action orientation of talk, and on the other hand, a macro level consideration of the 
discursive resources within which these discursive practices were produced.
The choice of material and resulting analysis reflects the theoretical commitments and 
interests of the researcher. Given the social constructionist (non-realist) epistemology 
underpinning this research, traditional criteria used to evaluate quantitative research (e.g. 
validity and reliability) are inappropriate as it is openly acknowledged that the analyst 
cannot stand independent of the text they are analysing. As such, no claim is made that 
the analysis is 'objective' in the traditional sense. Letting go of the hand-rail of'truth' and 
external validation, the aim was to illuminate local and contingent 'truths' rather than 
engaging in meta-theoretical 'truth games'. No claim is made other than to make a 
particular 'reading' available, which is open to further interpretations or 're-writing'. 
Nonetheless, the particular narrative or reading that has been constructed aims to forward 
a purposeful interpretation of the texts. Interpretations have been linked to quotations; 
therefore the reader is allowed to determine how persuasive, and well supported by the 
texts, the analysis is and what the utility of its insights are (see Elliot et al. 1999 for 
evolving guidelines).
Analysis
Discoursing Distress
Two opposing accounts / constructions predominated in participants' talk about 
'psychopathology', diagnostic categories and counselling psychology practice. These 
themes have been termed the 'empiricist' and 'contingent' repertoires respectively1. They 
are understood as providing the 'conditions of discursivity' (Curt, 1994) or background 
discourses that allow participants, within their professional communities, to sustain what
1 Given that I distinguished in the data set strong and consistent resonance's o f these repertoires that I had 
encountered in my reading before starting the analysis (see Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Harper, 1994), it 
seemed more sensible to invoke these terms rather than tiying to produce new terms for the same discursive 
phenomena with the aim o f laying claim to spurious originality.
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Wittgenstein (1953) called its "form of life". That is to say that traditional institutions, 
their discourses and practices invite particular ways of life and meaningful practices (for 
professionals and their clients), and discourage, silence or repel others.
With a twin focus the present study aims to take into account the availability of these 
interpretive repertoires within a particular cultural and professional formation - the 
discipline and practice of counselling psychology - alongside individual participants' 
local concerns and their realisation through discourse within a specific context. As a 
starting point, I have chosen to present several extracts in order to illustrate what 
appeared to be salient features of the repertoires. My aim is not to pit one against the 
other and attempt to determine which account is 'true or 'best' in any 'objective' sense (a 
modernist endeavour) but rather to reflect critically on the discursive systems (global and 
local) that participants are embedded within, along with the linguistic resources they 
utilise, in order to achieve certain ends, i.e. to 'make sense' and speak as 'rational' agents 
(psychologists).
Empiricist Repertoire
What is referred to in this paper as the 'empiricist repertoire' is used to signify modernist 
notions and assumptions regarding such basic issues as 'reality', 'knowledge', 'science', 
psychological 'disorders' and their 'cure', along with the principles of modern science 
implicit in contemporary psychology. It is often referred to synonymously as 
'objectivism', 'positivism', 'naive realism' or the 'received view' and provides the ground in 
which the empiricist repertoire is rooted.
Throughout the texts participants are seen implicitly and explicitly to make use of an 
empiricist discourse as they describe, explain and make attributions about the 'objects' 
they are orientating towards. This appears to serve many functions, the most salient of 
which being to construct a version of events wherein 'psychopathology' is granted 
ontological status as a 'thing' that 'exists' independently in the world. This particular
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construction appears to be intimately bound up with legitimating the use of diagnostic 
categories.
P ^Participant 
R= Researcher
Extract One (Interview 3 - Diana)
112 P: I suppose you’re looking for things that would (4) yeah (.) I haven’t
113 thought about this like this before but er (.) but that would (.)
114 differentiate them from how anybody might react in a particular situation
115 for instance or if  they have (1) if they're thinking in ways that wouldn’t
116 be within what you'd think to be the normal range (.) so (.) you know (.)
117 if  they think that they (.) as I had a client (.) who before she saw me
118 R: [right]
119 P: when she had a psychotic depression and was (.) enn (.) in hospital (.)
120 R: [Mmm] [mm]
121 P: she believed that she had caused BSC (.) you know (.) now the
122 R: [right]
123 P: medical model is (.) probably very useful when it comes to dealing
124 with somebody with that level of-of pathology that’s so disabling (.) er
125 (.) that is (.) well (.) that is so outside the norm (.) er (.) or people
126 R: [right]
127 P: who think they're Jesus Christ.
112
Extract Two (Interview 4 - Nathan)
30 P: She's a paranoid-schizophrenic (1.5) with CLEAR EVIDENCE of that
31 (.) auditory and visual hallucinations (.) many-many symptoms (1)...
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Initially in the first extract (line 112) the construction of'psychopathology' is offered 
cautiously ('I suppose') with an additional qualifier to minimise the extent of the claim ('I 
haven’t thought about this like this before'). This can be seen as a form of 'stake 
inoculation' (Potter, 1996) and appears to perform important work in terms of managing 
stake, i.e. it functions to reduce personal accountability for any claims that follow. Potter 
(1996) notes that the empiricist repertoire is a standard device for constructing the 'out- 
there-ness' of a particular phenomenon. In both extracts, the 'reality' of 'psychopathology' 
is achieved by working up a construction that portrays it as something that exists 
independently as a thing-in-itself 'out there' in the world. This is partially achieved by 
using the metaphor of scientific discoveiy and visual, observational and legal terms, for 
example, "looking for things" (extract 1 line 112) and "CLEAR EVIDENCE" (extract 2 
line 30). Crucially the use of this metaphor constructs a version of events whereby the 
discoverer (psychologist) is portrayed as merely revealing something that has been there 
all along. A notable feature of this type of accounting is that it constructs a logical 
(rational) argument: i.e. 'psychopathology' exists so therefore it can be dis-covered. The 
rhetorical pay off appears to be that the conclusion, i.e. presence of'psychopathology', is 
warranted by the impersonal operation of logic, rather than the motivated inference of the 
speaker, thus providing a reassuring sense of'objectivity' or rationality.
This sense of'objectivity' is made intelligible through recourse to an empiricist discourse, 
which operates in dualistic terms by creating a clear separation between subject and 
object, or between the knower and the known. This duality is evident in the second 
extract, "She's a paranoid-schizophrenic" (line 30), which is bolstered by the specific use 
of a diagnostic category and associated professional vocabulary, for example, 'auditory 
and visual hallucinations', which gains added legitimacy through its grounding in 
medico-scientific frameworks of understanding. It is also evident in extract 1 when Diana 
says, "if they're thinking in ways that wouldn’t be within what you'd think to be the 
normal range" (line 115-16) The implication that such a construction allows is that the 
speaker (psychologist) or the listener is positioned as the 'knower', an 'expert' who holds a 
privileged position in relation to the experiences of the client. Implicitly this makes it
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possible for clients to be positioned as 'passive objects' whose behaviour and thinking can 
be 'observed' and thus classified.
By constructing their claims in a logical fashion, weight is added to the notion that 
speakers are merely observing and reflecting upon an 'object' (psychopathology) that has 
a pre-existing character. The implication of this discursive form is that an atmosphere is 
created that allows speakers to account for and legitimate the diagnostic venture (and use 
of diagnostic categories) as a logical process of'objectively' discovering the 'facts' of 
'psychopathology'. In the present accounts, the 'facts' of 'psychopathology' come in the 
form of 'evidence', which is constituted by the identification of 'symptoms'. In the first 
extract, such 'evidence' takes the shape of behavioural reactions and particular forms of 
thinking that are either present or absent and which differentiate the client from 'normal' 
thinking and behaviour (lines 114-16). Initially, however, what the 'norm' is and exactly 
what kinds of behaviours or forms of thinking that constitute such deviation from this 
'norm' are not specified. Such non-specificity is also evident in the second extract. 
Though a categorical description (paranoid schizophrenia) is provided mentioning 
particular symptoms, i.e. auditory and visual hallucinations, the emphasis and stress is 
placed on there being "CLEAR EVIDENCE" and "many-many symptoms" (lines 30-31). 
Rather than providing detailed descriptions that situate behaviour and experience in their 
biographical and social contexts, it seems that vague global formulations are preferred. A 
possible function of this type of construction is that it erects a rhetorical barrier making 
the 'obviousness' of its claims difficult to challenge or undermine by providing just 
enough information to infer the presence of 'psychopathology. Another rhetorical device 
is used in the first extract that serves to further externalise the ’out-there-ness’ of 
'psychopathology'. The description of a client who thought she had caused BSC or people 
who think they are Jesus Christ (extract 1 lines 117-27) functions to make the report more 
effective by drawing on extremes of relevant dimensions of judgement with regard to 
f non-normative activities. As an example of what Edwards and Potter (1992) refer to as 
'extreme case formulations', it appears to achieve the rhetorical effect of rendering 'self-
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evident' the 'objective' presence of'psychopathology, thus increasing the 'facticity' of the 
account.
The features of an empiricist discourse highlighted in extracts one and two were common 
throughout the texts. For example, "you're the one with (.) the experience and knowledge 
(.) the expertise (.) you know (.) to make offers of treatment" (Annabel Interview 6: lines 
43-5.), Kate in relation to 'anorexia', "you can see it (.) no doubt about it"( Interview 8: 
line 145), "I try to seek understanding in observable behaviour" (Nathan, Interview 4: 
lines 360-1),"you get people (.) a lot of clinically depressed patients in primary care" (Sue 
Interview 7: lines 303-4), "someone presenting with a clear panic disorder" (Janine 
Interview 5: line 412).
Contingent Repertoire
Though the empiricist repertoire appeared to be central to participants' accounts they also 
drew upon a contingent repertoire during the interviews. I am using the'contingent 
repertoire to denote the conditional and interested nature of specific accounting practices. 
Whereas the empiricist repertoire appeared to provide a means of talking about 
'psychopathology' and diagnostic categories at a more impersonal, theoretical and 
'objective' level, the contingent repertoire constructed the use of diagnostic categories as a 
less than straightforward endeavour that was influenced and. shaped by a number of 
factors, for example, "client understanding and desired outcome" (Diana, Interview 3: 
lines 379-80), "personality factors" (Nick, Interview 2: line 159), "individual 
experiences" (Charlotte, Interview 1: line 336), "training" (Sue, Interview 7: line 251), 
"therapeutic orientation" (Janine, Interview 5: line 254), and "philosophical viewpoint" 
(Nathan, Interview 4: lines 83-4). As is evident, rather than having access to or only using 
an empiricist or contingent repertoire, both repertoires frequently occurred within 
accounts from the same participants. Nonetheless, a dominant feature that came up 
repeatedly throughout the interviews was that the contingent repertoire appeared to act in 
contrast to the empiricist account.
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Extract 3 (Interview 2 -Nick)
248 P: You know in the context of where I work now (1.5) you know (.) the
249 diagnosis o f  schizophrenia is not helpful because I can get a client or I
250 can go to assess a client and I (.) now his diagnosis is paranoid-
251 schizophrenia (1) but I have (.) you know (.) the diagnostic (.) erm (.)
252 criteria for that is so broad and so meaningless that it (.) it is meaningless
253 because I have no idea what to expect (.) it could be someone who's very
254 disturbed and very unwell and very unable to communicate yet it could
255 be someone who (1) has no problem communicating their symptoms (.)
256 R: [right]
257 P: yet (.) you know still had auditory hallucinations and can be quite flat
258 but coping okay. I think it depends (.) you know some criteria or some
259 labels are quite useful some really aren't=
260 R: =right
261 P: so I guess I take it with a pinch o f salt really (.) so at the end o f  the
262 day it's what it means to the client (.) it’s what concerns the clients (.)
263 erm (.) what they're expressing or able to express which I find most
264 important rather (.) that I go on (.) rather than whatever diagnosis they've
265 received.
266 R: When you say (.) "that you go on" (.) you mean?
267 P: That informs my formulation or informs (.) you know (.) whatever
268 therapeutic rationale that I'll try and consider (1) and I won't say (.) you
269 know (.) if  I'm referred a client and it says "this person (.) has a diagnosis
270 o f  borderline personality disorder" (.) I wouldn’t read that and think "oh
271 right so I'm going to do..." you know-you know (.) "evidence based
272 practice with this client is DBT [dialectical behaviour therapy] or
273 schema-focused therapy" (.) rather I'll wait until I see the person (..) let's
274 see what they come with (.) you know (.) they might (.) they could
275 describe symptoms that are consistent with anxiety or depression which
276 I'm thinking (.) you know (.) formulate in a different way.
As has been noted, the empiricist repertoire functions as a reifying discourse turning 
something abstract ('psychopathology') into a thing. One way in which this particular 
construction was put to use was to portray the psychologist as having 'objective' 
knowledge about 'psychopathology' independent from context or any form of 
interpretation. In the above extract, we find that the speaker forwards a more personal and 
interested account wherein the 'reality' of'psychopathology' and the utility of diagnostic 
categories are constructed as contentious issues contingent upon a number of factors.
. This alternate and contrasting version of events emphasises the local and particular over 
universal categorisations, and works potentially to subvert or problematise the empiricist 
account. Given that speakers actively gain certain rights and privileges (category 
entitlements) through use of an empiricist repertoire that constructs the psychologist as 
being in some way 'scientific' and 'objective, any break away from this position poses a 
dilemma for the speaker in terms of how they manage their own interest and stake, i.e. 
their culturally sanctioned position as 'professional helper'.
From the start of this extract Nick appears to be building an alternative account (situating 
psychotherapeutic practice) that contrasts with an empiricist one, whilst carefully 
managing his own stake or interest. In the opening sequence he starts by orientating to a 
specific context, i.e. his current place of work, which is followed by the claim that a 
diagnosis of schizophrenia is not helpful in this context (lines 248-9). This is not 
presented as a stand-alone statement; rather it is something that requires justification. 
Interestingly, even whilst working up an alternative contingent account, he still makes 
flexible use of empiricist forms of reporting. For example, he accounts for the claim that 
the diagnosis of schizophrenia is not helpful by presenting the reasons in the form of a 
list, i.e. I) the speaker does not know what to expect because the criteria are so broad they 
are meaningless, II) the client may be disturbed and unable to communicate their 
symptoms, III) the client may be coping and able to communicate their symptoms (lines
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251-56). The list works to indicate that these are more than individual instances on their 
own, but instances standing for a more general state of affairs. By appealing to the 
generality of the situation, this particular presentation helps to work up the veracity of the 
account, which makes it more difficult to challenge on the grounds that it is a one off 
situation or just his personal view.
Significant use is made of'context', which appears to be central to the account and serves 
several different functions. For example, 'you know in the context of where I work now' 
(line 248), can be seen to act potentially as an inoculation or disclaimer against 
challenges or counter claims that he is not doing his job responsibly. This is achieved by 
developing the account in the narrative of a role player, which positions the speaker as 
being pushed and pulled by the exigencies of context. For example, line 249 Nick says, 'I 
can get a client' and later in line 253 'I have no idea what to expect', which works to 
manage the accountability of his actions. Additionally, it characterises what follows, i.e. 
the speaker's interaction with clients and his stance towards and use of diagnostic 
categories to inform psychotherapeutic practice, as happening routinely - is 'normal' - in 
this particular setting.
As the account develops, the initial claim, i.e. that the diagnosis of schizophrenia is not 
helpful (lines 248-9) is followed by an additional claim, 'I think it depends (.)you know 
some criteria or some labels are quite useful some really aren't...' (lines 258-9). This 
possibly functions to deflect attention away from the initial claim, which could be 
undermined on the grounds that it is just his personal view. Further rhetorical work helps 
to neutralise the initial claim further: '...I take it with a pinch of salt really (.) so at the 
end of the day it's what it means to the client...' (lines 261-2). The implication of this 
construction is that the speaker is positioned as being somewhat ambivalent towards the 
possibility of achieving any fixed or 'objective' truths regarding 'psychopathology' and the 
utility of diagnostic categories. This subtly redirects the conversational focus towards the 
speaker's actual concerned involvement and interaction with clients and helps to work up 
and legitimate a contrasting account where the diagnostic venture and the utility of
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diagnostic categories only 'make sense' in relation to a context of usage. As such, 
'understanding' can be interpreted as being discursively linked to action and conduct. This 
is partly achieved by foregrounding the personal and involved position of the 
psychologist and the dynamic interplay with clients. For example, "...it's what it means to 
the client (.) it's what concerns the client (.) erm (.) what they're expressing or able to 
express which I find most important rather that I go on (.) rather than whatever diagnosis 
they've received" (lines 262-65). Additionally, there is significant use of personal 
pronouns where Nick refers to himself as 'I' to index the various actions he performs. For 
example, 'I work' (line 248), 'I think' (line 258), 'I find' (line 263), and 'I'll try', (line 268). 
A vital way that Nick warrants his actions, making them appear reasonable and 
justifiable, is by presenting different kinds of self, appropriately. As the speaker accounts 
for how his own personal understanding and stance inform his actual practice, he presents 
himself as considerate, thoughtful, reflective, open-minded, and acting tentatively with 
the client's best interests in mind. This positioning is achieved by accounting for how he 
would work with somebody who had received a diagnosis of borderline personality 
disorder. Referring to this diagnosis, use is made of reported speech, e.g. "oh right so I'm 
going to do ..." (.) you know-you know (.) "evidence based practice with this client is 
DBT [dialectical behaviour therapy] or schema focused therapy "...(lines 270-73). Even 
though this is presented hypothetically, it nonetheless indicates to the listener or reader 
that this report is in some way typical of 'standard' psychotherapeutic practice. In it the 
psychologist is portrayed implicitly as a detached impassionate empirical being who goes 
about 'objectively' applying the appropriate psychological intervention according to the 
'evidence' or specific diagnosis with little or no regard for the person. As such, any 
interaction is downplayed and the psychologist's interestedness is heavily obscured. This 
construction allows the speaker to position himself as being, and acting, in opposition to 
this. For example, '...rather I'll wait until I see the person (.) let's see what they come with 
(.) they might...' (lines 273-74). The implication of this is that the psychologist is 
positioned favourably as aiming to work collaboratively with the client rather than acting 
upon them. In contrast to the empiricist account, this particular construction casts the
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categorisation of behaviour and experience as being contingent upon an interaction 
between the therapist and client.
Dilemmatic Dances
So far it has been highlighted that participants possess contrary, i.e. empiricist and 
contingent, linguistic repertoires. The persistently oppositional nature of the views 
forwarded were often explicitly presented as being problematical or as positioning the 
speaker in a dilemma, for example, 'that’s where the problems start' (Charlotte Interview 
1: line 29), 'so you know the-the friction or tension between psychology and psychiatry' 
(Nick Interview 2: linel05), 'so you're automatically in a ‘funny position' (Diana Interview 
3: line 647), 'it was a huge dilemma' (Janine Interview 5: line 195), 'there are radically 
opposing philosophical views' (Sue Interview 7: line 390) and only make sense against a 
background of historical, cultural, institutional and ideological assumptions about the 
nature of reality and knowledge. The analysis proceeds by focusing specifically on the 
dilemmatic nature of participants' accounts as they orientate to the issues of 
psychopathology, diagnostic categories and counselling psychology practice. There were 
several pervasive themes evident across the texts relating to the dilemmatic aspects of 
ideology (Billig et al. 1988). They centred upon tensions between the notions of authority 
and equality, theory and practice and between categorisation and particularisation. Due to 
space limitation, the analysis will focus on the tension between authority and equality.
In the following extract, as Charlotte orientates to the use of diagnostic categories we find 
ambivalence between authoritarian expertise one the one hand and democratic 
egalitarianism on the other, as she manages her identity as a counselling psychologist.
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Extract 4 (Interview 1 - Charlotte)
368 P: I mean not in the sense that I think that diagnostic categories are
369 absolutely necessary and that’s what we should use and that’s how (.) we
370 should think (.) you know (.) how we should formulate client problems
371 or whatever but (.) in terms o f  the necessity o f (1.5) erm not necessarily
372 the necessity but (.) yeah in terms o f  the necessity me to have an
373 understanding o f  the DSM (.) and be able to use it (.) and be able to you
374 know speak this language (2) but this doesn’t necessarily (.) affect me (.)
375 my practice when I am with a client on a one to one basis
376 I: right
377 P: I wouldn’t you know call anybody borderline or something or I
378 wouldn’t you know do you see what I mean?
379 I: Yeah I'm trying to sort o f  (.) it seems as though there are different
380 levels to it in a way you're saying that it's different in your clinical work
381 P: [yeah] [yeah] [hmm]
382 I: so I was just wondering can you maybe expand on what those
383 differences are or possibly how come that it's like that?
384 P: Well erm say for example I have this client who has been diagnosed
385 as borderline personality and she has a severe personality problem erm
386 the way I would speak with other professionals is going to be different
387 than when I'm with her you know (.) I'm not going to perhaps say to her
388 (.) you have borderline or given your borderline personality disorder this
389 is what is best for you I would probably say something to her like
390 R: [Mmm]
391 P: (.) you know we're here together to think together what your needs are
392 (.) and you know how can we best (.) erm help you.
393 R: Right (1) so okay so the right okay yeah
394 P: and er perhaps I might have in mind what might be helpful or best for
395 her but I won't necessarily (.) I will not say to her well I think because
396 you are borderline I think you should be referred to [names hospital] or
397 something
398 R: yeah yeah okay
399 P: but I will tiy to work with her (.) to see what she wants and to see
400 what's best
Within a cultural context imbued with liberalist and democratic norms, the position o f  
counselling psychologist, i.e. an authority or 'expert' in the psychological domain, is 
constructed as being less than straightforward. They are the constituted authority with 
greater 'power' than the client due to 'expertise' and knowledge gained through 
professional training. However, despite this cultural and institutional positioning, a 
pervasive feature throughout the texts was the presence o f  democratic and egalitarian 
motivations within participants' constructions o f  counselling psychology practice that 
seemed to indicate an embarrassment with 'power' and the position o f  expert authority. 
One dilemma that appeared charged with ambivalence evolved around the speakers' 
discursive use and management o f  an empiricist repertoire on the one hand, i.e. the 
category entitlements afforded by the pathology-focused yet culturally- sanctioned 
position of'expert' who is supposed to be able, scientifically and 'objectively', to identify, 
categorise and treat 'psychopathology', and on the other hand, a position that values 
liberalist notions o f  equality and respect for the individual meaning o f  clients' distress, 
emphasising the local and contingent nature o f  understanding created in the therapeutic 
encounter (contingent repertoire). As such, speakers expended considerable discursive 
energy in order to maintain their status as an authority in a liberal or anti-authoritarian 
fashion.
In extract 4, the speaker manages the conflicting values and dilemmatic aspects o f  
authority and equality in a number o f ways, achieving particular effects as she attends to 
the issues o f  psychopathology and diagnostic categories in counselling psychology 
practice.
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The sequence starts with Charlotte distancing herself from the authoritarian view of 
diagnostic categories that is embedded within an empiricist repertoire. Her narrative 
essentially functions at an implicit level to challenge the 'correctness' of the dominant 
view that diagnostic categories provide the 'appropriate' (scientific and objective) or only 
means for understanding 'psychopathology' from which treatment can proceed. Initially 
this claim is personalised through the use of personal pronouns, for example, 'I mean not 
in the sense that I think that diagnostic categories are absolutely necessary' (lines 368-9), 
which works to position the speaker in opposition to this view. What immediately follows 
- 'and that’s how we (.) we should think (.) you know (.) how we should formulate client 
problems or whatever' (lines 369 - 71) - makes the inference available that this is 
precisely what the view she is opposing advocates. However, possibly in order to manage 
her institutional accountability, it is done without explicitly stating this and is therefore 
deniable. The use of 'we' possibly functions to further manage the accountability of the 
speaker's, views by providing a line of insulation against rebuttals or the criticism that 
solely personal interests motivate the account. A further rhetorical device is deployed in 
managing the dilemma of stake. The use of'o r whatever' (line 371) works to achieve a 
'disinterested' account of interest by mobilising indifference precisely at the point where 
it could become an issue or be called into question.
As the account develops, the speaker shows some hesitation and ambivalence before 
positioning herself as being held to account institutionally. For example, 'in terms of the 
necessity of (1.5) erm not necessarily the necessity but (.) yeah in terms of the necessity' 
(lines 371-2) constructs the speaker as having no 'real' choice in the matter. The speaker 
thus positions herself at the professional and institutional level as being required or 
obligated to work within a particular professional framework of understanding and 
associated vocabulary. Though this is presented as a concrete reality, the speaker 
nonetheless partially resists this forced positioning by constructing her own therapeutic 
practice with clients on a one-to-one basis as not necessarily being affected (line 374-5). 
One possible conclusion that can be drawn from this construction is that the speaker's 
ambivalence indicates an awareness of the politicised nature of her work and the dilemma
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of her position as a counselling psychologist - a liberal expert who simultaneously 
accepts and rejects authority.
This dilemma highlights that the speaker is positioned within an already constituted 
discourse (empiricist) and institutional framework of understanding, that makes possible 
and privileges certain practices. However, in spite of this, the speaker is able to construct 
a sense of choice and agency within this particular (and dominant) discourse. A contrast 
is constructed that is dependent on the addressee, i.e. between talk with other experts 
(professionals) and with non-experts (clients), that allows the speaker to position herself 
as an agent who selectively uses the technical vocabulary and diagnostic language 
grounded in the expertise of professional authority (empiricist repertoire) depending on 
its context of usage. For example, referring to a client diagnosed with borderline 
personality disorder she states, 'the way I would speak with other professionals is going 
to be different than when I'm with her' (line 386-7).
Talking about therapeutic practice provides the speaker with a context for rejecting an 
authoritative expert position in favour of a more egalitarian one. Two resources in 
particular are employed by the speaker to construct a position of equality. Firstly, in lines 
387-9, '... (.) I'm not going to perhaps say to her (.) you have borderline personality or 
given your borderline personality disorder this is what is best for you...' infers that this is 
what an expert authority would do and thus enables the speaker to work up the difference 
between this position and their own. Secondly, there is significant use of democratic 
semantics, i.e. 'we' statements. For example, '...you know we're here to think together 
what your needs are (.) and you know how can we best (.) erm help you, (line 391-2). The 
discursive form is one of polite invitation rather than imperious command. The ethos is 
one that expresses democratic aspirations and utilises the language of free and equal 
exchange. This works to construct the therapeutic encounter within counselling 
psychology practice as a joint venture wherein 'we' (counselling psychologist and client) 
discover and create meaning together rather than 'I' (the expert) tell 'you' (the client) the 
'objective' facts. This construction allows the speaker implicitly to resist the
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authoritarianism of their expert position, thereby re-positioning their self in a softer more 
egalitarian light. However, this position appears to be charged with ambivalence, as 
authority has not been totally abandoned. The speaker still contains the therapeutic maps 
e.g. 'I might have in mind what might be helpful or best for her' (lines 394-5) and 
therefore directs the client, but does so without appearing overly directive, which is 
achieved by using tentative words like 'perhaps' and 'might'. Wetherell, Striven and Potter 
(1987) have termed this particular pattern of discourse and behaviour as 'unequal 
egalitarianism' or a 'non-authoritarian authoritarianism'.
Overview
The analysis has suggested that the constructions offered by these Chartered Counselling 
Psychologists were achieved through a number of discursive practices and were situated 
within empiricist and contingent repertoires. Depending on the discursive context in 
which they were evoked, the identified repertoires appeared to work in conjunction with 
and in contrast to one another and functioned to construct particular versions of events. In 
the first section of the analysis, the empiricist repertoire was seen to act as a powerful 
linguistic resource that enabled speakers to perform attributional actions, i.e. the 
attribution of 'psychopathology' through use of an ostensibly dis-interested and 
descriptive discourse. At the micro level, the various strategies employed served 
particular rhetorical functions, such as, the managing of stake or interest, creating a sense 
of'objectivity' by making accounts to appear factual, and the dynamic positioning of self 
and others.
More broadly, at the institutional level, it seemed to provide the discursive conditions 
from which the diagnostic venture (application of diagnostic categories) could be 
legitimated as a process of 'objectively' dis-covering the 'facts' of 'psychopathology' 
independent of ideology, values or context. The pervasiveness of this repertoire and its 
effects can be interpreted as serving a socio-political function as certain 'non-normative' 
activities are brought into an arena requiring professional 'expert' interest. The accounts
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offered can be viewed as asserting professional legitimacy, as credence was given to the 
notion that the work of counselling psychologists was in some way 'objective', 'scientific' 
and thus worthy of its culturally sanctioned status.
Contrastingly, a contingent repertoire was used to emphasise the situated nature of 
therapeutic practice and use of diagnostic categories. Standing in opposition to the 
empiricist repertoire, which produced a version of events wherein the 'true' nature of 
people's distress could be determined, the contingent repertoire functioned to reinsert 
both the therapist and client as active agents (not objects) back into the discussion. What 
appears to be a monologue of reason about mental illness in the empiricist repertoire is 
transformed into a dialogue between mental illness and human experience in the 
contingent account.
In order to consider the conflict and tension evident between the two repertoires and the 
issues participants were orientating towards, the second part of the analysis examined the 
dilemmatic nature of the accounts, which was most evident in relation to the management 
of professional identity. A notable finding was that the process of constructing and 
negotiating identity was riddled with conflict (e.g. between the positions of authority and 
equality), as speakers claimed or resisted the images available to them through the 
opposing repertoires. A central feature of the accounts was that speakers constructed 
themselves as conforming to institutional requirements (e.g. the use of diagnostic 
categories) whilst simultaneously resisting dominant institutional stoiylines through 
agentive positionings in practice. As Linehan and McCarthy (2000) have noted, 'we 
define ourselves with respect to communities of practice and that 'identity' is constructed 
through the negotiation of meanings of our experience of membership in communities' 
(p.438). As such, participants' talk about professional 'practices' (both discursive and 
material) was seen to only make sense against a background of ideological assumptions. 
The historically constituted social and institutional structures (e.g. National Health 
Service, British Psychological Society, judicial, economic etc) thus contextualised the 
ways participants accounted for their understanding of 'psychopathology', diagnostic
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categories, counselling psychology practice and dealt with dilemmatic quandaries arising
from these particular conditions. Participants' talk demonstrated a reflexive awareness of
being embedded within institutional storylines, a moral order and local contexts, for
example, working within (and therefore being held to account) in a range of medical
contexts (NHS settings) that afforded certain rights, responsibilities, duties and
obligations. It was in between such macro and micro contexts that particular dilemmas
were played out. For example, in extract four, if the speaker was too democratic, then
their position, institutional authority and potentially their job as culturally sanctioned
'expert' becomes untenable or endangered, whereas with too much technical expertise the
equality (and quality) of the therapeutic relationship becomes threatened. Rather than
invalidating their accounts, the inconsistencies resulting from speakers being positioned
in dilemmatic ways can be viewed as the 'nodes' of tension that enable the construction of
creative and flexible accounts (Billig, 1988).
*
What this study has perhaps most saliently illustrated, is that participants actively use a 
variety of discursive practices embedded within historically and culturally available 
interpretive repertoires, in order to actively constitute notions of 'psychopathology', 
diagnostic categories and counselling psychology practice, and do so to achieve particular 
effects. This discursive view is a substantial departure from traditional conceptualisations 
and 'cognitivist' approaches to such notions as 'psychopathology'. The difference lies in 
the fact that discourse analysis has no need to posit the existence of mental entities or 
operations residing within the individual. As such, one advantage over more traditional 
'cognitive' approaches to researching psychological phenomena is that it allows such 
phenomena to remain as discursive events and does not treat them as reports of 
underlying cognitive states or events. It follows that words are always far more than 
merely 'labels for objective things' (Riikonen & Smith, 1997).
In relation to counselling psychology, the current findings indicate that there may be a 
gap between the 'ideal' and the 'real', i.e. between theory and situated practice. The 
principles and values as expressed in counselling psychology theory, such as, a
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phenomenological and humanistic value base, a reaction against the medical model of 
professional-client relationships and an emphasis on well-being rather than pathology 
(Woolfe, 1996), stand in opposition to the discourses (empiricist, bio-medical) prevalent 
in the applied contexts counselling psychologists find themselves working in. Given that 
current practices are culturally sanctioned and increasingly reinforced by an ideological 
framework of professionalisation (scientific 'treatment' mentality, evidence based practice 
etc) creates ongoing dilemmas for individual practitioners at a local level and more 
general dilemmas for the status, identity and development of the discipline.
If counselling psychology is to be a cultural enterprise reflexively questioning its 
relevance to society and its role in maintaining and / or challenging existing social 
structures and oppressive (pathologising / normalising) practices, as well as being a 
psychological activity, as Strawbridge and Woolfe (1996) contend, then it may be 
worthwhile for counselling psychologists to take a critical and deconstructive posture 
towards their theories and practices. Given these observations, the discursive register and 
range of possible positions and options available to practitioners may be expanded if 
future research continues to situate the theories and practices of counselling psychologists 
in their historical and political contexts. Such a focus may allow for power relations 
intrinsic to the therapeutic venture as a modem ideological and, strategic discourse to be 
attended to.
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Use of Self
I find the topic of mental illness inescapably personal. In attempting to understand and 
make sense of my own embodied experiences I have found myself asking the question, 
"am I normal or abnormal?" As a teenager somebody I was close to was categorised as 
being mentally ill. This was a frightening experience that gave me first hand experience 
of some of the negative, pathologising and dehumanising effects of defining somebody as 
'mentally ill'. The diagnostic category that was applied did not help me to understand 
their experience and seemed to create distance between us making relating to each other 
more difficult. These factors meant that for a long time I had lots of questions and no 
framework or way to understand and make sense of my own or others experiences. My 
decision to study counselling psychology was partly in response to these experiences. 
Perhaps naively I thought that it could provide the 'ultimate' answers. However, I quickly 
found both in theory and practice that it raised further questions. Early on in my training I 
was introduced to social constructionist and postmodernism dialogues. The inquisitive 
and critical postures appealed to me and seemed to ask different questions in relation to 
mental illness. In my own personal and professional development this has helped me to 
move in, around and through some of the dilemmas and contradictoiy options that I 
continually find myself facing both at a theoretical level and in my situated and embodied 
personal / professional practices. My decision to study 'psychopathology', diagnostic 
categories and counselling psychology practice reflects an intertwining of professional 
and personal interests and my own sense of personal, moral, professional and ethical 
responsibility to continually reflect, question and challenge my own position and 
practices as a trainee counselling psychologist. It is my belief that whether my 
experiences and interests are similar and provide echoes for other practitioners or are 
radically different to them, that we nonetheless mutually define ourselves through each 
other. In this respect it was my hope that this research could make a contribution to an 
area that is at the heart of the field by stimulating further conversations amongst its 
practitioners.
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I found the interview process challenging. Perhaps what was most difficult was trying not 
privilege one version of events over another. On the one hand, I felt part of the interview 
and what was being generated, but on the other hand I felt constrained or uncertain about 
my role as a facilitator. I wasn’t prepared for the way that I would be positioned in the 
interviews and how that would constrain my own responses and interactions. This centred 
on the fact that the participants knew I was a trainee counselling psychologist. 
Furthermore, some of the participants had graduated from the course where I am training 
or had some involvement in a professional capacity with the course. A great deal seemed 
to be being taken for granted during the interviews. Given that personally, this was 
exactly what I wanted to question, might have impinged on my ability to interview with a 
view to generating data in relation to my research questions. At times it seemed as though 
it was being implied that "we are the same so you must know what I mean". This led to 
the feeling that I was colluding with their particular 'take' on the areas under discussion 
and that I couldn’t challenge or question their views in any depth because of my 'trainee' 
status. As such, I found myself deferring to their authority (chartered status) and how 
they saw the areas under discussion and the nature of the research project. I also had the 
sense that participants' felt that there was a definite agenda and were trying to provide 
responses to fit with what they thought I wanted. Though in hindsight these factors were, 
providing rich analytic material, it was difficult to see this and get a critical purchase on 
the events because I was also part of them. Additionally, given the complexity of the 
areas under investigation and the difficulty I had experienced in trying to maintain a 
tightly defined research question (it seemed to change all the time) meant it was difficult 
to feel in control of the interviews or to keep to the interview schedule.
Doing the analysis whilst trying to meet additional clinical, academic requirements and 
also attend to life events and personal circumstances, meant that at times it was a difficult 
and lonely process. Though I have a long standing interest in discourse analysis this was 
the first time that I had attempted to conduct an analysis in any detail. Connecting my 
general understandings of the constructive nature of language to particular instances of 
talk was not easy. Learning through the doing was quite different to my previous
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conceptual understanding of discourse analysis. It seemed that a paragraph, a sentence or 
even a single word, were open to multiple interpretations. I often found myself spending 
several hours just looking at one piece of data and becoming very confused as to how to 
related to my research questions. It was difficult to make decisions and trust my own 
interpretations. Measuring my own efforts against the sophistication of analytic work I 
had read frequently led to a feeling of paralysis and not knowing how to move forward 
with my own work. Also the richness and volume of data, combined with a desire to 
include everything, meant that I experienced difficulty in knowing what to include. This 
was especially difficult when I had spent so long transcribing and trawling through the 
data - 1 didn’t want to let anything go! I also felt that the complexity and my own struggle 
and sense of confusion in relation to the areas under investigation led me to feel that my 
views or understandings were in some way unqualified or not clearly enough defined for 
the purposes of a research report.
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APPENDIX B
Participant Information Sheet
I am currently undertaking a three year Doctoral training in Psychotherapeutic and 
Counselling Psychology at the University of Surrey. During my training I have developed 
an interest in the disciplines relationship with psychopathology, i.e. how it views and 
works with psychological distress /  disorder. In particular I am interested in the prevalent 
use of DSM psychiatric categories as the primary means of categorising mental disorders.
As a chartered counselling psychologist you may have found yourself working with 
diagnostic categories of psychopathology or opposing their use. In the research element 
of my training I have decided to explore chartered counselling psychologists' personal 
and professional views about the use of diagnostic categories in counselling psychology 
practice. As this is currently a prominent area of debate being addressed within the 
discipline I feel that this is a valuable area for research and would therefore be grateful if 
you would consider taking part in this study.
Participation would involve taking part in an interview with myself lasting approximately 
one hour. During the interview I will be. introducing topics related to counselling 
psychology practice and the use of diagnostic categories of psychopathology. The 
interview will be audio taped and later transcribed by myself. Confidentiality will be 
respected in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998. Your name and any 
identifying information will not appear on the transcript and the audio tape recording will 
be destroyed. Some of your responses may be reproduced in the final study but at no time 
will your name or organisation be identifiable. You retain the right to withdraw from the 
study at any point without having to give a reason.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you would like further information. I can be 
contacted by telephone (01483 879176 or 07786 298 945) or in writing. The address is 
Department of Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford GU2 7XH.
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Thank you 
M ark Craven
APPENDIX C 
Consent Form for Participants
I am a trainee Counselling Psychologist who would like to do some research into 
Chartered Counselling Psychologists' views on the use psycho-diagnostic categories in 
Counselling Psychology practice. I have written an information sheet to explain it in 
more detail. If, once you have read the information sheet, you would like to be involved 
please sign this form and return it to me in the stamped addressed envelope.
If you have any questions please 'phone me (Mark Craven) on 01483 879176 or 07786 
298 945. Alternatively, you can write to me at the Department of Psychology, School of 
Human Sciences, University of Surrey, Guildford, GU2 7XH.
If you do agree to be involved in the research and then change your mind you can 
withdraw from the study, despite signing the consent form, at any time without having to 
give a reason. There are no penalties if you decide to withdraw from the study.
Please read the following paragraph, if you are in agreement, sign where indicated
I agree that the purposes of this research and what my participation in it would entail 
have been clearly explained to me in a manner that I understand. I therefore consent to 
participate in an audio taped interview regarding the use of psycho-diagnostic categories 
in Counselling Psychology practice. I also consent to all parts of the recording being 
transcribed for the purpose of research.
NAME OF VOLUNTEER (PLEASE PRINT):..............................................................
SIGNATURE:.................................................................. ................................. ................
DATE:.................................................. ...
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NAME OF WITNESS (PLEASE PRINT):
SIGNATURE:................................ .............
DATE:..........................................................
APPENDIX D 
Interview Schedule
(Introduce self and basic outline o f study to participants and ensure have gained 
informed written consent)
My research is concerned with Chartered Counselling Psychologists' views (both 
professional and personal) of the use of diagnostic categories of psychopathology in 
counselling psychology practise. I am interested in giving you the opportunity to talk 
about and express your views and experiences of the practice of counselling psychology I 
relation to the notion of psychopathology and the use / non-use of diagnostic categories.
If you have any questions at any time during the interview, please do not hesitate to ask.
(Turn on tape)
Constructions of Psychopathology
The notion of mental illness or psychopathology continues to receive widespread 
attention and generate debate within the discipline of psychology. I would like to start by 
exploring what your own view of'psychopathology' is.
How do you personally define or understand the notion of psychopathology / mental 
illness?
(Follow up - what ideas / issues come to mind?)
What factor and experiences do you consider to have been formative in the 
development of your view?
(Follow up - how have these factors shaped your views?)
162
Counselling Psychology Practice
The field of counselling psychology is still a relatively new branch of applied 
psychology. There is continued development in terms of the identity and practices if the 
profession and individual counselling psychologists who are encouraged to develop their 
own distinctive philosophy and approach to practice. I am interested in your own 
understandings, views and experiences of counselling psychology practice.
Can you tell me what comes to mind when you think about counselling psychology?
There are different opinions regarding counselling psychology's view of 
psychopathology. What are your views in relation to this?
Diagnostic Categories of Psychopathology
Counselling psychologists utilise various methods of assessment in order to inform their 
work with clients. One method available is to use diagnostic categories to classify mental 
disorders.
- There are a variety of different views or stances towards the use of diagnostic 
categories within counselling psychology practice. Can you tell me what your own 
views are?
When practising as a counselling psychologist in what ways, if at all, are diagnostic 
categories of psychopathology useful in understanding and helping clients. Can you 
give any examples?
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That is all the questions that I would like to ask
- Is there anything else on the subject that you would like to talk about which I have 
not covered?
- How did you feel talking about this subject?
(Prompts to use throughout the intei'view to help encourage participants to explore their 
responses further)
Could you say more about that?
Can you give me an example of that? What you mean? How do you feel about that?
Why do you think that?
What makes you say that?
How useful do you find that?
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APPENDIX E
Transcription Notation
The form of notation used is based in the system developed by Jefferson (1985), a 
complete description of which can be found in Atkinson and Heritage (1984). Some of 
the basic features are outlined.
1. Square brackets mark an overlap between utterances. - [
2. An equals sign at the end of one speakers turn and at the start of another's 
indicates no discemable pause - =
3. A full stop in brackets indicates within a speakers utterance - (.)
4. Underlining indicates those words are said with particular emphasis, whilst words 
in UPPER case characters were said louder than the surrounding speech.
5. Empty square brackets [ ] indicate that some of the transcript has been 
omitted.
6. Round brackets ( ) indicate that the speech they contain was inaudible or doubt 
regarding its accuracy.
7. Italicised material refers to contextual information.
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APPENDIX F
Transcription of Third Research Interview
R = researcher 
P = participant
1 R: okay (.) erm to start o ff with the notion o f  mental illness or psychopathology receives
2 widespread attention and generates debate within the discipline o f  psychology as a whole
3 (.) I'd like to start by exploring what your own view o f  psychopathology is?
4 P: (2) hmm erm I suppose if  you say the word psychopathology then I do start thinking
5 o f  the diagnostic categories because the word psychopathology to me implies the medical
6 model and gets me
7 R: u-huh
8 P: into that area
9 R: yeah
10 P: o f my thinking er I suppose my practice is grounded in the humanistic approach and
11 therefore I try and face each individual without thinking oh they are a "depressive" or
12 they are a blardy blah
13 R: yeah
14 P: just meet them as a person and er see what (.) try and get an insider perspective o f
15 what their experience is
16 R: yeah
17 P: er so I suppose I (.) would have an awareness o f  the diagnostic categories (.) existing
18 particularly because I located in a community mental health team
19 R: yeah
20 P: which tends to be dominated by the medical model but I would try and bracket those
21 R: right
22 P: when I see the clients I'm just meeting them as an individual
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23 R: sure
24 P: erm (1) and I suppose (.) talking a lot (.) but I suppose in thinking about the
25 humanistic approach to things and (1) and linking it into erm what Spinelli and existential
26 (.) later existential framework said (.) was that (.) really in therapy (.) I think it was
27 Spinelli (.) I'm not sure (.) in therapy erm two people are meeting both with difficulties in
28 living in the hope that the therapist has slightly less difficulties that the client and that the
29 focus will be on the client's not the therapists
30 R: sure yeah
31 P: so it's about reducing that distance that’s there in the medical model about somebody
32 as an expert
33 R: right
34 P: and somebody as not an expert that you're going to give a treatment to (.) so though I
35 have the medical model bracketed up there
36 R: right
37 P: I tiy and keep it bracketed except when I need it for certain things if you see what I
38 mean? I relate to it but I try and be in the room not as this expert as a person to work co-
39 collaboratively with the client.
40 R: Right so it sounds from what you've just said there that there's something veiy distinct
41 or very different I suppose in terms o f  how you approach psychopathology i f  you're
42 coming at it from the medical slant (.) which seems to me from what you've saying that
43 somebody approaches the client as some form o f expert or as opposed to as you approach
44 them from a humanistic perspective (.) there's a difference or some form o f  difference
45 there or?..
46 P: Yeah I mean (.) in danger of setting up straw persons cause I'm sure not that many
47 people are that extreme
48 R: right yeah
49 P: as that but I think its necessaiy for clarification purposes you know to set it up as that
50 R: yeah so you're saying in practice its not actually as clear cut as that?
51 P: Well in practice most psychiatrists for instance if you think of the medical model and I
52 have a psychiatrist in my head
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53 R: right yeah
54 P: in practice most psychiatrists probably don’t go in as you know (.) erm classically the
55 expert as maybe they used to years ago most people have moved a little bit to saying that
56 the patient has expertise on their own (.) you know to a more equal (.) but if  you think if
57 R: [right] [yeah] [yeah]
58 P: it as a continuum they would be more towards the medical end obviously than I would
59 R: [sure]
60 P: be (.) also clinical psychologists would tend to be (.) but again you know not always
61 (.) but tend to be more towards that end of the spectrum continuum than I would be.
62 R: [yeah] [yeah] Sure so
63 whilst not (.) rather while taking into account that its to some extent its sort o f  over
64 generalising or its making a case for it but what's then (.) if  there is this association or to
65 your mind a link between the medical model and a particular view o f  psychopathology (.)
66 how do you see that relationship, or how is psychopathology viewed within that
67 framework?
68 P: Within the medical model?
69 R: Yeah it sounds as though that seems to be the main thing that jumps out when you
70 think o f  psychopathology you think ah there's a medicalised or...
71 P: yeah I mean I suppose its also saying there is pathology (.) there is something wrong
72 with the person {laughs)-
73 R: = can you maybe give an example o f  that or what sort o f things do you think of?
74 P: Hmm (.) erm well I suppose at the extreme end of the (.) erm (.) pathology end of the
75 (.) you know if  you had somebody who was psychotic (laughs) erm then most people
76 would say (.) see them as having something wrong with them erm their not just having
77 difficulties in living they have a medical problem.
78 R: Right.
79 P: But that could be argued (.) I mean you know (.) was it erm (.) I cant remember who it
80 was that argued (.) was it Lacan or French people anyway (laughs) that argued that it was
81 R: [okay yeah]
82 P: with schizophrenia that it was environment that (.) I mean it's difficult to separate out
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83 R: [yeah]
84 P: everything anyway and I suppose psychopathology you think psychopathology if
85 people have a diagnosis as something that's an illness then-then you tend towards
8 6  R: [yeah]
87 P: thinking about medication
8 8  R: right
89 P: there's a link to that
90 R: right yeah-yeah
91 P: so with psychosis you put them on an anti-psychotic erm (1.5) and you might think if
92 they were clinically depressed to put them on anti-depressants erm (2) and I think'm
93 sometimes that can be (.) you know that is probably the fairest (.) that they (.) I'm not
94 saying I'm against that
95 R: right
96 P: you know erm people often do need medication
97 R: yeah sure but there's something about it that is about an understanding of what
98 psychopathology is that then links to how its treated and you're saying that medication
99 would be associated with that framework that causes would be attributed to
100 presumably...
1 0 1  P: yeah the difficulties are clearly located in the patient
1 0 2  R: right
103 P: (2) hmm (2)
104 R: So how-how does it work then (.) you're saying that (.) I mean this is quite over
105 generalised views o f  how er it is in practice but if  people are somewhere in between say
106 if  we've got humanistic on one side and-and the strict medical type understanding on the
107 other (.) i f  people do shift between how do the two (.) do the two come together or what
108 is the interplay?
109 P: erm I think (.) I think they do when you assess the patient
1 1 0  R: right
111 P: I suppose you're looking for things that would (4) yeah I haven’t thought about this
112 like this before but er but that would (.) differentiate them from how anybody might react
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113 in a particular situation for instance or if  they have (1) if  they're thinking in ways that
114 wouldn’t be within what you'd think to be the normal range (.) so (.) you know if they
115 R: [right]
116 P: think that they (.) as I had a client (.) who before she saw me when she had a psychotic
117 depression and was erm in hospital (.) she believed that had she caused BSC (.) you know
118 R: [hmm] [hmm] [right]
119 P: now I think the medical model is (.) probably veiy useful when it comes to somebody
120 with that level of-of pathology that's so disabling (.) er that is (.) well that is also so
121 outside the norm
122 R: right yeah
123 P: er or people who think they're Jesus Christ or...
124 R: Yeah. So how does (.) I'm just thinking back to what you said about if  there is a view
125 that we could think o f  psychopathology or mental illness as problems in living or
126 something like that as opposed to it being erm biological or some form o f  illness or
127 pathology how does=
128 P: =1 think I put it on a continuum erm (5) so one end o f the continuum you've got
129 somebody that's an in patient-needs medication er in order to for their behaviour to be
130 normal (laughs) within a normal range.
131 R: [right so] Right so if  somebody's behaviour is outside o f  what
132 we're talking about this normal range then is it no longer problems in living or?
133 P: I mean it gets quite philosophical doesn’t it at this point (.) but it depends on degree
134 R: [yeah sure sure]
135 P: doesn’t it (.) I mean if  somebody thinks they've caused BSC and they're going to kill
136 themselves or-or if  they think they need to kill somebody else er that is the extreme end
137 o f  the continuum (.) I suppose where it meets more (1) would be with something like
138 clinical depression which may be (2) which one could see as possibly arising as in a
139 reactive way to events in their lives because they want to understand why somebody's
140 R: [yeah yeah]
141 P: become depressed but they've (.) reached a degree o f  depression where you'd tick all
142 the boxes for clinical depression and that might imply that they might also need, they
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143 R: [sure] [yeah]
144 P: might need erm medication in order to lift their mood up enough to respond to therapy
145 sometimes erm (6) can't remember what the yeah...
146 R: [yeah yeah right]
147 No that’s fine. I was just thinking rather wondering what your experience has been of (.)
148 you've spoken about a continuum and that there being sort of a norm to some extent and I
149 guess that’s as a practitioner what you're faced with or I the mental health professions
350 that you're faced with making some kind o f  (.) I mean judgements are being made and I
151 guess I was curious about how that sort of fits when we're talking about psychopathology
152 if  its something that is outside o f  what we are calling a normal range (.) how those kinds
153 o f decisions are made or how (.) how do you get to that understanding or judgment?
154 P: Right cause there're culture bound aren’t they so what's acceptable in one society (.) to
155 a degree (.) I mean some things wouldn’t be acceptable probably anywhere either to the
156 R: [yeah]
157 P: individual or society (.) to a degree their culture bound erm how (.) so sony (.) how do
158 I get to-to a judgement o f whether its (??)
159 R: well just what it like for you in practice (.) you know here is somebody who's
160 behaviours whose what their telling you etcetera and then I guess to some extent you're
161 trying to make sense o f  that and make sense o f  that with them so ...
162 P: I mean I don’t see people who are (.) I haven’t as yet seen people who are psychotic (.)
163 so I haven’t had that issue in my practice if  you see what I mean (.) er I do see people
164 R: [hmm] [hmm]
165 P: who are severely clinically depressed and have been inpatients erm (1) but I'm not
166 thinking this person is oh (laughs) its difficult isn't it because I suppose because I'm
167 applying (1)1 tend to be applying that model (.) its an integrative model but the cognitive
168 behavioural approach say to a severe depression would be (.) big in there because the
169 R: [right]
170 P: outcome studies have shown it to be very effective er so I'm not thinking then (.) in a
171 medical model way of depression er I'm thinking of the case conceptualisation of that
172 R: [right]
171
173 P: client (2) so you know I'd be (.) so (.) in a way that's kind of inde-independent of how
174 severely depressed they (.) are as long as they're able to come you know they're
175 outpatients you know they're able to come and see me (2) and (.) yeah the severely
176 [hmm hmm]
177 P: depressed ones tend to be on medication as well so-I-think-that-side of its taken care
178 o f  by the psychiatrist to a degree
179 R: right right yeah
180 P: I mean I do have times when I have to write letters to other professionals or when I
181 would get more into a sort of diagnostic category with (.) and I do think of people as
182 depressed or as anxious er (1) but what (.) I'm not sure about the meanings behind
183 R: [yeah]
184 P: psychopathology and it seems to have a label of (2.5) something wrong with them (2)
185 it could be seen in a derogatory way I suppose-psychopathology whereas diagnostic
186 R: [yeah yeah]
187 P: categories slightly different (2) erm
188 R: Hmm (.) so what sort of things are you thinking of when you say that
189 psychopathology might have this negative sort of connotation=
190 P: =(well) I think of the word pathology as being bad (laughs)
191 R: Right how so?
192 P: Don’t know er (.) well I suppose people tend to use the word don’t they "god that’s
193 really pathological"
194 R: yeah
195 P: in language you know (.) and therefore it has (.) to me and I'm sure I'm not alone
196 (laughs) it has got connotations o f  negativity about that word but (4) its not a word
197 R: [right]
198 P: I use a lot (.) I wouldn’t say (2) I don’t tend to (.) that word doesn’t tend to come up a
199 lot in practice erm diagnostic category might if I'm writing to other professionals.
2 0 0  R: [right] [sure] What
2 0 1  are the implications of that then if-if psychopathology or saying that somebody's mentally
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202 ill (.) the terms that we use (.) does that make a difference to practice or how it actually is
203 with a client (.) how you see a client?
204 P: If somebody's labelled mentally ill there might be different expectations o f  outcome
205 R: [right]
206 P: I suppose (1) I'm not saying I'd have them but they might be out there enn (I)
207 R: [hmm hmm]
208 P: mentally ill it tends to imply something more permanent or something like
209 schizophrenia or psychosis enn cause o f  course the other big area is personality disorder
2 1 0  R: [yeah] [hmm]
211 P: disorder (.) which is a (1) bit o f  a nightmare really (laughing) in some ways but er (4)
2 1 2  R: [sure]
213 P: so (.) do you want me to say more about when I would use diagnostic criteria? Is that
214 or...
215 R: Well I-I certainly will do but I thought maybe if  I could just ask I mean we've
216 mentioned quite a few things about sort o f  your understanding o f psychopathology (.) I
217 guess soine-of-some o f  the implications we've touched on those kinds o f  things but first
218 o f all is there anything else that comes to mind or that you think o f  when we speak
219 generally about psychopathology or mental illness?
2 2 0  P: I don’t know its just seems to be sometimes associated with a culture of blaming the
2 2 1  individual
2 2 2  R: right
223 P: erm associated with that (.) and particularly in the media
224 R: right
225 P: you know and it frightens people (.) it has negative connotations.
226 R: Right. Are you able to give any examples or are you thinking o f  anything in particular
227 when you say that?
228 P: (1) er well if  you look at the recent er governments putting emphasis on in into the
229 sever and enduring mentally ill erm which seems to be a lot more to do with the response
230 R: [yeah]
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231 P: to a fear in the public o f  (.) people erm attacking being not safe with people who are
232 mentally ill than to do with the actual needs out there (.) erm because I mean very small
233 (.) the risk from people who are mentally ill is so small and also (.) its often (.) the other
234 R: [hmm hmm]
235 P: thing is they want to (.) there's a government dictum to reduce the suicide rate
236 particularly in young men (.) well their not the severe and enduring (.) the people (.) a
237 lot o f  people who commit suicide are not the severe and enduring mentally ill (.) they are
238 more neurotic than psychotic (.) you know more reactive depression (.) you know highest
239 suicide rates doctors (.) dentists (.) vets (.) farmers that sort o f  group o f  young men has
240 gone up not in (.) paranoid schizophrenics=
241 R: =right
242 P: so its like they want to bring down the suicide rate but they're putting the money into
243 that area instead (laughsj  or not that that area doesn’t need money but (.) and it’s a
244 R: [right] [yeah]
245 P: skew in what the public seem to think o f as mentally ill people (.) they seem to think
246 o f  the mentally ill as dangerous, that’s the presentation often given in the media.
247 R: [yeah] Right so
248 I'm just thinking that’s (.) I mean this is a quite different view really to what we've just
249 spoken about when we've talked about psychopathology and er what goes with that
250 P: (laughs) [right]
251 R: and then this seems to incorporate a much broader picture (.) I was just wondering
252 how that sort o f  (.) if  that feeds back into... (2)
253 P: I think what the public believe and what is generally out there; I mean not all the
254 public obviously but tends to be (.) very different to what mental health professionals
255 believe.
256 R: Right.
257 P: (2) Because what's presented in the media is what sells newspapers and that tends to
258 be to do with (1.5) with the dramas.
259 R: Right. So there seems to be two very different understandings or its in (.) and again to-
260 to you know generalise (.) I'm sure its not as clear cut as that (.) but there seems to be a
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261 very different level o f  awareness or-or thinking around psychopathology and what it
262 means from the general population as opposed to the professionals who work with
263 people.
264 P: Hmm, yeah
265 R: And=
266 P: =LIKE people who are severely mentally ill would tend to be more risk to themselves
267 than others on the whole (.) you know
268 R: Yeah-yeah
269 P: erm (1) but the few cases that have happened were mentally ill people have (1.5) er
270 murdered somebody have been highly publicised so it’s a false picture.
271 R: Right.
272 P: But I (.) I'm very interested in how things are represented in society.
273 R: Yeah-yeah (.) so ...w ell (.) what (.) from what you've said then what's the
274 representation in society o f  psychopathology or mental illness?
275 P: AS DANGEROUS (.) as a threat (.) as scary (.) as (.) something to be controlled erm
276 R: [right] [right]
277 P: (2) I mean you know (.) at the extreme end obviously (.) I suppose certain newspapers
278 R: [yeah] [yeah]
279 P: will tend to be more measured than others (laughs).
280 R: Yeah-yeah. Do you think that sort (.) the media or the political element is that present
281 in practice or does that, is there interplay between these factors?
282 P: Yes because politicians respond to public - they want votes (laughs)
283 R: Right
284 P: MAYBE they're not totally doing that (.) you know (.) I guess they also have think
285 tanks and research groups that feed back to them but they are a lot o f the time responding
286 R: [yeh] [yeh] [yeh]
287 P: to public (.) feeling because they want (.) because they're elected.
288 R: Right
289 P: Erm
290 R: (2) so what as a practitioner then are you responding to in your role within=
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291 P: =well I don’t see majority o f  people with severe mental illness as-as dangerous.
292 R: Yeah
293 P: erm but then tend not to see the very severe end anyway so its not (.) you know (.) but
294 I don’t see them as dangerous and I don’t see them as making up the majority o f  the
295 population who have (.) a problem with living or a mental (laughing) illness, I mean there
296 is a continuum erm (1.5) there isn't anyone that doesn’t have issues but I guess its when
297 R: [yeah]
298 P: those issues you have begin to interfere with everyday living to a degree that you
299 R: [right]
300 P: have to seek help.
301 R: Right.
302 P: Which will be in primary or secondary care according to where you're placed and how
303 severe you are and what the-provisions are.
304 R: Okay-okay
305 P: but...(2)
306 R: I wanted to ask (.) when we've spoken about erm what your view o f  psychopathology
307 is or speaking about it generally and your own views as well(.) but what's been sort o f
308 formative in the development o f  your own views (.) are there any sort o f  factors or
309 experiences that have really (.) contributed towards how your view has developed-where
310 your view has come from?
311 P: I suppose just my experience in (.) training on different placements (.) one o f  my (.)
312 and since qualifying (.) I suppose since qualifying (.) worked in (.) and for the year before
313 (.) in community mental health teams (.) erm (.) but I've also worked in an inpatient unit
314 some o f  the time running a group (.) helping run a group on a men's inpatient unit AND I
315 think that helped to make me less-less nervous o f  people who are (.) who look very odd
316 and I guess that's the other thing that often (.) the-the severely mentally ill can look veiy
317 R: [yeah]
318 P: odd if they've been on the erm the very old fashioned medications.
319 R: And how've you experienced that or when you (.) what's=
320 P: =So they might have strange gaits and strange habits and ticks that you know until
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321 R: [u-huh]
322 P: you've learnt about it you don’t realise that it’s the result of the medication not them or
323 and you know actually when you've experienced them (.) although they can be a bit
324 unpredictable its less scary once-once you've (.) been alongside them for a while.
325 R: Right. So I mean just linking that back to what you said earlier about the sort of
326 publics view or representation as something being scary and frightening or possibly
327 P: [hmm]
328 R: dangerous (.) are you saying in your own experience it changes with contact or there's
329 something about...
330 P: Yeah yeah
331 R: Would that (.) is that=
332 P: =because then you begin to see that actually they're not that (.) you know (you begin)
333 to understand them and see them as people and not just as objects-scary objects (.) I mean
334 R: , [right] [right]
335 P: the unknown is always (1) is always more scary than the known isn't it or...
336 R: [yeah] Right yeah.
337 So the you're actual (.) yeh (.) the actual placement experience that’s been-that's been
338 formative or how else has that actually (.) what has that meant for the development o f
339 your views or how (.) can (.) are you able to say?
340 P: (2) (gosh) erm (4) er just that (.) oh dear (.) most of the time their ordinary (.) you
341 know with very difficult (.) severe problems in living (.) but ordinary people really erm
342 (1) hmm
343 R: and how is (.) I guess=
344 P: =I'm wondering whether I should be talking more about (1) whether you want me to
345 be talking about the severe end all the time or whether we should be talking more about
346 (.) I suppose I associate pathology (.) but I know strictly speaking depression is (.) could
347 be seen as psychopathology (.) anxiety and you know (.) I suppose I don’t like that label
348 R: [sure]
349 P: for it cause I don’t like that word because the connotations of that word.
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350 R: Right (.) so if someone is talking about depression or anxiety you wouldn’t view that
351 as psychopatholgy?
352 P: No I know it is but I don’t think of it in that way though.
353 R: Right-right
354 P: I know it’s a label isn't it
355 R: yeah
356 P: but I don’t think (.) I don’t have anything on any o f  my little notes that says
357 "psychopathology" (laughs) you know erm (2.5) I have books I suppose that I (2) the
358 R: [yeah]
359 P: other thing was my training was therapy led rather than diagnostic categoiy led (.) so
360 most of the literature I was reading was to do with how to do therapy with people not
361 "this is depression and this is how you work with depression" for a lon-g time coming
362 from the (.) you know (.) initially psychodynamic was my (.) before I did the course I
363 had some experience of that and then erm and then it was client-centred and
364 psychodynamic coming together
365 R: right
366 P: so that wasn’t coming from a medical model I came from the therapy
367 R: yeah
368 P: and it was only later then (.) I suppose when I started doing cognitive-behavioural
369 particularly when I started doing the cognitive-behavioural erm (.) model that you started
370 having protocols for depression and protocols for anxiety that you started thinking more
371 R: [right] [right]
372 P: in terms o f  those boxes (2) and I suppose clinical psychologists tend to be more in (.)
373 tend to be more that way because their placement experience is dictated by experience
374 with client groups (.) rather than with (.) its not quite the same thing but do you see what
375 R: [yeah] [right]
376 P: I mean (.) rather than with therapeutic er milieu.
377 R: So what (.) what's sort of the difference there then coming at it form a therapy point of
378 view as opposed to a=
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379 P: =okay. So if  somebody presents to me erm (.) what I'm asking them is why there here
380 and (1) what they hope (.) to achieve by coming here erm (3) and so I go from that and
381 R: [yeah]
382 P: work with that rather than this (.) label "oh yes I've got to take PTSD o ff the shelf' you
383 know (.) although with PTSD I do tend to do that more but erm but I go from their
384 experience and what-what they want to do and make a case conceptualisation which is
385 individual (.) then I may bring in things according to what they've got in that case
386 conceptualisation (.) I know its quite (.) so difficult to be clear on because its very
387 R: [right] [hmm] [hmm]
388 P: complex (.) erm
389 R: I mean do you see there as being pro's or con's to that approach, you're saying that, it
390 sounds as though there's an awareness that there's this way o f  understanding or using
391 these labels etcetera but that your choice is to (.) to go about it in a different way and I'm
392 just wondering what the pro's and con's are?
393 P: Yeah (.) erm (.) I think if  you go in and think "right I've got a depressive here's the
394 treatment" you're in danger o f  missing out things (.) your in danger o f  going in with
395 R: [yeah]
396 P: assumptions and not really seeing what they're presenting with (.) erm (2)...
397 R: So what are (.) so would they be really presenting with if  its not depression or etcetera
398 etcetera if  its not one o f  those things?
399 P: (laughs)  well it could be things labelled other things couldn’t it (.) but it could be
400 things like environmental (.) you know (.) you could be taking in the broader context o f
401 their life erm (.) which may involve looking at things (.) using the psychosocial-bler-
402 bler-bler-biological whatever that long word is (laughs) approach to things (.) so your
403 taking a more holistic view erm you might (.) you know they're allowed to speak about
404 what's important to them (.) they might start talking about something that might be better
405 addressed by (.) some other way or complimentary to it you know (.) you might get a
406 community support worker to go in and give them advice on there erm (.) how to sort out
407 their bills and get there lives in order in that way (.) which might have more effect than
408 R: [right]
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409 PI 10: you know (.) o f  therapy you know,(2) erm also you take in account o f  where their
410 located socially because (1) you know (.) looking at it from a feminist perspective, if
411 somebody's living in a deprived erm (2) I always think North Peckham estate you know
412 (laughs) cause I did work there once erm, well you know wouldn’t it be normal to be
413 depressed under certain
414 R: [okay]
415 P i l l :  circumstances (1) and its I mean (.) YEAH BYE (says goodbye to her children)
416 R: [right]
417 P: (5) erm (2) there can be political arguments as well, I very great difficulty in not
418 (going) down to the political (laughs) for some reason but you know (.) if  your blaming
419 the person (.) locating the problem in the person then your never looking at what the
420 societal problems are you're always blaming the person erm when you look at the suicide
421 rate in farmers for instance if  you say "oh they're depressed" you might out on the fact
422 that a lot o f  it is EEC legislation or the way the newspapers talk about farmers or the way
423 new people don’t like the mud on the roads. Its about taking a more holistic approach and
424 R: [yeah yeah]
425 P: and taking more things in and different levels o f  analysis erm=
426 R: =this=
427 P: =not that I'm doing social research all the time (both laugh)
428 R: this sounds as though from how you've described it, it poses quite a dilemma to the
429 individual practitioner or that it sounds quite a difficult task in a way.
430 P: [well I think] Yeah I mean you
431 can say to a client you know if  this this and this is going on you can normalise their
432 experience for instance and say like (.) you know "I'm not surprised you're feeling bad (.)
433 so would I" you know.
434 R: Yeah-yeah
435 P: So you're immediately coming down (.) not coming down to their level but it's
436 equalising.
437 R: Right, and what do you think is the=
438 P: =benefit o f  that?
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439 R: Yeah (both laugh)
440 P: Erm well its normalising they think "oh well maybe I'm not mad".
44] R: Right.
442 P: Cause they come to you and they come to a community mental health team and they-
443 they have feelings about that (.) people have seen them as having a mental health
444 R: [yeah]
445 P: problem maybe (.) they're coming with that (.) already (.) a lot o f the time erm (1.5)
446 R: [right]
447 P: and they feel relieved if  you say "well look, this is a normal response (.) I can
448 understand why you're responding in that way" and then I guess you might not be able to
449 change the world (laughs) so (.) but that in itself (.) that normalisation (.) that recognition
450 that (can bring) incredible relief to people (.) just yeah (.) you know I'd be like (.) I'd feel
451 like that in (.) or anyone would feel like that in that situation.
452 R: Right.
453 P: That in itself is so therapeutic erm (.) I keep going o ff on tangents.
454 R: It moves around (.) it’s a big area.
455 P: It is a big area its quite complex isn't it.
456 R: Just to (.) sorry (.) just to try and come back to the development o f  your views and I
457 appreciate there's so much there (.) but you've mentioned your own experience o f
458 working and practicing er I think you mentioned training as well as somehow being
459 formative in the development o f  your own views (.) is there anything else around that (._
460 any other experiences or factors that sort have-have gone into that? I mean you've
461 mentioned this awareness about...
462 P: I mean I do use DSM-IV for instance (.) I don’t know if  you're coming on to that in a
463 bit but or (.) can I talk about it now?
464 R: O f course.
465 P: Erm there are times when its veiy useful to have the diagnostic categories and (.) and
466 to use them (.) in the aid o f  the client erm (.) you might get (.) they might have an
467 insurance claim you know (.) there might be times when you do use quite a traditional
468 R: [right].
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469 P: medical approach erm (.) psychopathological if  you like approach to it because they
470 suffered as a result o f  something and they need the label in order to go through the legal
471 process o f  what they're doing (.) for instance and the medical model fits more with
472 R: [right]
473 P: the legal process than an existential one (laughs) you know wouldn’t be very useful in
474 that-in that (1) so it's pragmatic enn (.) also I suppose (.) it can be helpful to a client
475 sometimes to have labels too you know (would say) you're depressed because it can be
476 helpful to have an explanation, to have label, ''what's wrong with me" you know,
477 R: [yeah] [yeah]
478 P: and if  they say "oh I've got this, I've got post..." sometimes that helps to do that too (.)
479 I wouldn’t say I’d that I wouldn’t (.) not acknowledge someone's depressed or someone
480 who's anxious or (1) erm (.)or suffering from Post Traumatic Stress. I've used
481 R: [yeah yeah]
482 P: it more with PTSD than other things because that's often the thing that involves er,
483 R: [right]
484 P: they've been referred for by their company or something or they've got time o f  work to
485 come for that or there're legal implications er (.) I'm just trying to think what other
486 R: [yeah] [yeah]
487 P: things (2.5) well sexual abuse but that's not a diagnostic criteria but er one tends to
488 think about (.) things that might arise from (.) if  someone's been abused you have in your
489 mind (.) what things might be difficult for them you have (.) I always have bracketed o ff
490 the things research has shown with those sort o f  things that (.) you know happen because
491 R: [right]
492 P: it would be stupid not to because it might help to be (.) aware o f them (.) to be (.) er
493 not on guard but (3.5) well to be aware that for certain client's certain things might be
494 particularly sensitive or erm (1) you might look for certain things a bit in certain client's
495 because its (.) well it saves time and you know (.) erm yeah helps the therapy.
496 R: Right
497 P: So its not that I don’t think o f  them but I don’t necessarily think o f  it as
498 psychopathology but just as (.) what goes with that presentation.
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499 R: Right. So there is a benefit to you in a sense as well? I mean you've said that it
500 P: [yeah]
501 R: benefits the client in a way=
502 P: =Yeah=
503 R: =and it sounds as though that aids you in your conceptualisation your...
504 P: Yeah you might think "ah yes (.) de-de-de, ah yes, ur-ur-ur" seen that seen that.
505 R: I was just thinking how do you actually, how do you arrive at those decisions, or how
506 does that process sort o f  work, it sounds difficult in a sense?
507 P: (3) erm (.) I don’t know which bit o f  this to get at it from erm (6 ) well again talking
508 about CBT if somebody is presenting with depressive symptoms then working in certain
509 ways (.) have been found to help-with depression. There will be certain CBT techniques
510 that will go across the board erm what Pedesky calls "cognitive therapy unplugged",
511 things that you might use for (.) across the board (.) but there are particular (2) erm you
512 know (.) like thought record keeping and that sort o f  thing that (.) erm activity scheduling
513 (.) all the things that come from the protocol research on CBT.
514 R: Right.
515 P: So then I might (.) say "oh yes that's been helpful" (.) you know so (.) or for anxiety.
516 erm panic attacks you'd bring down the protocol on panic attacks and get them to draw up
517 a (.) do a hierarchy o f  the anxiety provoking situations and work your way through them
518 and it really works.
519 R: Right.
520 P: BUT you might not just be doing that (.) you know but...
521 R: But there's something about there are things in place that are o f  use to you ...
522 P: Erm yeah yeah and that’s I suppose the benefit o f  an integrative approach (.) in that
523 you can do that (.) you can take (.) you can take the things that are useful from (.) which
524 ever (.) camp as it were
525 R: Right
526 P: IT makes it more complex yes (.) it is more complex but then people are (.) you know
527 R: [yeah] [yeah yeah] [yeah right]
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528 P: and I suppose it-it all comes together in the case conceptualisation erm, (3) which is
529 not always overtly stated to the client (.) you know I won't always be working (.) I work
530 much more obviously CBT with certain clients that other clients erm (.) if  somebody .is
531 presenting with a history o f  (.) abuse for instance (.) er and they just feel its impacting on
532 their life I might be much more (1) much more humanistic much more erm exploratory
533 than someone presenting with a clear panic disorder you know (.) and I'd be thinking
534 probably o f seeing them for longer and 0 )  perhaps have to pay more attention to certain
535 things (.) certain aspects o f  the therapeutic relationship (.) you know different things
536 come in (.) sometimes I think about in terms o f  the five therapeutic relationships
537 framework o f  Clarkson's erm you know what am I working in now (.) and Pedesky does a
538 similar thing
539 R: [yeah yeah]
540 P: er (.) what do you need to be with this client if  they are being very emotional do you
541 need to be more structured or do they need to let that out or you know (.) what's
542 happening in the room (2) and I might not necessarily go (.) yeah (.) AND whether you
543 R: [yeah yeah]
544 P: focus on the present or the past or (.) but this is going away from the point isn't it.
545 R: That’s fine. I was just (.) it just popped into my head (.) I was just thinking about (.)
546 wondering about how (.) you know you mentioned a complexity and that there are so
547 many different sort o f  ways that you can approach things (.) people are complex and
548 we've got all these complex procedures and different (.) you know things in place (.) you
549 know to try and help people and everything. Is there something about the context that
550 does sort o f  shape practice or what are the effects o f the context or the system that you
551 are working in?
552 P: Sure er I think there is pressure, there is a pressure at the moment to work more
553 cognitive behaviourally (2) erm because the G.P.'s have got it-got it in their heads (.)
554 eveiybody's got it in their heads (.) its really trendy (laughs) there's been (.) I mean
555 there's been loads o f  outcome studies on it (.) it lends itself to outcome studies (.) its sort
556 o f research based all the way along its evolution and erm (2.5) and yeah it lends itself
557 more to outcome research than perhaps psychodynamic for instance approach would do
184
558 although the psychodynamic has improved recently in measuring things but the very
559 nature o f what its talking about (.) its more difficult to look at unconscious by its very
560 R: [hmm]
561 P: definition erm (3.5) but there's a lot (.) there's also (.) as I said earlier with the erm (.)
562 more recent conceptualisations o f  cognitive-behavioural therapy particularly with schema
563 focused approach there's an awful lot o f  overlap in ideas (.) erm or (1) yeah there is a
564 R: [yeah]
565 P: tendency towards (.) movement towards integration in practices anyway and o f  course
566 experienced practitioners tend to be integrative the research shows doesn’t it erm but you
567 were saying context (.) Yeah (.) in the CMHT there's the influence o f  the medical model
568 there (.) you know I'm sharing a corridor with two psychiatrists and an SHO (laughs) so
569 er (1) I-I will be more aware o f  diagnostic criteria's and so forth than I was when I was
570 working in-in a student services department in an art college and I suppose I feel perhaps
571 a slight more pressure to be more like that (.) the whole milieu is more like that.
572 R: Right so how-how does that pressure sort o f  manifest itself?
573 P: Well I suppose writing to G.P.'s writing to consultant's (.) talking to consultants (2) if
574 you're talking to people like that then you're tending to use their language or you need to
575 communicate (.) so you use some things erm, 1-1 tend not to talk about existential
576 concerns a great deal or sort of...
577 R: Can I ask (.0 I mean it seems (.) or why or what's the?...
578 P: I suppose people would (.)for one thing its quite difficult to get into that in the short (.)
579 you know (.) in the short times we have er (2) it somehow doesn't quite fit.
580 R: Right
581 P: Erm so (1) but you know I do deal with clients who do have existential anxieties erm,
582 particularly people who have anxiety generally you know ...
583 R: Yeah-yeah so is that (.) what's that like in practice for you (.) you're saying that the
584 context (.) the language (.) the way o f  talking that you're involved in (.) it sounds as
585 though it doesn't necessarily fit with your own actual stance or understanding o f  things?
586 P: I was just thinking about it now (.) I would tend to be talking to those other
587 professionals about the clients that they would tend to be coming into contact with
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588 anyway (.) which wouldn't tend to be the clients who tend to bring those existential
589 issues.
590 R: Right.
591 P: They tend to be (.) I'm using tend a lot (.) at they erm at the less (.) er pathological end
592 of the spectrum (laughs)
593 R: Right.
594 P: The ones who have difficulties in living that the psychologist's would see but not the
595 CPN (laughs)
596 R: Right.
597 P: The CPNs see clients (.) usually see clients that the psychiatrist gives them to see (1.5)
598 that need a more team approach erm that might be more likely to be on medication and so
599 forth.
600 R: Right (.) I'm trying to get that clear in my own head is there (.) is it different for
601 psychologists or different types of workers?...
602 P: Yeah it can be. We sometimes we see clients who are (2) less-yeah-well (1.5) I don’t
603 want to say this because I-I-I cant (.) this is only my own experience and I cant say that
604 its true for eveiy psychologist
605 R: Yeah sure but your experience is?
606 P: That I tend to get the client's that are perhaos-not all mv clients but I have a proportion
607 o f clients that I think o f as sort o f  luxury clients (laughing)
608 R: What are luxury clients? (laughing)
609 P: Erm clients who are (.) oh dear (.) erm perhaps very intelligent (.) very middle-class
610 (.) have the luxury o f  being worried about (.) are they being fulfilled in life (.) but are not
611 maybe (1) severely depressed bit I suppose what people would call the worried well.
612 R: Right.
613 P: Erm I see a few of them (.) not many erm and often they do present with something
614 that can be a diagnostic category (.) you now mild obsessive-compulsive disorder is quite
615 common in that group (.) I've found in my experience, erm (1) existential anxiety
616 certainly (.) you know if you're struggling to live from day to day your not worried really
617 about whether or not you're being fulfilled because you haven’t got time (.) you know
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618 you have clients who are living on thirty pounds a week with their kids (.) they haven't
619 got time to worry about the meaning o f life.
620 R: Right.
621 P: Sometimes (.) well okay sometimes they might but you know its kind o f  a luxuiy isn't
622 it er (2) but there's I suppose one is tending to see less o f those luxury clients because o f
623 the pressures on services (.) I mean I've got a waiting list of one year (.) so I can't see
624 them for long anyway.
625 R: Sure-sure
626 P: those ones anyway.
627 R: I was just thinking moving into try and talk a little bit more specifically about
628 counselling psychology practice enn I think what you're saying lead into that and I was
629 just wondering about how does the counselling psychologist (.) again in the context
630 you've been talking about (.) how does that fit in (.) you're saying that you might get (.)
631 you see certain clients or what's your experience of=
632 P: =WelI I see primary and secondary client referrals (1) so I'm lucky that I can do both
633 so I get a mixture. Now in some CMHT's you cant. In the CMHT were I was working
634 before I-I could only see the secondaiy referrals so I got more o f  the severe end.
635 R: Yeah.
636 P: I get a cross-section now in fact you know (.) it depends how you define primary and
637 secondary care that’s another issue erm, but I see a mixture o f  suffering levels.
638 R: Right-right.
639 P: A mixture o f (.) what (.) yeah (.) if  you want to call pathology (.) degree o f
640 pathology.
641 R: Right. How does what we've been talking about and I mean your own experience (.)
642 your own (.) the context that you practice in (.) how does that fit into counselling
643 psychology practice?
644 P: Oh right (.) as opposed to clinical you mean?
645 R: You're a counselling psychologist aren't you?
646 P: Yeah
647 R: Yes
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648 P: My job was advertised for a clinical psychologist.
649 R: Right.
650 P: A lot o f them are.
651 R: Yeah.
652 P: So you're automatically in a funny position.
653 R: So what's the...
654 P: Well they might have expectations that you'll be like a clinical psychologist and often
655 times yeah (.) I mean as I said to set up straw persons (.) is dangerous erm in some o f the
656 CHMTs I've worked with you know (.) I can say that the person who was a clinical
657 psychologist was for instance (.) more psychodynamic than I was (.) were as traditionally
658 clinical psychologists have been seen as more cognitive-behavioural erm and counselling
659 psychology (.) psychologists has taken in (1.5) more o f  the psychodynamic approach but
660 that is a generalisation enn (2) I probably have moved partly more towards cognitive-
661 behavioural through being influenced by clinical psychologists that I work with as well
662 (.) although my department's probably fifty-fifty now (.) er (1) I mentioned training
663 differences so there are difference in underlying philosophies.
664 R: Right.
665 P: Er (.) I don’t do testing you know (.) I haven’t been trained in it (.) erm I might be less
666 inclined to use testing materials (.) you know less forms (.) BDI' (.) less o f  that
667 measurement stuff than your traditional clinical psychologist.
668 R: Right.
669 P: I might be (.) I don’t know if I am erm, yeah I feel a bit resistant to using things like
670 that but I'm required to use them to a certain degree (I mean there's pressure)
671 R: [the resistance is?]
672 P: Oh well I don’t know if  that's personal or philosophical I hate forms (laughing) you
673 know I hate having to put things in boxes.
674 R: Right.
675 P: Er at the same time we've got to show clinical effectiveness (.) we've got to show
676 outcomes (.) so that=
677 R: =right (.) so you mentioned (.) there is a pressure there is a context related pressure.
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678 P: Yeah yes (.) which I wouldn’t have say in private practice (1) to the same degree (.) it
679 R: [right]
680 P: would be slightly different (.) I'd still have pressure to be effective (A but maybe not to
681 be demonstrating it in that way.
682 R: Right
683 P: So you know (.) there's a twenty (.) there's a thirty-three and there's a twenty-two
684 (joking) (laughs) sorry I'm being very...
685 R: No-no-no
686 P: erm so yeah there is context pressure.
687 R: And you mentioned about erm differences in training and perhaps some o f  the
688 differences perhaps between a clinical and a counselling and your experience o f  not
689 doing as much testing and that kind o f things.
690 P: Traditionally although...
691 R: traditionally
692 P: yeah
693 R: Although?
694 P: Although some counselling psychologists are veiy clinical in a traditional way (.) do a
695 lot o f  testing you know (.) but traditionally its generally felt that clinical psychologists
696 tend to be more cognitive-behavioural (.) do more o f  the testing stuff (.) come-come
697 from a behavioural you know have evolved from a behavioural (.) basis haven’t they
698 R: [right]
699 P: clinical psychology evolved from that background (.) counselling psychology didn’t
700 (.) it came from the humanistic.
701 R: Okay so=
702 P: =but it still (.) you're still scientist-practitioner but (2), I can get so-so (.) you know
703 into what you mean by science and so on at this point.
704 R: Sure (.) well feel free to (.) but what I did want to ask though was given-given those
705 differences that you've mentioned there. What do you think counselling psychology's
706 view o f  psychopathology is?
707 P: As compared to clinical psychology's (laughs)
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708 R: Well no (.) if you want to make that comparison?
709 P: I think they're less inclined (.) I think they're less inclined traditionally (.) maybe I
710 shouldn’t (.) you know they're less inclined you can have a continuum maybe with
711 psychiatrists (.) clinical psychologists (.) counselling psychologists (.) counsellors (.) so a
712 counsellor or psychotherapist maybe (.) although hmm erm would be at one end o f  the
713 continuum and a psychiatrist would be at the other end (.) but you know there's (.)
714 individuals are different but that would be er (1) you know that could be a broad brush or
715 (.) god I'm mixing my metaphors wonderfully (I laugh) enn (4) yeah what (.) its
716 interesting that where I work I've been responsible for supervising (.) five counsellors in a
717 (managed) counselling service (.) cause your seen (that) the counselling psychologists
718 within the department are more appropriately trained to supervise counsellors (.) because
719 R: [right]
720 P: o f our training in therapeutic models and its felt that the clinical psychologists aren't
721 (2)
722 R: [right]
723 P: as appropriately trained for that because they come more from the diagnostic (.) erm
724 (.) you know different types of, haven’t had personal therapy you know, and those things
725 impact (.) and I'm probably thinking of loads of stuff I could have said about that
726 (laughs) but you know the fact that you've personal therapy yourself has an impact erm
727 might make you less defended therefore you might be less inclined to want to put people
728 in boxes (.) I don’t know
729 R: Right. So what would be the inclination there the-the distinction between somebody
730 who possibly has had psychological personal therapy and as opposed to not (.) and
731 something about categorising or putting people in boxes?
732 P: Yeah, well if somebody label (and that’s them) and they're not just people similar to us
733 with difficulties in certain ways or whatever (.) then that (.) then that makes you look at
734 your own stuff and if  you haven’t done personal therapy you might be veiy defended
735 against it.
736 R: Right.
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737 P: So you might tend to project (.) you know (.) do all sorts o f things around that (.)
738 because you're defended not acknowledging you're own (.) easier to think o f people as (.)
739 in boxes you know (.) as mentally ill.
740 R: Right so I mean you're doing that with your hand as well (pushing away motion)
741 P: [yeah yeah]
742 R: pushing away (.) so-so what (.) how do you (.) I don’t know, something seems
743 significant
744 P: [pushing away]
745 R: there (.) I not sure what it is about=
746 P: neither am I (.) I'm sort o f  evolving the idea m yself at the moment (laughs) but...
747 R: there seems to be (.) I think (?) notion o f  doing that and how you've described...
748 P: it causes a separation doesn’t it-it’s a separation (.) yeah (.) it’s a separation when you
749 R: [right, some distance]
750 P: put a diagnosis on somebody.
751 R: A separation between=
752 P: =between you and them (.) it can be (.) they have this label you don't erm (1.5)
753 whereas if  you're thinking in terms o f  a case conceptualisation with somebody with a
754 difficulty with (.) a particular sort o f  thing in their life (.) you know there'd be a lot o f
755 echoes with your own life a lot o f the time (.) there might be a less o f  a separation with
756 (3) erm it (.) its something to do with being to acknowledge your own stuff (.) that might
757 R: [right]
758 P: be easier to do if  you've had therapy, erm, and being defended against that and a
759 feeling that you must always (.) especially when its doctors hence the suicide rate but,
760 (laughs) one o f  the reasons (.) sorry rambling madly (.) (laughs) erm, de-de-de-de-de (.)
761 yeah so it was felt that counselling psychologists would be more appropriate to supervise
762 the (.) counsellors.
763 R: Sure.
764 P: Enn the counsellors would have preferred to have had counsellors (.) they had issues
765 with it being psychologists (A y ou know whether there's a hierarchy
191
766 R: the-ss (.) I was thinking I mean its been mentioned throughout but you mentioned then
767 about the continuum or hierarchy when=
768 P: =1 seem to think in continuums a lot don’t I?
769 R: Yeah erm but the erm there's something about the continuum or hierarchy or the
770 different sort o f terms attached to workers in the field ranging from the psychiatrist right
771 through (.) I-I don’t know there seems to be some significance to that in terms o f  what
772 the psychiatrist is here (.) the clinical psychologist is there the counselling psychologist
773 is=
774 P: =are you talking about status (2) (laughsj  I wasn’t implying it there but you could (.)
775 The medical model has a higher status (.) than (.) humanistic counselling would-does (.)
776 erm (2) erm (.) counselling sometimes has negative (.) seems to have negative
777 connotation for some people, they say "oh you're a counsellor, oh you know, you've done
778 a bit o f  counselling training".
779 R: How's that fitted for you as a counselling psychologist in practice?
780 P: A lot o f  the time I don’t mention I'm a counselling psychologist, I say I'm a
781 psychologist.
782 R: Right because?
783 P: Because some people hear the word counselling and say counsellor and that could
784 mean (.) I mean it’s a meaningless term you know and its probably (.) it depends were I
785 am erm (1.5) but it’s a small profession and probably not very well understood as a result
786 (.) erm (1.5 )people often hear the word counselling and think o f  counsellor and that
787 could mean (.) a very small training or it could be a massively long wonderful training,
788 but its meaningless (.) term (.) they pick up on (.) and I'm a psychologist first anyway
789 R: [right]
790 P: you know first degrees in psychology (.) so I'm grounded in that, grounded in research
791 blah-blah-blah you know o f  psychology. Erm (1) what I do is counsel...I prefer (.)
792 psychotherapeutic and counselling psychology the whole title but you can't say
793 psychotherapeutic counselling psychologist (said rapidly) can you? And the division is in
794 counselling psychology though they did think about changing the name at one point (.) or
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795 having a different name but erm (1) YEAH its clinical implies medical has a, implies in
796 the word higher status.
797 R: R ight
798 P: I think, I mean as personal opinion but have heard it expressed elsewhere.
799 R: Right okay.
800 P: I happen to have done research in it personally.
801 R: Alright (.) can I ask you though (.) I mean there are a variety o f  different views or
802 stances towards the use o f  diagnostic categories within counselling psychology practice
803 (.) which I think we've touched on that (.) but what are your views on this (.) on the actual
804 use o f  diagnostic categories?
805 P: (2) Do you mean by diagnostic categories actually looking at the DSM-IV and saying
806 this person fits the criteria because dum-dum-dum or do you mean calling someone
807 depressed?
808 R: Erm I think (.) I guess that’s a distinction I'm interested in (.) on what that means for
809 you, erm the veiy fact that I think=
810 P: =1 would use the word depressed because its-its short hand=
811 R: =would you think o f  yourself as using a diagnostic category then when you say
812 depressed?
813 P: (1) erm (1.5) no probably not...
814 R: right-right.
815 P: If I said clinically depressed I might because then your implying tick-tick-tick-tick.
816 R: Right.
817 P: You've ticked o ff certain boxes or reached a certain score or hmm
818 R: Right so there seems to be a I don’t know there's...
819 P: oh I'd better say a reactive depression (.) a different (.) qualify really the term.
820 R: Right.
821 P: Erm (2).
822 R: Okay. In what ways then when you're practicing do you find diagnostic categories
823 useful (.) if  you do find them useful (.) in understanding and helping clients (.) and I'm
824 thinking can you give any examples o f  that?
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825 P: Certain erm, you know examples (.) well with Post Traumatic Stress for instance, if
826 somebody's saying they've had an accident, the G.P's written they've had an accident and
827 they've got certain things erm that they're experiencing since then I would tend to be
828 thinking oh have they got PTSD and if  they have got PTSD one o f  the things I've learnt
829 about that helps PTSD, and there are certain things that you can do that have been found
830 to be really helpful, and so I would use-use it, erm and you know I'm aware o f  it if
831 R: [right]
832 P: people are saying (.) if  (•) if  they haven’t come with that label but they're having
833 nightmares or they're jumpy and I'd say "oh are you also de-de-de-de-de" and they think
834 R: [right]
835 P: they'd say "oh I had this accident" and I might say, "well (.) did you think you were
836 going to die?" or say "what were you thinking" (.) I'd say "what were you thinking at the
837 time o f  the accident", look out for whether they, (.) although that depends which, whether
838 you were using 1CD-10 or DSM-IV whether they need that thought (.) that they are going
839 to die or not (.) I don’t think they do in ICD-10
840 R: But what are you thinking or what are your thoughts or feelings towards that use o f  a
841 diagnostic category (.) when, in that situation?
842 P: I think it can be useful because it relates to a collection o f things you can do and it
843 might take you a long time to get there otherwise erm (.) well it might also be counter
844 intuitive at times somethings er (1) I didn’t like the idea o f  asking people to recall what
845 had happened in the present tense going from before it happened (.) talking all the way
846 through, it felt like a really cruel thing to do (.) you know (.) but you know having sort
847 o f  done (.) having been on courses on PTSD and short ones, er spoken to people who've
848 done lots o f  research and work in this area seems to be a helpful thing to do (.) so I've
849 done it (.) and trusted that research that comes from that diagnostic criteria I suppose
850 associated with it (.) and used it and its helped the client no end. I had one client whose
851 nightmares (.) what she'd been having every night for several months went in the minute
852 (.) now I guess maybe it wasn’t just that maybe it was other things but you know erm
853 cause you cant separate out (.) erm (.) but she'd have a lot o f the other (.) the sort o f
854 friendly (.) talking from people so forth so.
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855 R: Right. There seems to be something about=
856 P: =So (.) its looking a the literature as well and blending it with what works for who (.)
857 stuff and thinking right what does it say in the literature about somebody presenting with
858 this with these sort o f  issues
859 R: Yeah I mean you mentioned what works for whom and I guess I'm thinking in that
860 sense that there's something about a utility or there's a pragmatic aspect.
861 P: Yes thank you (laughs) yes. Yeah I am very pragmatic you know (.) I always
862 remember reading in (.) schema-focused therapy you don’t need to go hunting for
863 schemas if  somebody, if  you can just work at the automatic thoughts level with someone
864 for instance.
865 R: Right.
866 P: And you don’t have to go digging up people pasts necessarily (.) you know (.) so you
867 R: [right]
8 6 8  P: might work (.) might work from top down according to ...(laughs) According to what
869 is pragmatic
870 R: right
871 P: yeah and what they want to do too (.) obviously (.) it would be, you're responding as
872 well to (.) what they (.) present with erm what they feel they can talk about themselves (.)
873 you don’t impose it, it done in the context o f the therapeutic relationship
874 R: right
875 P: and the person in front of you.
876 R: Yeah-yeah.
877 P: But you might at times say, "this has been found to be useful with this (.) I wonder
878 how you feel about this" you know?
879 R: Yeah
880 P: Doing this
881 R: Yeah
882 P: So you're being open (.) with them
883 R: Sure. Is there (.) are there any other things?
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884 P: Writing to G.P.s (.) it can be useful to say this person de-de-de is clinically depressed
885 you know short hand.
886 R: Right.
887 P: They don’t want to have a long-winded (.) explanation o f this client they want
888 something precise for their notes.
889 R: Right.
890 P: You know? similarly with anything to do with the courts, although I've not actually
891 had to go to court I might have to this year with somebody who I only saw twice and then
892 the police came and asked me de-de-de if  I could go to court because its an abuse thing.
893 So that might come up but erm (.) and I've helped a CPN write a report for court.
894 R: Right.
895 P: Because we use DSM-IV for that for PTSD
896 R: Right-right so there's the uses there.
897 P: Yeah er AND for research purposes I guess
898 R: Yeah
899 P: Although chance would be a fine thing but y e s ... (laughs)
900 R :O k ay...
901 P: and one is always doing research anyway in practice but not in a formalised way
902 R: Right-yeah
903 P: erm so short hand er as well and linking things together (1) in your head (.) it helps to
904 have categories in your head (.) schemas in your head (.) that you can attach things to
905 sometimes but that you can also remain open (.) you know to the person in front o f  you.
906 R: Yeah I mean just from what you said it sounds as though there's a movement back and
907 fourth between sort of, I think that's how I've understood how you've spoken about
908 P: [it is rather]
909 R: your practice as something about being with somebody but also drawing upon or
910 using different theoretical understandings or diagnostic systems when its seems relevant.
911 P: Yeah, yeah yeah, I like the back and fourth yes erm
912 R: and that all seems to have been shaped by the context that you've mentioned or the
913 actual situation you work in.
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914 P: Yeah er sometimes in the past I've done joint assessments with (.) CPN's and so fourth
915 so (.) and also we have forms in (poster form?) that we have to fill in.
916 R: Right.
917 P: Which is horrible (.) which actually comes from social services not from health at all
918 but...
919 R: Right but again that’s part o f  the context I guess in terms of=
920 P: =yes you do have to (.) some things you do because they're useful (.) some things you
921 do because (.) you have to do them.
922 R: Yeah, so and then I-I assume that's sort o f  a tension or an ongoing.
923 P: a bit I mean sort o f (.) I've been involved with the NHS in different ways on and off
924 since 1978 so I'm kind o f (.) I don’t get too upset.
925 R: Okay (both laugh) all right, okay. That’s all the sort o f  direct questions I'd like to ask
926 is there anything else on the subject that you'd like to talk about or that you think hasn’t
927 been covered that feels important?
928 P: (3) Hmmm I'm sure there's something that after you've gone I'll think, "oh god why
929 didn’t I say that, that would've been so useful"
930 R: I think we've identified (.) and I mean how the conversation we've had what a big area
931 and how complex it is.
932 P: Yeah and I think you need the categories to a degree when you're reading the literature
933 and also to read literature from different places (.) so its not in the counselling
934 psychology review but its in (.) oh I don’t know (.) clinical psychology forum or
935 something or-or the BABCP (.) which is a very good thing to join erm (.) but you need to
936 have the ideas o f  these things in your head and how they fit in and communicating,
937 communicating with other journals (.) other professionals (.) other contexts erm and
938 being useful to the client, being able to link what's useful in the research to the client.
939 R: Hmm okay, and finally how did you feel about talking about this subject area?
940 P: Oh I suppose I think quite anxious, I think "golly" will he think that I'm-I'm, you
941 know, doing my job properly (laughs) er gosh and can I say I hope this is useful?
942 R: You can say that (.) you know its been interesting for me to find out somebody's
943 views really who's actually practicing.
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944 P: Well they tend to be waffully which doesn’t help (both laugh)
945 R: Well I think its perhaps something we're both found is that is a very difficult area to
946 be concise and specific about because there is so much involved (.) I mean that’s
947 something I've found when I've spoken to people about this area (.) there are so many
948 areas and things...
949 P: Yeah I guess on the surface you think its quite straight forward but when you get into
950 it there's so many levels of analysis and and yeah
951 R: Yeah okay well thank you very much for your time.
952 P: That’s a pleasure.
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Between the real and the not real: ’knowledge’, ’truth’, 'power' and the creation of 
clinical realities. A discourse analytic study of psychotherapeutic practice.
Abstract
This study set out to examine psychotherapeutic discourse from a social constructionist 
perspective. Discourse analysis was performed on pre-existing textual data in order to 
examine the discursive relations between 'knowledge', 'truth' and 'power' within the 
context of therapeutic practice. Analysis suggested that prevalent 'images of the 
individual' contained within humanist, psychological and psychodynamic discourses 
constituted the 'self within therapy as a 'real' object and 'correct' focus of therapeutic 
inquiry, whilst simultaneously reproducing culturally dominant forms of individuality. 
Operating in relation to psychodynamic theory and psychological 'truths' concerning 
human 'nature', therapy was constructed as a process that 'liberated' clients' 'essential self 
from the forces of 'repression'. Moreover, the dominant discourses available fashioned 
speakers' discursive practices and constrained the subject positions and relations of power 
available to therapists and clients. The possible implications and effects of these 
discourses and practices are discussed.
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Introduction
One popular conception of the modem discipline of psychology is that it is a disembodied 
yet coherent 'paradigm'. However, rather than being an 'objective' and value-free body of 
thought, modem psychology can be viewed as a certain form of life distinctive to 
contemporary times. Rose (2000) recently depicted the social reality of psychology as a 
"complex and heterogeneous network of agents, sites, practices and techniques for the 
production, dissemination, legitimation and utilisation of psychological 'truths' " (p. 10).
- Whilst not holding a monopoly, modem psychology and psychotherapeutic practice have 
gained unprecedented significance in public and private life as Western culture 
increasingly makes sense of experience through interpreting human action (recast as 
behaviour) through the highly individualised idiom of psychological and therapeutic 
discourse (Furedi, 2003). This ascent, which involves an ever-increasing preoccupation 
with the inner world of the self-contained individual, has been cultivated to the point 
where problems that were once thought to be political, economic, social or spiritual in 
nature are today framed from within a psychological perspective (see Burr & Butt, 2000; 
Moskowitz, 2001)
Generally regarded as having been shaped by the search for the 'true nature of reality' 
(Burr, 1995), spawned during the Enlightenment era, modem psychology set about the 
task of'discovering' the 'truth' about human nature, people and society (Billington et al.,
1998). Modelling itself on the natural sciences and adopting the concomitant belief in a 
'knowable world' ensured that psychological inquiry, for the large part, has remained 
wedded to the empirical hand of science. Consequently, the traditional view of 
'knowledge' has proceeded from a realist epistemology. From this perspective, the object 
under discussion has been viewed as a pre-existing entity whose essential nature can be 
delineated by a perspicuous observer and be captured in a theory or model (John, 1997). 
Thus the researcher or psychologist is represented as a neutral observer, immune from the 
influence of values or context. One of the major implications of the realist epistemology 
and 'scientism' driving modem psychology is that psychological 'knowledge' and theory, 
viewed as 'objective' reflections of'reality', come to receive the stamp of'truth'.
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Located within institutional, political, economic, material, discursive and social contexts, 
psychotherapeutic practice in its current guise can be viewed as an outgrowth of 
modernism and the scientific worldview (Gergen, 1994). In general terms this is apparent 
as each of the major theoretical models and theories informing psychotherapeutic practice 
(e.g. psychodynamic, cognitive, behavioural and humanistic) are either derived from, or 
have firm links with, the modem discipline of psychology, sharing deeply in its values 
and assumptions (McLeod, 1999). Furthermore, the subject-object dualism inherent in 
modem psychology is apparent in contemporary therapeutic models' preoccupation with 
the individual subject or 'individualism' (Sampson, 1993).
This focus on the self-contained individual largely came into being through the humanist 
philosophical tradition, which put the 'self (perceived as an independently functioning 
entity) at the centre of both study and values (Payne, 2000). Humanism is essentialist; it 
assumes that there is an essential 'human nature' or 'self at the core of an individual that 
in some ways is unique or original. Subsequently, the modem view of the 'self has been 
taken up in different ways by the various models of therapeutic practice in terms of their 
respective theories of personality and motivation, the assessment process, how they 
conceptualise change, and the nature of the relationship between therapist and client.
Clearly the notion of the 'self has become a pervasive 'truth' at the heart of modem 
psychology and psychotherapeutic practice. However, as the scientific status of therapy 
as a modernist enterprise has been challenged by new paradigm epistemologies and 
recent attempts to place psychology in a critical historical context (e.g. Cushman, 1990; 
Danziger, 1997; Gergen, 1985), it has increasingly been acknowledged that the self- 
contained individual, so central to traditional theorising, research and practice, cannot 
exist independently of the observer. Such acknowledgement has drawn attention to the 
potentially hazardous shortcomings of modem forms of psychological inquiry and 
practice, i.e., their normalising and pathologising effects, (see Fee, 2000; Hook & Eagle, 
2002; Parker 1999). One of the principle players involved in this critical project has been 
social constructionism (e.g. Gergen, 1985, 1994). With post-structural and post-modern
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philosophies1 serving as a cultural backcloth, social constructionists view language as 
constructive and constitutive of social and clinical realities rather than as a neutral tool 
that simply reflects an independent 'reality'. Thus psychological knowledge and theory 
along with the foundational notions underpinning modernist models of therapy, such as, 
the 'self, 'objectivity', 'truth' and 'expertise', are recast as social constructions rather than 
'actual things' (McNamee & Gergen, 1992), which are linguistically negotiated through 
the socio-cultural meanings that are historically prevalent (see Burman & Parker, 1993; 
Gergen, 1994; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). As such, attention has been re-directed towards 
the discursive or textual underpinnings of mental life, 'psychopathology' and 
psychotherapeutic practice (see Parker, 1999; Parker et al., 1995; Rose, 1989; Shorter, 
1993).
Clearly the 'turn to language' (Parker, 1992) has posed considerable ethical and political 
challenges to modem psychology and traditional therapeutic practice. Central to such 
challenges is the claim that 'knowledge and social action go together' (Burr, 1995, p.5), 
i.e. that 'knowledge' is inextricably linked to, and emerges as, a product of discursive 
activity. Correspondingly, for social constructionist and critical psychologists, claims to 
'knowledge' and 'truth' become important issues linked to the operation of'power'.
White and Epston (1990) have argued that notions of power in therapy have been "much 
overlooked in the therapy literature generally, and especially in the benign view that we 
frequently take of our own practices" (p. 18). They note that analyses of power in therapy 
literature "have traditionally represented it in individual terms, such as a biological 
phenomenon that affects the individual psyche or as individual pathology that is an 
inevitable outcome of early traumatic personal experiences, or in Marxist terms as a class 
phenomenon" (pp.18-19). However, from within a Foucauldian-inspired constructionist 
framework, 'power' is more than a concept mobilised by various interest groups. It is not 
a 'thing' that individuals can gain, possess and then lose; rather 'power' is viewed as an
1 Often termed 'anti-humanist' precisely because they deny the 'self as being the essential core o f identity.
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interlocking series of relations, which are played out in discourse and our uses of 
language. Furthermore, according to Foucault (1980), the analysis of'power-knowledge' 
relations becomes central to the analysis of 'power-relations', because 'power1 and 
'knowledge' are inseparable and implicate and determine each other. Following the thesis 
that 'knowledge' and 'power' directly imply one another, what is deemed to be 'truth' 
comes to be viewed as a product of'relations of power'.
Directing the focus towards the relational patterns in which language is employed and the 
interrelation of'power' and 'knowledge' becomes essential to the examination of'relations 
of power' within psychotherapeutic practice. By viewing psychological knowledge / 
theoiy and psychotherapeutic models as discourses that systematically form the objects of 
which they speak (Foucault, 1980), including the 'self, the present study aims to attend to 
the ways in which 'claims to knowledge' and 'truth' contained within dominant discourses 
both reproduce culturally dominant forms of subjectivity and specify particular 'power 
relations' between therapist and client.
This study aims to examine psychotherapeutic discourse from a social constructionist 
perspective. The discursive relations between 'knowledge', 'truth' and 'power' are 
examined by focusing on the constructions (and their implications and effects) of 
psychological knowledge / theory, and psychotherapeutic models evident during 
therapeutic exchanges between therapists and clients. More specifically, the prevalent 
discourses and epistemological foundations of contemporary psychotherapeutic practice 
are deconstructed and critically questioned by focusing on 'power relations', i.e. the ways 
of acting and relating made possible by particular versions of events, between therapists 
and their clients within the micro context of the therapeutic relationship.
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Method
Data
This study utilises pre-existing textual data (transcribed audio-recordings of therapy 
sessions) obtained from an archived data set that was originally collected for the second 
Sheffield Psychotherapy Project (Shapiro, Barkham, Hardy & Morrison, 1990). The 
project involved a programmatic series of quantitative investigations, which crossed 
treatment with duration in comparing the effectiveness of proscriptive (cognitive- 
behavioural) and exploratory (psychodynamic-interpersonal) therapy. The material 
contained in the archive was deemed appropriate as it provided a source of 'naturally' 
occurring psychotherapeutic discourse and practice as opposed to interview data. Clients 
and therapists whose interactions feature in the archived data consented to their therapy 
sessions being recorded and transcribed for use in the Sheffield Psychotherapy Project 
and in subsequent analyses undertaken by other researchers. Ethical approval for using 
the data was gained from the University of Surrey's Advisory Committee on Ethics (see 
Appendix A).
As the availability of data was limited and I was unable to view the materials contained 
within the archive in person, it was not possible to specify detailed inclusion criteria other 
than that the transcribed data should be of individual therapeutic sessions between 
therapists and clients. In order to simplify this process, I requested that a total of between 
twelve and twenty transcripts be selected randomly from four or five therapists, so as to 
allow a variety of discursive practices within and across the accounts to emerge.
The data set obtained consisted of twelve transcripts in total, selected randomly from four 
different therapists, each conducting three sessions of psychodynamic-interpersonal 
therapy2 with an individual client. The therapists, all of whom were male, were qualified
" Psychodynamic-interpersonal therapy is based on Hobson's (1985) Conversational model. Using 
psychodynamic, interpersonal and humanistic principles, it focuses on the therapist-client relationship as a
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clinical psychologists who had been trained in the United Kingdom and had received post 
qualification experience in psychodynamic-interpersonal methods. Clients were white 
males drawn from a target population of professional, managerial and white-collar 
workers from the United Kingdom. Their mean age was 49.5 years and all had presented 
with clinical symptoms of depression.
Though the quality of the transcription was quite basic (see Appendix B), as it did not 
follow the kind of notation scheme (e.g. Atkinson & Heritage, 1984) usually used for 
discourse analytic studies, it does include basic features such as, timed pauses in the talk 
and words said with particular emphasis or stress are underlined.
Method of Analysis
Discourse analysis is an umbrella term for a number of different interpretive and 
reflexive approaches to conducting research, united by a common attention to the 
constitutive nature of language and role of discourse in the construction of social and 
psychological realities. The form of discourse analysis utilised in the present study is 
influenced by the poststructuralist tradition, which draws on the work of Michel Foucault 
(e.g. Hollway, 1984; Marks, 1993). Within this perspective, discourses may be defined as 
'sets of statements that construct objects and an array of subject positions' (Parker, 1994, 
p.245). As discourse is viewed as being implicated in the process by which 'human 
beings are made subjects' (Foucault, 1982, p.208), attention is given to the ways in which 
discourse both facilitates and limits, enables and constrains what can be said, by whom 
and when (see Parker, 1992). The concept of positioning (see Harre & Van Langenhove,
1999) is employed to help identify subject positions, which provide, 'a location for 
persons within the structure of rights and duties for those who use that repertoire 
[discourse]' (Davies & Harre, 1999, p.35). The socio-political concern with the 
assignment of subject positions through discourse means that Foucauldian-inspired
vehicle for 'revealing' and 'resolving' interpersonal difficulties, which are viewed as primary in the origins 
o f depression.
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discourse analysis attempts to move beyond the situated and occasioned nature of spoken 
interaction in interpersonal communication, i.e., the action orientation of talk (e.g. 
Edwards & Potter, 1992), in order to say something about the relationship between 
discourse, power, human subjectivity and social relations. Its deconstructive potential, 
i.e., its ability to problematize and question what is usually taken-for-granted, is 
politically appealing in the context of the present study, as it allows us to mount a critical 
account of the functions and effects of psychotherapeutic practice, through examining the 
interrelationship between 'knowledge' and power in the production of psychological 
'truths'.
Analysis of the data did not operate according to a set formula but broadly observed the 
following process. To start with, the transcribed data set was read line by line several 
times in order to identify and highlight the discursive objects that were being constructed, 
for example, the 'self, human 'nature' etc. For this purpose Parker's (1992, p.5) definition 
of a discourse as 'system of statements which constructs an object' was utilised. All 
references (no matter how oblique) were then taken out of the text and organised using 
relevant themes. The second stage of the analysis aimed to locate the various discursive 
constructions of the object within the specific discourses of psychology, psychodynamic 
theory and wider discourses of the individual prevalent in contemporary Western society. 
The guiding principle was to determine the functions and effects of the prevalent 
discourses within the texts. That is to say, I was concerned with the ways in which claims 
to 'knowledge' and 'truth', contained within these discourses, shaped therapists' and 
clients' discursive practices and produced particular forms of subjectivity. Thus a great 
deal of time was spent rereading texts and formulating hypotheses about how the 
available discourses, specified particular relations of power between therapists and 
clients, and circumscribed the subject positions and opportunities for action available to 
them.
Although the study was approached with a clear theoretical and analytic focus, influenced 
by my (the researcher’s) interest in critical approaches to psychology, and experience of
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entering and practising within the culture of psychotherapy, the various themes and 
analysis of discourse arose from the detailed examination of the texts. Once 
interpretations of the data had been formed, the extracts were examined further for 
evidence that either supported, modified or countered them. In the final stages of the 
analysis, care was taken to ground all interpretations and analytic claims empirically 
using quotations from the text as linguistic evidence. Though qualitative research, in 
contrast to quantitative (positivist) research, is relativistic, it is by no means a solipsistic 
form of relativism. Nonetheless, the non-realist epistemology underpinning 
poststructuralist and social constructionist perspectives precludes recourse to the 
objectivity assumed by the criteria (validity and reliability) traditionally used to evaluate 
quantitative research. As such, the present study should be evaluated according to the 
extent to which the material being studied has been rendered coherent, how well the 
interpretations are supported by and grounded in the texts and the utility of the insights 
provided (see Yardley, 2000).
Analysis
Throughout the texts, speakers make-a number of claims to ’knowledge’ and !truth' 
relating to the nature and development of the 'self, problem formation and problem 
resolution, which are routinely expressed in naturalistic accounts of life and identity.
The extracts that follow have been selected in order to render more visible the ways in 
which speakers' discursive practices are influenced by the prevailing 'images of the 
individual' contained within humanist, psychological and psychodynamic discourses. In 
establishing a sense of what is 'real' and 'true', speakers' 'claims to knowledge' structure 
therapy as a context that is both constituting of the modem subject and reproducing of 
dominant cultural notions of what it means to be a 'real' person, e.g.. 'self-contained', 
'individuated', 'autonomous', 'self-actualised' and so on. The discernments made in their 
accounts implicate, or are dependent for, their meaning upon taken-for-granted 
psychological 'truths' concerning the presumed existence of an essential human 'nature' or
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'self. As such, speakers' 'knowledge' practices work to 'naturalise', and hinder a 
consciousness of the constitution of life through such 'truths'. Arguably this has a 
'normalising effect' that largely obscures the operation of power in determining what is 
deemed to be'true'.
Whilst there are numerous aspects of the texts that could be attended to, in terms of how 
participants use and manipulate discourse to achieve certain ends, my concern at this 
stage centres more upon the ways in which speakers are products of, and are spoken 
through, dominant discourses. This in turn will enable a more situated deconstruction of 
the specific professional discourses, 'knowledge' practices and 'power-relations' on show 
in the texts and the implications and effects these hold with regard to psychotherapeutic 
practice.
T = Therapist 
C = Client
Extract 1: (Transcript 11)
46 T: It feels to me as if, I mean it's not so much digging in the past as kind of just
47 bringing..bringing things together (C: yes) putting the pieces o f  your life together in a
48 way
49 C: Mm. Things that I've just sort of tended to push away on one side and forget.
50 T: Push away and forget, yeah and...
51 C: Yeah, and I ought to bring them in, sort, sort of line them all up and say well look,
52 "There they all are."
53 T: This is me.
54 C: This is me, this is what happened, yes, yeah.
55 T: This is..is all part of me and it's important and..and..and that my tendency
56 to..to shut things off and run away from things is may be not.not the best thing for me
57 now. (C: mm) Maybe now's the time to put the pieces together a bit.
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58 C: Mm, mm. Yeah, yes. I..I can see a certain amount of sense in it, because it's sort of
59 almost as though I'm sort of building up a base or I'm trying to sort of reconstruct my life
60 (T: mm hm) on top o f  it. Er..
61 T: Reconstruct yourself.
62 C: Myself, sorry, yes, myself.
63 T: To know who you are. (C: yeah, yeah)
Extract 2: (Transcript 4)
352 T: It feels to me it's something about, something deeper than that. It feels to me it's
353 something about not [3] not having a depth inside. [9] Somehow not having, not having
354 anything inside you to give, it seems (C: mm, mm) empty and hollow, I don't know
355 whether that's actually the words..
356 C: Well I do feel empty and hollow (T: yes) there's no doubt, yeah I feel there's nothing
357 there. (T: nothing there) Dead right (T: mm) dead right. (T: mm) Um...
358 T: [3] And I reckon if you're feeling there's nothing there, it may be because there are
359 things there that you're not able to say. (C: mm) And that, there's like..we've talked about
360 the frustration (C: yes) OK (C: yeah) it's..and there's..with Q. you get, you know, you get
361 angry and you don't (C: mm) you don't really come out with it. I, you know what I mean
362 (C: yeah) there are feelings that you're not expressing (C: yeah) if all the time, you're not
363 coming out with what you're feeling
364
One of the most defining and pervasive features throughout the texts is the tendency of 
speakers to utilise naturalistic explanations that either implicitly or explicitly evoke the 
'nature' of the 'self. In the texts, clients primarily display their identities through making 
'declarations' in the form of'self-reports' to their therapists. During these declarations, the 
'reality' of the 'self is partially established through the clients' indexical use of personal 
pronouns such as 'I' and 'me'. Such 'self-talk' is encouraged and developed by the 
therapists who use the terms 'you', 'you're' and 'you've' in responding and commenting
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upon the clients' declarations. This works to establish the 'self as a 'real' entity and as the 
'correct' object of therapeutic discourse.
Such structural and essentialist understandings of identity formation, i.e., the idea that 
there is a 'self or 'personality' residing at the centre of who we are, structures therapeutic 
practice and discourse in such a way that the client is invited to make certain kinds of 
'discoveries' about their 'true nature' and what troubles them. As evident in the first 
extract, therapy is constructed as a benign and emancipatory process involving 
"..bringing things together.." and "putting the pieces of your life together.." (line 47), 
which supposedly enables the client to 'discover' or 're-discover' his essential 'self, 
become more 'whole' and therefore live a life that is a more 'authentic' expression of his 
'true nature'. The context for the 'discovery' - "This is me" (lines 53-54) - and the 
significance this realisation takes on are made possible on account of the guiding 
therapeutic goal of attaining self-knowledge or self-understanding, e.g. "To know who 
you are" (line 63), thus fulfilling the ancient injunction 'Know Thyself.
The widespread cultural and therapeutic pursuit of uncovering the 'truth' of human life in 
the form of'self-knowledge' is central across the texts and is influenced by what Foucault 
(1988) considered to be the central philosophical question of the modem era in Western 
society, namely, "what is the truth of who we are?" Integrally bound to the discourse of 
the 'individual', which elaborates norms of'autonomy' and 'self-realisation', the workings 
of the 'will to truth' (Foucualt, 1988) are visible in the texts as clients' expressions of life 
and of identity are set in contrast to images of more 'ideal' or 'natural' states of being. In 
the first extract the influence of the cultural and psychological imperative of 'facing up' 
("Yeah and I ought to bring them in, sort, sort of line them all up and say well, look, 
There they all are" - lines 51-52) and 'being real' ("This is me, this is what happened..." - 
line 54) works to situate the client and their problems within such normative discourses 
that set standards for mental health and self-realisation. One implication of the discursive 
practices supporting this discourse, is that clients are encouraged to think that they have
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to 'develop' or 'improve' themselves in order to close the gap between where they 
currently stand and more culturally and psychologically 'desirable' ways of being.
The prevalence of humanist and psychological discourse, along with the associated view 
that there exists an essential 'self or human 'nature', has led to a great lament concerning 
"How comes it that we all start out originals and end up copies?" (Geertz, 1986, p.380). 
This has become of paramount concern and comes into focus in the texts as therapeutic 
work is motivated by a search to discover and overcome that which stands in the way of 
the client becoming who they 'truly' are.
Throughout the texts this 'will to truth' is discursively linked with the psychoanalytically 
derived notion of'repression', which is construed as the guilty party; as being that which 
obscures and conceals from the client their 'true nature'. The idea that the client is in 
possession of an 'essential self, and that their 'true nature' is hidden to them through the 
forces of repression, is achieved as speakers employ and contrast metaphors of 'surface' 
and 'depth', 'inner' and 'outer', 'centre' and 'peripheiy' and 'conscious' and 'unconscious' 
during the therapeutic dialogue. In each instance the use of these metaphors creates a 
highly individualised image of the 'self as a bounded and dynamic unit containing 
different parts or layers that are frequently in conflict. Furnished out of psychological and 
psychodynamic discourses, the client is depicted as being in possession of invisible or 
'hidden' essences and elements (e.g. psychic material and 'unconscious' desires, emotions, 
needs and so on) which are seen as incorporating more 'truthful' statements about their 
'true nature', and are held responsible for inducing illness through having not been 
expressed.
For example, in the opening sequence of the second extract (lines 352-355), the therapist 
employs the image and metaphor of the 'depth' of a person in order to suggest that there is 
something going on that is currently outside the client's awareness ("something deeper 
than that"). This is done in a tentative fashion ("It feels to me it's something about.."), 
which functions to reduce authoritative overtones and minimises the extent of the claims
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that follow. The suggestion that follows, i.e., that the client is lacking in 'depth', has 
nothing inside to give and is "empty and hollow" (line 354), is interspersed with several 
qualifiers, for example, "something about not", "somehow not having" and "it seems", 
which soften, and make it more difficult to contest, what could be seen as a rather 
negative and unpalatable description. The final qualifier - "I don’t know whether that’s 
actually the words.." (lines 354-5) - serves to downplay what the therapist has just said. 
In this account (as in others across the texts) it is emotion (e.g. "It feels to me..."), rather 
than speech or thought that is accorded privileged status and serves as the justificatory 
base to the therapist's assertions. As the therapist provides no other bvert information 
(i.e., reference to personal experiences, professional training or theoretical allegiances 
through which one's knowledge claims are generated) here or at any other point in the 
texts, other than his 'feelings' to situate his assertions, it becomes difficult for the client to 
determine how they might take the views expressed by the therapist and it restricts the 
range of possible responses available to them.
Moreover, the dominance of'deficit' discourse, for example "not having a depth inside" 
(line 353), locates problems squarely within the client who finds himself to be 'lacking' 
when viewed in relation to the 'truths' of human 'nature' and according to the 
psychological 'norms' championed by these 'truths'. In effect, the discursive practices 
associated with these discourses equate 'knowledge' and 'truth' with meaning 'objective' or 
'intrinsic facts' about the 'nature' of people. This creates an in-built injunction that makes 
it difficult for the client to raise questions about the therapist's 'claims to knowledge' or 
about the socio-political and historical contexts giving rise to these 'truths'. Accordingly 
only those discourses relating to the 'individual self, 'human nature', 'feeling' and 
'normality' tend to be encouraged and developed by the therapist (in accordance with 
psychodynamic theory), whereas other discourses relating to culture, gender, inequality 
and power are kept out. Consequently, the client in the second extract is compelled to 
make sense of his identity, lived experience and difficulties through the 'prism of 
emotion', which is privileged throughout the texts as a legitimate area for therapeutic 
scrutiny.
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Notably, this subjugation occurs freely as the client does not rail against or contest the 
therapist's assertions. Rather, he fully enters into viewing and speaking of himself from 
within the discursive frame provided, e.g. "Well I do feel empty and hollow" (line 356). 
This piece of'self-realisation' ("there's no doubt, yeah I feel there's nothing there") is 
offered unreservedly and is strengthened as the therapist reflects back to the client 
"nothing there" (line 357), which subtly encourages the client to continue in this vein. 
Having gained repeated and unconditional confirmation from the client (e.g. "Dead 
right..."), which is interspersed with affirmative noises (line 357), this exchange works to 
increase the veracity of the therapist's 'knowledge' claims, thus strengthening his position 
as an authority on the client's life and problems.
As the discursive practices within psychodynamic discourse include the notion that the 
client has 'unconscious feelings', which the therapist is superior at inferring and 
understanding, it becomes possible for the client's expressions of living and identity to be 
recast as 'surface manifestations' of 'repressed' emotions that are believed to be a more 
accurate or authentic expression of the client's 'true nature'. In the final part of the second 
extract (lines 358-363) the therapist offers the interpretation that the cause of the client's 
problems is a blockage of his 'true feelings', i.e., "..there are things there that you're not 
able to say" (lines 358-359) "...you don’t really come out with it" (line 361) and 
"...you're not coming out with what you're feeling." (lines 362-363). The act of 
interpretation is represented as a catalyst, bringing into the client's consciousness what 
was previously 'unconscious' or 'repressed'. This discursive practice constructs therapy as 
a process that psychologically 'liberates' the client's 'true nature' and 'self from the forces 
of'repression'. In doing so, it actively constitutes the subjectivities of an 'expert' therapist 
and an 'unknowing' client who is unable to understand himself without the aid of the 
therapist.
In summaiy, the analysis has gone some way towards exposing the ruse. In using 
'techniques of the self elaborated by therapists (e.g. modes of self inspection and
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vocabularies of self-description) in the name of psychological liberation, clients are 
incited to scrutinise and act upon their emotions, their thoughts and their forms of 
conduct in order to become and express more authentically who they 'really' are. 
However, rather than 'revealing' something intrinsic about clients' 'essential self or 
human 'nature', this poststructuralist reading of the texts highlights how the 'claims to 
knowledge' and 'truth' made by speakers work actively to constitute the self, rather than 
reveal a pre-existing entity, and in doing so reproduce culturally dominant forms of 
individuality.
As has been highlighted, speakers' subjectivity (including the problems for which they 
seek help) is constituted through modernist-derived psychological and psychodynamic 
discourses - that is, by the effect of power/knowledge. However, therapy in the name of 
psychological liberation arguably constitutes a blind spot to life as it is produced and as 
we produce it. The constitutive effects of power are largely invisible to speakers, who for 
the most part willingly embrace their own subjugation through the influence of presumed 
psychological 'truths'.
As such 'truths' are determined through relations of power, the final part of the analysis 
will attend to the local 'power relations' between therapist and client by examining the 
'subject positions' made available to them in discourse.
Extract 3: (Transcript 12)
251 C: So I..I am at fault there because I don't show the affection. I
252 don't say anything nice. It...
253 T: Mm hm. Because it's hard for you to say nice things. (C: mm, mm..mm) It's hard for
254 you to show., to show affection.
255 C: Yeah.
256 T: That's important.
257 C: Yeah.
258 T: There's something.,1 bet that's..! bet that's important. (C: yes) It's hard for
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259 you to show affection.
260 C: Um... If one relates it to say a meal, um..if a meal is veiy nice I..L. I might say, "That
261 was a nice meal." But I tend to just um, I suppose take it for granted. (T: mm hm) I do
262 sometimes say, "Yes, I enjoyed that meal." But I don't say, "Well you've put a lot of
263 effort into it," or anything like that and I should. Um..on the other hand, if the meat's a bit
264 tough or something like that, I will always tell her. (T: mm hm) So, that's not really..I
265 really ought to be trying to give her more encouragement.
266 T: OK. You can see what you ought to do in all that quite clearly. I think what, .what we
267 need to do here, what's important for us to do is to look at what stops you. (C: yes) To
268 look at what stops you from doing the things which when you stop to think about it, you
269 can see are right. (C: yes) And. .and I think we've touched on something that is..is pretty
270 important in your life about showing affection. (C: mm) Because it comes up in relation
271 to the., to the girls as well. And it comes up, I think it may come up also in relation to the
272 whole business o f  working with people, and the kinds o f  friendly contact with people that
273 you find difficult to make at work too. (C: mm) You will always keep your distance, go
274 out for a walk, not talk about things. (C: mm) And it's not just angry feelings you're
275 avoiding, I think it's..it's loving..it's loving feelings as well (C: mm) that you're not
276 expressing.
Extract 4: (Transcript 8)
351 T: [5] You're talking easier about it now.
352 C: Yeah, I feel suddenly a lot., calmer. (T: mm., do., you look.. ) I think that actually
353 having to say to you what I just said was.. I wanted to say it (T: yeah) you see it isn't easy
354 to say.
355 T: Right, .right.. I was aware o f  actually, .letting you go through that, because somehow
356 it felt like you., you have to tell the story, you had to say. (C: mm) you had to lead up to
357 the point about what you realised at the weekend about (C: mm) maybe not going back.
358 (C: mm) That actually it was important for you..
359 C: Well I find that hurtful to say, mm...
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360 T: Yes. But somehow you had to say it rather than even me coming in and saying it for
361 you. (C: mm) I thought about that, but (C: yes) I felt like it was important for you.. [2]
362 (C: mm) to own saying that. (C: yes) However painful it was. (C: yes) You see now
363 you're., now you're talking about [4] I don't know., there's possibilities in way which is
364 not., not getting so., you're., your arm's still..
365 C: Well I'm., no, I'm not, I don't feel.. I don't feel, you know, I feel much more peaceful
366 (T: yeah) than.. than'I was.. I don't know, ten., quarter of an hour.. I don't know how long
367 ago it was (T: mm) um.. [5] mm...
368 T: Because somehow you've been able to ...
369 C: Well, I.. I suppose that I'm just., been able to share that with you., really. Um..
Extracts three and four provide further evidence of the influence of the discourse of the 
individual. At the local level of psychotherapeutic practice, the prevalence of this 
discourse has the effect of configuring and constraining the power relations, discursive 
practices and subject positions available to therapists and clients in particular ways. One 
notable effect, which features heavily across the texts, is that the therapeutic relationship 
and therapeutic interaction are virtually always represented as a one-way process. Only 
the client speaks, as it were, on their own behalf, whereas the therapist utilises a more or 
less established theoretical framework to classify and decode the client's expressions of 
life and identity according to the conceptual categories contained within psychodynamic 
discourse.
For example, at the beginning of extract 3 the client (referring to his relationship with his 
wife) tentatively and reflexively positions himself as being personally culpable ("So I..I 
am at fault") on account of not showing affection or saying anything nice (lines 251 -252). 
In response the therapist provides an explanation for the client's actions. On both charges, 
i.e., of not showing affection or saying^nice things, the therapist tells the client that this is 
because "it's hard for you" (lines 253-254). Whilst to all intents and purposes this 
explanation is, no doubt, made with the client's best interests in mind, it nonetheless
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inadvertently positions the client as being emotionally illiterate. Given the relative 
structural inequality of 'therapist as helper' and 'client as helped' it is perhaps not so 
surprising that up to this point in the exchange the client does not contest this position. 
Though he has not explicitly taken up or supplemented what has been said he appears to 
agree with the therapist, e.g. "mm, mm..mm" (line 253), "Yeah" (lines 255 & 257). As 
such, it is the therapist who is in a position to define what is significant, e.g. "That's 
important" (line 256), and how the client should understand his situation and what the 
'correct' focus of their conversation should be.
The therapist reinforces his pronouncement - "..I bet that's..I bet that's important (C: yes) 
It's hard for you to show affection" (lines 258-259). Given the association with gambling 
and therefore 'risk taking', the use of the phrase 'I bet' might seem somewhat curious in 
the context of therapeutic discourse. Nevertheless it appears to work on two levels. On 
one hand it signals the conviction and certainty with which the assertion is being made. 
On the other it can be heard as a challenge (either agree or disagree with the claim) and as 
a prompt for the client to say more. It appears to have the desired effect as the client then 
provides the therapist with further information by relaying an example of what he might 
say to his wife following a meal she has made (lines 260-265). Through contrasting what 
he does say ("..I might say, ‘ That was a nice meal ’) with what he doesn’t say ("But I 
don’t say, ‘ Well you’ve put a lot of effort into i t ’, or anything like that and I should") 
the client implicitly confirms the therapist's 'bet' and simultaneously positions himself as 
being morally reprehensible. In effect, he accepts the position of emotional illiterate, i.e., 
as somebody who cannot understand or manage his emotions, which works both to justify 
and mask the call for therapeutic intervention.
A consistent and characteristic feature of the texts is a dialogic one-sidedness to the 
therapeutic exchanges. The client is encouraged to probe ever deeper into their own 
psychological histoiy and situation; however, the therapist reveals nothing of their self. 
Though ostensibly the sustained focus on the inner world of the individual appears to 
place the client at the centre of therapy, paradoxically it works to centre the therapists'
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professional 'knowledge', 'expertise' and skill. This particular power relation is pervasive 
(albeit in an obfuscated form) because it operates in relation to supposed psychological 
'truths' about 'human nature'. As such, the ways of being and discursive practices 
available to therapist and client are not seen as the effects of relations of power but rather 
as a 'natural' consequence of the process of psychological 'liberation'.
As apparent in the final part of extract 3 (lines 266-276), primacy is given to the client's 
inner dynamics, which ensures that the client views himself as the locus of responsibility. 
This is reinforced through the therapist's selective use of 'you' and 'we' or 'us'. For 
example, the therapist positions himself as an ally or comrade (and as part of the solution) 
- "..what we need to do here, what's important for us to do..." (lines 266-267) and 
"..we've touched on something that is..is pretty important in your life about showing 
affection" (lines 269-270) - which unwittingly draws attention away from his position as 
arbiter of 'reality' and the client's corresponding location as an 'object' of professional 
discourse/knowledges. However, at no point does the therapist acknowledge himself as 
part of the problem context, i.e., constituting therapeutic problems (as well as solutions) 
by the way he carries out the therapeutic interview and endeavour (O'Hanlon & Wilk, 
1987). Instead the problem and ultimate responsibility for resolving it lies squarely with 
the client, e.g. "You can see what you ought to do in all that quite clearly" (line 266) and 
"To look at what stops you from doing the things which when you stop and think about it, 
you can see are right" (lines 267-269).
Having verbally drawn attention to and gained sufficient confirmation from the client - 
e.g. "Yes" (lines 267, 269) and "mm" (line 270) - that 'showing affection' is problematic, 
the therapist continues building a description of the problem that fits with psychodynamic 
theory. It is no coincidence then that psychodynamic discourse and practice (as with other 
models of therapy) engenders psychodynamic problems in the client. The therapist 
reinforces the problem definition by pointing out interpersonal situations that the problem 
'comes up' in relation to and connects this with the client's avoidant responses - "You will 
always keep your distance, go out for a walk, not talk about things" (lines 273-274). As is
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pervasive throughout the texts, this culminates in the construction of the problem as being 
the 'repression' or lack of expression of the client's 'angry' and 'loving' feelings, which in 
psychodynamic discourse are accorded privileged status as primary emotions (Rycroft, 
1972). This particular construction of the problem contains within it the solution to the 
problem, i.e., unblock that which is repressed in order to 'liberate' the client thus enabling 
them to express more authentically who they'really'are.
Though the therapist's account appears to be grounded in information obtained from the 
client in prior conversations, at no point is attention paid to any gaps, inconsistencies or 
contradictions in the client's narrative where he has shown or demonstrated affection in a 
satisfactory manner. This leads to totalising descriptions of the client as a person who 
cannot show affection. As such, the client is repeatedly placed on the deficit end of the 
adequacy/inadequacy continuum. Arguably, such descriptions are capturing of the client 
who is positioned as 'other' and is therefore subject to a marginalisation of their identity.
This particular relation, which entails the objectification of the client as they are 
positioned as the recipient of the therapist's professional 'knowledge' and skill, comes 
together in the idea and ideal that the client is the person who is changed as an outcome 
of therapy. This is clearly visible in extract 4. For example, the therapist observes "You're 
talking easier about it now" (line 351) and later "..your arm's still" (line 364). Likewise 
the client reports "Yeah, I feel suddenly a lot..calmer" (line 352) and "I feel much more 
peaceful.." (line 365). Thus the focus is on the ways in which the client is changed. 
Furthermore the passage through the therapeutic is constructed as an arduous and 
typically painful process that the client 'needs' to go through alone. The therapist 
responds positively - "Right..right" (line 355) - to the client's remark "you see it isn't easy 
to say" (lines 353-354) and discloses how he was aware of "..letting you go through 
that,.." (line 355). To this end the therapist positions himself as a detached spectator who 
knows and can see what needs to happen but purposefully remains out of the way, which 
reinforces the onus on the client to accept individual responsibility. This particular 
construction of the change process, which invokes the image of the client having to 'go
through the fire' in order to 'come into the light', may seem somewhat 'cruel' to those not 
familiar with psychodynamic discourse, as the therapist appears to be purposefully 
withholding from the client. However, within psychodynamic discourse and practice this 
reflects the view that change is a painful process and journey that each person must 
ultimately navigate alone in order to achieve autonomous selfhood. Though the one-way 
account inherent in psychodynamic practice promotes psychological liberation and 
empowerment, a more cautious reading requires us to review the consequences and 
effects of such relations. At the end of the extract the client attributes change to having 
"been able to share that with you.." (line 369). However, reciprocity and a sense of equal 
exchange is by passed in this one-way account. Therapy becomes a 'gift', as the client 
changes whilst the therapist remains the same as an outcome of therapy. As such, this 
relation holds the potential to become one of domination due to the increased risk of the 
client feeling 'indebted' to the therapist. As Mause (1954) wrote regarding the potential 
hazards of such unequal relations, "To accept without returning or repaying more is to 
face subordination, to become a client and subservient...to receive something is 
dangerous not only because it is illicit to do so, but also because it comes morally, 
physically, and spiritually from a person" ( in Epston & White, 1992).
Overview
In line with Parker's (1992) recommendation that we 'consider all tissues of meanings as 
texts' (p 7), this study used transcribed audio-recordings of psychotherapeutic sessions, 
viewed as constituting suitable texts for analysis, as the source of data. Within an 
empirical framework, the small sample used might seem questionable. However, in 
contrast to quantitative research where validity depends on a large sample, discourse 
analysis depends on a representative sample of texts, not participant numbers (Coyle,
2000). In order to be representative of the phenomena under consideration, the data being 
analysed needs to represent what Coyle (2000) refers to as a "variety of discursive forms" 
(p 247). Tine original study, from which the data were drawn, was quantitative in nature 
and specified clear objectives, strategies and techniques in the form of manualised
treatment protocols, in order to maximise control over therapist and patient variables. 
Though the quantitative measures taken in the original study to deliver a tightly 
controlled form of therapy were appropriate within the context of the original researchers' 
aims and method, the data generated do not exist in a vacuum and are not immune to the 
influence of broader cultural, psychological and psychotherapeutic discourse/knowledge 
within which they are located. As such, the random sample selected for this study, though 
small, provided sufficiently varied discursive forms both within and across accounts in 
order to be representative of the research topic.
Nonetheless, further criticism may be directed at only four extracts having been selected 
for discussion and it could be argued that the analysis was based on pre-determined ideas 
and upon an idiosyncratic framework. However, a discourse analytic approach attempts 
to make explicit the researcher's position and the relationship between theory, method 
and data. As such, the analysis does reflect the interplay between ideas developed as a 
result of my own experience of being a client and a therapist, reading of relevant 
literature and themes made available within the texts. Within the limited breadth of this 
study, the extracts selected for inclusion in the final report, were chosen as they provided 
good illustrations of themes that had emerged at an abstract level during the analytic 
process, whilst remaining grounded in the data. The account offered here is one possible 
construction made available by these texts and remains open to alternative interpretations. 
It has been presented to highlight aspects of psychotherapeutic discourse that this 
researcher takes to be salient and politically informative for the development and practice 
of psychological therapy.
Given the preceding discussion, the research has generated findings worthy of reflective 
consideration. In the first half of the analysis, the active constitution of the 'self through 
culturally prevalent 'images of the individual' contained within humanist, psychological 
and psychodynamic discourses were rendered more visible. Speakers' 'knowledge' and 
discursive practices were seen to operate in relation to presumed psychological 'truths' 
concerning human 'nature' and the 'self, which had the effect of situating clients within
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normative discourses of mental health and self-realisation. This operated in tandem with 
the construction of therapy as an emancipatory process, which 'liberates' clients' from the 
forces of 'repression'. A notable effect of this construction was that relations of power 
were obscured, as 'truth' was equated with 'objective' or intrinsic 'facts' about the nature of 
people. Consequently, clients were incited to embrace openly their own subjugation and 
view themselves as the sole locus of responsibility. The ways of talking, thinking, feeling 
and acting that were enacted served to reinforce, reproduce and support the discourse of 
the individual and at the same time silenced that which did not fit with this discourse. 
Thus the successful operation of power was proportional to its ability to hide its own 
mechanisms (Foucualt, 1980) and was intimately connected to the continual constitution 
and recreation of the subject, i.e., the representation of the individual in discourse.
The relationship between 'knowledge', 'truth' and 'power' was further explored in the latter 
part of the analysis by homing in on the ways in which the 'knowledge' and discursive 
practices associated with psychodynamic theory and the discourse of the individual 
configured and constrained the power relations and subject positions available to 
speakers. Here, the therapeutic relationship and interaction were constructed as a one­
way process wherein only the client was changed as a result of therapy. This particular 
representation of psychotherapeutic practice established a power relation that 
marginalized clients' identities as they were positioned as objects and recipients of the 
therapists' professional 'knowledge' and skill. As such, the subject positions made 
available to speakers were those of 'expert' therapist and 'unknowing' client, both of 
which facilitated and constrained their opportunities for action.
It might be argued that this particular study, which reinstates queries regarding the role of 
psychotherapeutic practice as a potentially normalising and socially regulative discipline, 
only points out what other researchers and clinicians already know, and that the concerns 
raised about power relations don’t really matter if therapy manages to alleviate 
psychological distress. However, in light of Parker's (1997) observation that, "most 
psychologists live so comfortably in the subject positions that are laid out for them in the
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psy-complex that even reflection on the consequences of these ways of speaking and 
writing [and practising] will seem strange or pointless to them" (p 124), it seems that 
such critique continues to be valid. It gains further momentum in relation to counselling 
psychology's ongoing commitment to reflective forms of practice (Woolfe, 1996). 
Perhaps more than anything else, this paper has drawn attention to the constitutive effects 
of discourse and the need for practitioners to acknowledge and embrace the ethical 
responsibility that they bear for the real effects of their work in the constitution of the 
lives of the clients who consult them. A discourse analytic approach provides one way in 
which counselling psychologists might attend to and examine the effects of the discourses 
they engage with in the context of therapy. This in turn might help to bridge the 
individual-social divide and assist practitioners to step outside the boundaries of what is 
familiar and known and to challenge the limits of our current ways of thinking.
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Use of self
This research project came into being for many different reasons. Through my own 
personal history and experiences of life, I have come to prefer values of equality, 
mutuality and respect for difference. Seeing people being subjected to abusive, 
oppressive, unequal or disrespectful practices makes me feel angry. During the course of 
my adult life and upon entry to the culture of psychotherapy, I have become increasingly 
sensitised to and have attempted to acknowledge my own privileged cultural location as a 
white man subject to living in a male dominated culture. My experience of being 
personally and professionally oppressed, i.e., being objectified and negatively positioned, 
and my limited attempts at resistance, within the context of one particular clinical 
supervisory relationship, reinforced my preferred values and ways of being. As my 
experience of this particular relationship represented what I wished to avoid in my own 
work with clients, my desire to explore the implications and effects of such practices 
grew. As such, my decision to conduct research into the relationship between 
'knowledge', 'truth' and 'power' represents an attempt to understand complex issues that 
touch upon and shape my own personal and professional identity and experience of life. 
It is set within the overarching context of developing my own preferred approach towards 
practice as a counselling psychologist. Above all I see my research as an ongoing 
personal, professional, political and ethical commitment to reflect upon, question and 
challenge the implications and effects of both my own and the wider psychological 
community's practices. My hope is that this research will assist my own attempts to find 
ways of facilitating mutuality and shared understanding between clients and myself, thus 
minimising structural differences and inequality, whilst stimulating further reflection and 
debate amongst other counselling psychologists.
The process of conducting research was both stimulating and challenging. I quickly 
became aware of the sheer complexity of the issues I was attempting to investigate and 
felt that I had bitten off more than I could chew. Pressures to meet the multiple 
requirements associated with a Doctoral level training meant that the spectre of failure 
seemed to loom ever large in the background. I frequently felt bogged down and
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overwhelmed by the richness and volume of the data, which were open to multiple 
interpretations. Perhaps the key dilemma I faced was in regard to what to include in the 
analysis. Though a discourse analytic framework does provide a means of being explicit 
about the relationship between the researchers own position and interestedness in relation 
to the data, I still felt constrained and uncertain. It was difficult trying to honour and do 
justice to my own interests and interpretations without falling into a solipsistic form of 
relativism. The most difficult part of the analysis, then, was trying to ensure that the 
themes that I had identified at an abstract level during the analytic process were grounded 
in the data and not just a case of me seeing what I wanted to see.
Whilst within the context of social constructionist and discourse analytic frameworks I 
find the open recognition that any research 'findings' are but one construction or 
interpretation available amongst a multitude, to be liberating, my own research efforts 
continued to be tinged with trepidation. Significantly, whilst explicitly attempting to say 
something about the relationship between 'knowledge', 'truth' and 'power within the 
context of psychotherapeutic practice, I am acutely aware of my own location within 
institutional and academic contexts. The subject position of 'trainee' and associated 
discourse of evaluation within which I am currently located, in reality means that some 
constructions and realities are more acceptable than others. Thus the ongoing challenge 
throughout the research was to construct an analysis that was shaped by the data but that 
also took into account the wider personal, professional and political contexts in which it 
was generated.
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Appendix B 
Copy of Eighth Transcript
C = Client 
T = Therapist
1 C: Um ..J'm  afraid I've had a...bad time. Um [5] I er... (sighs) [inaudible] last er...
2 Friday. Um just to er... meet my deputy (sighs). Um.. [4] and I er.. I felt, you know, quite
3 [3] confident about that um.. [4] I was.. I was., .a little apprehensive as I.. I went in, but
4 I.. I assumed that I would be anyhow. And.. [8] and.. .I'm sure he was., .trying to be..
5 .helpful and [4] and I just had er.. .well I.. I., (sighs) [5] I er.. .felt., .that I was intruding..
6 .somehow. And er.. (sighs) [3] I the more we., .spoke um. [3] the sort of., .enormity o f
7 (sighs) [6] sort o f  what lay ahead o f me to get back, er.. .just seemed (sighs) quite
8 gigantic really. Um.. (sighs) [7] I er.. .sort o f  talked about what... what I., .hoped would
9 be (sighs) sort o f  helpful programme for me for... the next two weeks and er [10] he had
10 some doubts about whether., .some o f my ideas would be right because o f  [3] things that
11 had happened since I've been away and [3] and then we talked about some o f  the things
12 that had happened. Um.. [3] some o f the things that he felt that I needed to come to terms
13 with (sighs) if  I was to er.. to go back. Um.. [5] we spoke about a lot o f  things that had
14 happened that., had obviously gone very well. Um.. er.. I.. I feel that in doing that, he
15 was. .trying to be assuring and yet. .in a way..
16 T: It felt like you..
17 C: I just felt (T: (un)needed in some way) (sighs) yes, I just felt out., .outside it, and not
18 understanding eveiything that um.. .he was saying (sighing) um.. .well I.. I., er.. I left the
19 school um.. .feeling (sighs) um.. [3] I don't know., .of.. [4] frightened I suppose, but I.. I
20 sort o f  had this feeling again that.. .I'd had some months ago about something um.. [2]
21 awful that was going to happen. And um.. (sighs) well I., .the rest o f  the day wasn't very
22 happy for me. Um (sighs) I er.. I didn't really say veiy much, but I was very sort o f  weepy
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23 and., .um.. .1 was able to control that to some extent in the evening when my., when N.
24 came home. Um.. .but I didn't sleep at all in.. .at night, um.. .1 just.. .1 was hardly in bed
25 really I . . . um [4] sort of., went back to the situation o f  all sort o f things to do with school
26 looming up and., er..
27 T: I mean you're., you're clearly kind of. distressed now.
28 C: Yes, I.. I feel., .yeah.
29 T: Yeah, you're, you're all up tight and you're..
30 C: Yes. (sighs)
31 T: [5] Can we just., go back to., and stay with what., the feeling as you left the
32 school? (C: yes, mm.. ) You were., you're talking, I mean there's., there's the kind o f
33 enormity o f what you saw before you. (C: mm) But then there was (C: sighs) you were
34 talking about the frightened feeling.
35 C: Well I think I.. I'd run into the school., although apprehensive Um.. I'd gone into
36 school, I mean I., you know.. I had been feeling better, a lot better than I'd been (T: mm
37 hm) and er.. and yet in a way I was (sighs) sort o f  leaving with many o f  the same feelings
38 that five months ago., that morning. (T: mm) had just been., all brought back and er I
39 was feeling er.. (sighs) very much the same. (T: right) Um..
40 T: Right .just, .just how you are now. I just, .just noted that it's as i f  you're trying to sort
41 o f  somehow hold everything...
42 C: Well I.. I'm.. I'm., conscious that my.. I'm shaking and er.. I'm trying to stop that.
43 T: But it's that somehow you're tiying.. you're trying to control and (C: mm) keep
44 eveiything (C: sighs) everything in.
45 C: Well I'm trying to control them., control my se-self, yes.
46 T: And if  somehow, if  you don't., what will happen?
47 C: Well I.. I feel that I need to talk to you (T: yeah) and that., yeah., if  I'm., if  I don't..
48 just., keep my grip and er.. that might become particularly difficult.
49 T : That showing emotions would be difficult?
50 C: [2] No., that., (sighs)
51 T: You want to talk..
52 C: If I want to talk to you (T: yes) I want to be able to.. (T: yeah) talk rather than
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53 get held back by getting., too upset.
54 T: Right. But as if somehow., while you're talking to me, you're also using up and trying
55 to kind of., keep on top of..
56 C: Mm. .1-1-1 want to talk to you (T: yeah) I want to tell you..
57 T: I-I hear.. I know that. (C: mm) But I'm.. I'mjust also kind of.. (C: sighs) seeing
58 you in a lot of distress and., that., there's but somehow feeling like as if you've got
59 to sit on it and (C: mm) you can't somehow let it just..
60 C: No, I-I'm not worried about showing distress really, I just want to be able to talk.
61 T: Yeah, yeah., yeah.
62 C: All right? (T: yeah) Mm.. I er..
63 T: I suppose it.. (C: sorry) I.. I want to say to you (C: yeah) it's OK to..
64 C: Right (sighs) mm., .(sighs) I um.. (sighs) I um.. [2] on Friday evening um.. very
65 late on Friday evening, there was a letter pushed through my door and it was
66 from my er. .chairman of governors asking if I could meet him over the weekend. And
67 obviously my deputy had been in touch with him, and um ... so I went to see him on um.
68 .Saturday morning for a couple of hours. And er. .again, he was trying to be helpful, um..
69 (sighs) he was talking about er [3] strategies for going back I suppose and um.. that he
70 was concerned that [4] for my health and., but also that he had to be concerned for the
71 school, that., if I was to go back and lead the school that er.. I wasn't in a sort of
72 teacher's position where to a much greater extent., er.. you can work your way back in.
73 And I understood what he was saying and.. I., and., and.. I.. I couldn't argue with that.
74 Um, I mean, again, he was talking about things that had been happening within the school
75 and er.. I suppose that was more or less in emphasizing in a way um.. what my deputy
76 had said on Friday, (sighs) Er.. [2] (sighs, blows nose) [5] well.. Saturday afternoon, well
77 the rest of the weekend really was just a mess., um.. (sighs). [4] Er.. N. and I tried to do
78 things um, rather than just sit about, but er.. I.. I again didn't sleep on Saturday night.
79 Um.. [3] I.. I got some.. I suppose I got some spasmodic sleep., sleep on Sunday, um..
80 but it was sort of., (sighs) I don't know, difficult to know how long I slept, but I kept
81 waking up in a panic sort of situation and er.. very hot and sweaty and., upset and er.. I
82 spent quite a number of hours downstairs, reading and., (sighs) [3] Yesterday er.. [3] I
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83 was a bit more peaceful um.. I think, perhaps mainly because I.. I didn't do any walking
84 on Saturday and Sunday and er.. although I was feeling., very tender at the beginning o f
85 the morning, I did go out and walk and um.. I., (sighs) I said., well I think peaceful wasn't
86 the right word. I did feel more peaceful about it, um.. last night I read to the., the., sort o f
87 early hours and then fell asleep and in fact didn't wake up till., er.. sort o f twenty to
88 seven. And I think, knowing that I was going to come to see you today was again., um..
89 [3] a help, um.. [6] but um.. (sighs) I.. I suppose I had some feelings at the weekend that..
90 that I hadn't had before. Um.. [6] I suppose was that I.. I didn't.. I didn't imagine that um,
91 when I was with you last week that., er.. I'd never get er.. as low as I-I have been again. I
92 felt, you know, I really did feel., not better, but much better than I had been, particularly
93 looking back. Um.. but also, I just don't want to go through that situation again, but I
94 think perhaps the thing that bothered me most was that N. 's been veiy upset this weekend
95 and er.. (sighs).. I just don't want to put her., (sighs, tearful) through what she's um.. had
96 to go through (sighs)., over these past months. Um.. I mean she certainly., was feeling
97 happy about er, me last week and er.. (sighs)and was sort o f plunged back into this [4]
98 situation and this supportive role again, (sighs) I just don't feel I've got a right to.. .1 know
99 she would, [3] but I'm just very concerned about what it's., er.. doing to her. I wouldn't do
100 it to her. [7] I.. I had a telephone call from um.. my staffing officer yesterday, he.. I
101 suppose either the school or my., chairman [inaudible] must have contacted him. Er..
102 (blows nose) he's a man that I've., sort of., had a good deal o f  respect for over the years.
103 Um.. [inaudible] he has., on many occasions been very helpful and understanding, um..
104 so he wasn't the sort o f  person that I didn't know and er.. basically he., he., he., er.. rang
105 because somebody had said that there was a possibility that I was thinking of.. I might be
106 going back soon. And that um.. that he., he said that he., that he needed to therefore let
107 me know that., when people had been o ff with a similar condition that. .I've. .I've been in
108 for more than three months, that um.. the authority have somebody at the education
109 department who er.. needed to see me to., (sighs) er.. um.. agree I suppose with the., the
110 doctor's report that I am fit to resume. That's why he was ringing um.. but er.. (sighs)
111 anyhow I.. [3] did talk to him about what had happened in fact over the weekend and er..
112 [6] he was understanding. [4] But I er.. [3] I suppose perhaps for the first time it. .it., it
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113 just hit me that maybe [3] I might not be going back. That maybe er.. (sighs) [6] this has..
114 (tearful) in order to become., well again, um.. [5] (sighs) [4] I won't be doing the job
115 again. [4] I.. I suppose although it might seem a bit strange, it's just something that I've,
116 not [inaudible],
117 T: Not come to you before?
118 C: No.. I.. (sighs)Even now I do feel that I am going to be right, but. (sighs) I suppose it..
119 it sort o f occurred to me last., well.. 24 hours really that., maybe, although that's so, that's
120 [4] it wouldn't be fair on myself, N.. .it's (sighs) that.. I may not be the right person for
121 that job any more. Um.. that the same., (sighs) situation may be triggered o ff when
122 pressure inevitably would come on and., (sighs) [9] um.. I'm finding that hard um.. and it
123 isn't something that I wanted to happen. On the other hand., there are some things that are
124 more important than my job, er.. (sighs) [3] and obviously my health is one o f  them but I
125 suppose really what's., it's really (sighs) well, my health, yes and what a breakdown and
126 that would mean to.. toN . ander.. the whole family situation really, (sighs deeply twice)
• 127 (tearful) Anyhow I [5] did say to the staffing officers (blows nose) that I.. I wasn't being
128 very good and., but on Friday in fact I had seemed., feeling quite positive and yet., er.. a
129 sort of., a sort o f  very small immersion into the school scene., had a quite a., catastrophic
130 effect. [4] And he said, well., well, .he certainly wouldn't be putting any pressure on to
131 me with regard to resuming., um.. that there would be certain consequences salaiy-wise
132 that., um.. up to now I.. I.. I’ve still been getting my salary, but in a few days in fact, I..
133 um.. I shall go onto half salary. Um.. but., but um.. the authority just wanted me to get
134 well and there., there wouldn't be any pressure from them. Er.. (sighs) I did say to him,
135 "What would be the con., consequences in fact that., if  in fact [4] I wasn't able to resume?
136 What., what., what would I need to do?" And um.. um.. he said, "Well, one thing is you
137 mustn't do is., if  that it., if it comes to that, if  you, although in fact you said you must
138 think about that when you feel at., more in control o f  yourself than.. ." I was thinking
139 when I spoke to him. Um.. (sighs) That., if  it., if  it came to that, um.. I would need to get
140 in touch with the., er.. what 1 mustn't do would be resign. That um.. I would need to get in
141 touch with the DES and to a., a contact at the education department (sighs) [3] and that..
142 that um.. I.. I-I should have to um, apply for um.. um.. I think.. I think he said a disability
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143 pension. Um.. and that that would be., taken up by the Department o f Education Science
144 and that. .if. .if. .if it did come to that that um.. I would need a.. I would need a statement
145 from my doctor., and., in support of., in support o f  that claim. Um (sighs)but really., um..
146 that was., that was as much as he was able to say. A., again he was very kind and
147 understanding and er.. (sighs)
148 T: [5] It seems like.. (C: sighs) you've had contact with a lot o f  people. (C: yes) All. .of
149 whom, .have been kind (C: yes) understanding (C: mm) trying to.. [3] assure that the
150 [inaudible] will be.
151 C: Yeah., there was., although in fact, the consequences o f my talking to my deputy and
152 my chairman o f  governors, um.. were that, .it made me extremely unhappy (T: right) and
153 worried (T: right) er..
154 T: It's., it wasn't anything that anyone really said, though, something.. (C: it was just I
155 think..) something that came over you.
156 C: Well, something that came over me and also the um.. (sighs)., the size o f the task o f
157 getting back, um.. was sort of., so far greater than.. I'd ever anticipated..
158 T: Right, it's., at that time (C: sighs) going in it., so huge.
159 C: At the time., whil-whilst I was in, and., you see, at the time of., it wasn't as huge when
160 I was..
161 T: No, time., time., going in.. it was., it felt huge when you went in there..
162 C: Mm., well it., it., when., when I started talking, after I'd been talking, it was then..
163 that., er.. I said it was., sort o f  an apprehension o f  when I went in (T: mm) but.. I mean..
164 that was understandable um (T: mm)., (sighs)., but um.. (sighs) [9] (sighs)
165 T: Right.. [2] people were assuring you and (C: well) understanding (C: well) but
166 somehow it feels like y o u ..
167 C: Probably were reassuring me (blows nose)., reassuring and.. I.. I don't think my.
168 .deputy and the chairman were reassuring (T: right) um, I think that they were trying to
169 be helpful and (T: right) they weren't being antagonistic or (T: right) but um..
170 T: But the point is you., you., you took on, I mean, you're not., you're holding yourself
171 now, you., something happened., listening to them and realizing, making you feel., well,
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172 just that this is somehow., this was an imposs.. almost an impossible task. (Cr.yes) It felt
173 impossible. (C: yes) How on earth can I do this?
174 C: Yes. Yes, I mean I.. I've been realistic enough to know, that it was going to be..
175 T: Yes, you., you knew it would be., you'd be apprehensive, you knew..
176 C: I knew it would be a huge task, yes.
177 T: Yeah, but nothing., to match the.. (C: nothing to match) what it felt like when
178 [inaudible] talked about.
179 C: No, no, when they tried., no, no., and er.. (sighs) so there., there was that aspect o f  it
180 and then my reaction to that and then the consequences for N . and (sighs) it was just
181 awful really. In some ways it's been more awful than., you know., when it first happened.
182 Um.. in as much as (T: yeah, you've) I've had five months and er.. (T: yeah) help and er..
183 T: Yeah, but., .if you were talking there at. .it. .it.. I get the feeling somehow the.. [2]
184 the., you became in a way., disappointed or., at yourself somehow about not being able
185 to..
186 C: Yes, yes.. I suppose I., yes., as well disappointed within myself, mm..
187 T: Mm., and., and then., and the pain somehow about N., N.'s a real., touched.. I mean
188 that really touches a nerve in you.
189 C: Oh, yes, yes., m m m ...
190 T: You, I mean, you were distressed, you know, really distressed (C: mm, well I could
191 see) and you could.. (C: the whole family situation) it was., right..
192 C: I mean it has been under tremendous pressure anyhow, but er.. (T: inaudible) it's just
193 that she shouldn't be having to (T: right) (sighs)
194 T: Do you., do you., it's this thing again of., you., you in the depths o f  despair, OK? [6]
195 Your concern comes out for N.. .of what she has to carry.
196 C: Well yes.
197 T: Yeah. That somehow it's... [4] it's almost like somehow I can't burden her.
198 C: (sighs) Well I deal with it happening to me, but (ciying) I just see it happen to
199 her.
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200 T: Right. [7] It's almost like a way it could.. (C: sighs) the pain it causes her which hurts
201 almost more than pain that you've felt., seeing her distressed (C: yes) because o f  this. (C:
202 yes) And that's why..
203 C: I tried not to.
204 T: Yeah, the controlling bit (C: sighs) that you're trying., trying to sit on it (C: yes) a bit,
205 trying to. .kind o f  (C: blows nose) keep it away from her. (C: yes) [11] Seeing other
206 people hurt is almost, .it is worse (C: sighs) somehow than you hurting.
207 C: [3] Yes, I'm er.. I um.. .yes. I suppose I have got the feeling as well o f  (sighs).. I
208 suppose in. .in between, .from my level, it. .in m yself there was. some., some bitterness
209 really which., and.. .1 don't know if  that's right., um.. [2] that the job should have done
210 this to me (T: to you) me, um.. yes., mm..
211 T: And to N. therefore?
212 G: Oh yes, (T: yes) yes., yes., um.. [3] you see er.. if  you., if  you ask me to go out now,
213 in front o f a group o f  children, and just teach them [4] I feel that that's., perhaps even
214 something I could almost enjoy doing.
215 T: To give you something. (C: That?) You'd get something from that, you'd..
216 C: I. .1.. I feel that that situation, I could cope with, but o f  course, I’m not in that situation
217 and er (T: mm hm) that isn't my job (T: right) but is here just the same, [inaudible]
218 (sighs).
219 T: [4] You hear what.. OK, it's not your job. But even now you can sit here and say.. .
220 "That., that I could.. I could enjoy. (C: yes, I-I think I.. ) There's something in there that.
221 .mm.. I could give."
222 C: I think that I could still, .given that situation, (T: mm hm) but o f  course that was the
223 situation I was getting more and more removed from (T: mm) and I did try to hang on to
224 that as much as I could and I was. .still doing when I finished two days of., o f  teaching.
225 Um.. and., still enjoying that, but that., that isn't my job with my., (sighs)
226 T: But. .just, .just staying there with what you., what you've picked up as a feeling there,
227 that that's something you could do. (C: mm) Last week were kind o f  talking about sort o f
228 feeling o f you feeling related to things. Feeling like you could relate, mm., [inaudible]
229 and being able to., to relate, I was just picking up there, a feeling of., you were talking
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230 about teaching (C: mm) it almost felt like somehow there was something there that you
231 felt, you know, there., there was you and there were the children (C: mm) and somehow
232 you., that had a meaning for you. You knew what you could give (C: well.. .) and you
233 knew what you., what the job (C: mm) gave you. That somehow.. (C: y ea h ..) in.. in.. in
234 the headships, somehow it's almost like..
235 C: [2] One o f  the great fears that boil up there, the sort o f  administrative (T: mm)
236 although it's not., not so much the administrative situa.. .1 mean that's part o f  it, um.. er..
237 (sighs) it's the other things that., have been brought into a head teacher's role that um..
238 (sighs) er.. I mean much o f  it is national curriculum. Um.. although in some ways that
239 was a sort o f  last straw I think. All the things happening and happening (T: mm) so
240 quickly, um.. I think if  I'd had been in secondary education and it'd had been just., sort o f
241 one., one subject (T: mm hm) mm, maybe that um.. . [4] I could have taken, but it., at..
242 .er.. with all these things happening in so many subjects at the same time and (T: mm)
243 (sighs) and other things., that heads er.. having to become responsible for and., other
244 groups o f  people that they're having to be answerable to and (T: mm) (sighs) it's um.. [4]
245 And I can see why people., may be saying "That's the way a thing should be," mm..
246 (sighs) I can see why they're saying that, I.. I.. I., it's just that when I went into a head
247 teacher's job and [7] the job wasn't the job that it's.. (T: that it is now) has become and
248 (T: and not as [inaudible]) and I.. I'm not., it's not a job that [4] well i f  I was still
249 teaching, it wouldn't be something that., would appeal to me at all.
250 T: Being a head?
251 C: No. I suppose in the first case, I became a head because advisors advised me to apply
252 and people encouraged me to apply and.. (T: mm) mm.. [3] and so eventually I did and
253 um..
254 T: But can.. (C: sighs) and as you just., as you've talked through that (C: mm) wh- what
255 I'm being struck by is., the things that you've said during our meetings and just now,
256 about, .o f the things which are important to you, right from the veiy start, to you
257 relationships are important. (C: mm, yes) That relationships are important. Clearly N. is
258 incredibly important, I mean (C: yes) from your., your feelings about her., her., thought
259 you've been through. (C: mm) Um.. [3] just earlier on, saying, you know, I mean., this..
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260 sort o f  coming here was important today (C: mm) and talking with somebody about (C:
261 mm) talking here. (C: mm) And then, kind of., the depth o f  looking at that kind o f
262 mountain that's., being a head, you can say.. "If I were to teach .." it's one., it's just when
263 you said that, (C: mm) I got this feeling of., you., you., as if  somehow it's., it was you
264 again relating to children. There's something about.. (C: well.. ) good relationship, if
265 you., .with people. When you're with people., and.. (C: yes) and somehow it has meaning
266 and., somehow you can touch those people and they can touch you, somehow. But (C:
267 mm) somehow that., that seems to., that seems to give you something and you.. (C: yes)
268 are somehow faced with this administrative, m onolithic..
269 C: And this backlog o f  reading that I., need to..
270 T: Or how., as you., as you were saying that, it was somehow becoming increasingly
271 like., this was worlds apart from what is important to you., as you (C: yes, yes) as a
272 person. (C: yes) What, .and when you said then, you know it's., almost like you know,
273 you have a choice now and you knew you., it's not what you..
274 C: No, I wouldn't, .no. No.
275 T: It's., you see, it's almost like saying somehow in a way "Things which are there that
276 feel like a mountain., are not things which are important to me. What's important to me is
277 N., (C: yes) N.'s feelings (C: yes) is my feeling about, you know, helping people, caring
278 for people," (C: mm) those things are the thing which feel important to you. (C: yes)
279 That somehow., that the headship thing, somehow it feels like there's nothing there that
280 you can kind of..
281 C: Well it wasn't there (sighs) I've. .I've never had any great desire to become a head. It
282 wasn't a.. (T: inaudible) an ego., trip, I mean.. (T: you were a boy., you were) No.. I
283 enjoyed my teaching (T: mm hm) um.. er.. thoroughly.
284 T: Enjoyed the teaching, but., but the head, you were advised to..
285 C: Well, yes I.. I.. I.. I.. I suppose I was supposed I was considered, well, I was advised, I
286 never [3] sort of. .from the early days, I., when I just thoroughly enjoyed my teaching
287 (T: mm) um, and eventually was advised by my head and my advisor to apply for a
288 deputy headship., um, which I did um.. [4] I was still teaching full-time and enjoyed that
289 position.
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290 T: It's almost like because o f  teaching somehow you have still..
291 C: Oh, yes, well I.. (T: inaudible) I mean I was responsible for a great deal that
292 happened., er.. that.. that happened, um.. effectively I was sort o f  a deputy head in really..
293 in three schools. And., first one quite a small school and then I was.. I had a very large
294 school where I was designated head o f  junior department, which was., er.. because it was
295 a veiy large school and., it was really a sort o f  deputy headship over the junior part o f  the
296 school. And then I became deputy head of., well I had a big school. Um, and I enioved
297 (T: mm) the position and I enjoyed um, the responsibility o f  that, er.. [5] and moving
298 into a headship I had a pretty clear idea as to how I would be as a head and. .er.. we've
299 talked before about the fact that when I, the school that I went to, I., found people who I..
300 [2] never saw., that I hadn't come across before in teaching, some people, and er.. the
301 school where they were, lots of., personnel problems and that., um, distressed me a great
302 deal. Um.. but for my first sort o f  six years with that., at that school, I still managed to
303 teach for three days a week and do my headship job. Um, although it meant working long
304 hours., er.. long hours, I., was prepared to do that and..
305 T: But that somehow because., somehow you didn't want to give up that teaching.. (C:
306 yes., yeah, well., in one way) in way you., you couldn't..
307 C: In. .well I suppose I thought .and I think I overdid it, looking back, um.. . [7] that I
308 wanted a particular style o f  teaching in a particular rela. .relationship with (T: mm) kids,
309 um but the best way perhaps to do it was., to get in the classroom and do it myself. That
310 was one reason, and the other reason was that., there was certain things that I wanted to
311 happen within the school and the only way I could free staff either., to see those things
312 happen or to train for them happening was to., either take over a class or., mm., very
313 often a number o f classes, so., mm., very often the whole school was away. Um.. and that
314 part um.. [3] no, um.. that didn't distress me at all and I.. [2] got a good deal o f  pleasure
315 from that part, but um. .increasingly , o f  course the pressures o f  being that., a lot o f  the
316 things I enjoy doing because I.. I was spending a lot., every dinner hour working with
317 kids, or doing activities with children and er.. every Friday evening I stopped behind until
318 quarter to nine with a series o f clubs from half past three ‘til quarter to nine, and again,
319 thoroughly enjoy it. (T: mm hm) I wasn’t being a martyr, I just enjoyed..
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320 T : That's right, because it means something to you.
321 C: Yeah. But in the last two, two and a half years, [3] well the dinner time activities have
322 had to go because it became, .impossible. I was the only one on duty and we had three
323 dinners., three dinners., duty sessions. Er.. nobody else um, was prepared to do a dinner
324 duty. Er.. [2] the Saturday morning activities that, again, I er.. thoroughly enjoyed and
325 that involved lots o f parents as well, I had to give up because I was fmding more and
326 more hard to get into school on Saturday and do things. And my., the Friday night., group
327 which I had with the older children, um.. had to go., because it was a tiying.. to try and
328 catch up with the work that I hadn't been able to get through during the week and er.. so
329 in a way, I suppose the things I most enjoyed, .all the relief from some of the things I
330 least enjoyed (T: mm) was taken away and. .and I suppose really , inevitably um it., the
331 last straw arrived with (sighs) [3] this tremendous flood of work with the national
332 curriculum.
333 T: You see., as., as you were talking there, and it's almost like in a way [3] you said
334 earlier on in the session for the first time at the weekend, there was a thought o f  actually
335 maybe not being able to go back (C: mm) losing the, you know, being the head became
336 (C: mm) entered your world for the first time. (C: mm) But you're talking there, it's
337 almost like over a period o f time you've gradually been losing the part o f  your work..
338 which (C: well, yes) is important to you.
339 C: That's right, and a sort of., the way I envisaged um.. I would be best suited for doing
340 the job. (T: mm) You know., er, I think it would be true that um, that the qualities
341 required o f  a head teacher in a primaiy school from now on, will be different to the ones
342 which were being required (T: mm) er. .in the past. That I think in the past um.. [3] most
343 primary school head teachers, er.. probably became head teachers because in the first case
344 they were competent teachers, or good teachers., and were able to accept responsibility.
345 But now, um.. [4] well, their ability as teachers will not be., need to be., addressed. They
346 will require other skills which haven't been required to such a great extent anyhow, and
347 some of them um.. not at all, in the past. And um.. [5] well, er, if., if., if all that's
348 envisaged in primary education is to take place, well (sighs) so be it, but um.. [5] I
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349 suppose it's just not my scene really. It um.. .that's not quite true, it. is my scene, but I..
350 in.. in the position of head teacher, er.. would have obvious weaknesses.
351 T: [5] You're talking easier about it now.
352 C: Yeah, I feel suddenly a lot., calmer. (T: mm., do., you look.. ) I think that actually
353 having to say to you what I just said was.. I wanted to say it (T: yeah) you see it isn't easy
354 to say.
355 T: Right .right.. I was aware of actually. .letting you go through that, because somehow
356 it felt like you., you have to tell the story, you had to say. (C: mm) you had to lead up to
357 the point about what you realised at the weekend about (C: mm) maybe not going back.
358 (C: mm) That actually it was important for you..
359 C: Well I find that hurtful to say, m m ...
360 T: Yes. But somehow you had to say it rather than even me coming in and saying it for
361 you. (C: mm) I thought about that, but (C: yes) I felt like it was important for you.. [2]
362 (C: mm) to own saying that. (C: yes) However painful it was. (C: yes) You see now
363 you're., now you're talking about [4] I don't know., there's possibilities in way which is
364 not., not getting so., you're., your arm's still..
365 C: Well I'm., no, I'm not, I don't feel.. I don't feel, you know, I feel much more peaceful
366 (T: yeah) than., than I was.. I don't know, ten., quarter of an hour.. I don't know how long
367 ago it was (T: mm) um.. [5] mm...
368 T: Because somehow you've been able to ...
369 C: Well, I.. I suppose that I'm just., been able to share that with you., really. Um..
370 T: [3] Rather than sitting on it and..
371 C: Yes. But I., just the possibility of not returning, I've just never (T: it's a blow,
372 yeah) and never., .(sighs)
373 T: Something we'd never spoken about.
374 C: I've never re.. I never thought for one.. I really hadn't thought (T: mm) for one
375 minute that., that sometime 1 wouldn't return. Now [3] I suppose that., that the events of
376 this weekend just., sort of thrust that upon me and the sort of consequences of going
377 through the next five months in the same way as last five months um.. [4] I'm just not
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378 (T: mm) it's just something that I can't., that I don't want to (sighs) really think about. [3]
379 (sighs)
380 T: [6] Perhaps., that made you., sort o f  upset again over that?
381 C: A little, yeah., yeah.
382 T: Catching your breath. (C: mm) [6] It feels like somehow you've.. .I'm
383 wondering whether it feels in some way like, .having walked through a barrier in some
384 way. Mm., maybe that's not the best way o f  saying it, I mean, it feels like somehow now
385 you're looking at., all possibilities., in a way.
386 C: Mm., what about, my future (T: mm) you mean? (T: yes) Yes, I don't.. I don't.. I don't
387 know what., the possibilities are in a way, I mean the possibilities um.. .are A) that
388 something happens over the next few weeks and that I'm., and I'm altered yet again,
389 what., what that likelihood is, I just don't know. I mean I don't know whether the way I
390 am today is a typical, .response to somebody doing what I did on Friday, um.. and that it's
391 something that., it's sort o f  phased out or.. [4] in a way it's something that I get over now,
392 I am, despite the way I'm feeling now, able to resume. Um.. but if  I'm not able to resume
393 and I.. I have to therefore apply for this, um.. this disability pension um.. [7] um.. [3] I-I
394 suppose that the authority therefore on the DES have got to. .agree that I am not able to
395 resume my duties and I don't know whether that is a (T: mm) a difficult matter or it's
396 um.. fairly straightforward and., i f  they., did say that um, I wasn't able to resume and that
397 I got a disability pension um.. [5] how I would use my time I've., that being so, I don't
398 know, um. I say physically I feel.. [3] I don’t feel an old man, put it that way. Um.. (T : ,
399 mm)but I guess I would want to tiy to do something anyhow, um.. exactly what it would
400 be I don't know, but I think I would want to do something, mm..
401 T: Could it be that (C: sighs) you know, it's., you know, we., we don't need to sit down
402 now and talk about., options I suppose. (C: yeah) I was just.. [2] I was. .recognising
403 somehow that it feels like now you're looking at., a range o f  things. (C: mm) You know,
404 it's almost like there's., there's almost like greater uncertainty about the future in one way,
405 because, you know, would you be going back to work or (C: yeah) won't you or (C: yes)
406 whatever, but somehow being able to., to look at those, to talk about those here as you are
407 (C: mm, mm) you know..
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408 C: Yes.. I think perhaps because it., as I say, I-I don’t know, mm. In some ways, it.. I
409 suppose having talked to you this afternoon. I'm.. I'm almost resigned in a way [4] to
410 feeling I’m not going to be able to get back and that it wouldn't be the right thing., for me
411 or., for N., to take that risk., even. I suppose I., in a way um, that's how I'm feeling at the
412 moment.
413 T: Somehow like you've gone., gone to a place where that's., what's happens and saying
414 to yourself, "Well., that that., that safeguards what I treasure, what I value. (C: yes) And
415 maybe that's a better place for me to be now (C: mm) than facing that mountain, that
416 gigantic mountain."
417 C: I think so really, er.. [4] yes, I think so really, um.. [6] but, I mean obviously that
418 would have consequences, um.. [5] but the., obviously., well I-I think my health and.
419 .our family life, .is more important than financial considerations. Um.. [10] if in fact I..
420 am not fit to resume and er.. do get a pension and [4] obviously some things will not be
421 as easy and., but maybe the sort o f  quality o f  er.. life may be er.. well, I.. I would think, I
422 certainly feel would be., better than it has been (T: mm hm) for the last two years
423 particularly (sighs).
424 T: [4] You see, I think all., all I'm wanting to (C: mm)to recognise not that one is., right
425 and the other is wrong (C: mm) but the fact that you're able to sit here and talk (C: mm)
426 about those possibilities (C: mm) from, you know, sort of., places at the weekend when
427 you were clearly., and earlier in the session when you were clearly., talking about that
428 (C: mm) as a., as an option, as a possibility. (C: mm) You know, it's tremendously
429 painful for you.
430 C: Mm, well, yeah, I suppose that part o f the pain at the weekend was this.. [2] this
431 acceptance yeah um.. (sighs) [6] my concern has been how long it would be before I did
432 get back. (T: mm) Um.. [7] I mean when.. I mean.. I suppose scores of people over the
433 last., um.. [2] months have sort of said, "Oh, you., you need to apply for early
434 retirement," and it's just something that I just., dismissed because it wasn't something that
435 er.. to me, was going to happen and er.. [5] I'm aware of the fact that in fact, er.. a
436 number of my friends who would be younger than me in fact have done that, er, but it
437 wasn't something that er.. [2] I'd been interested in, er.. [3] But er..
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438 T: I-I-I'm wondering, I'm wondering whether looking back you. .feeling [3] ups., or..
439 annoyed or angry in some way that you went into school, somehow if you hadn't gone
440 into school, well all this wouldn't have happened.
441 C: No, I., no.. I., (sighs) in some ways, no I don’t feel that. Because I, you know, when I
442 spoke to you last week, I really felt..
443 T: That's right, you., seemed to be wanting to do ...
444 C: Um.. sort of trying to sort of., look at it from a pace back really, and trying to be
445 detached about it. I mean, perhaps it was a good idea that I did go in, if only to.. I don't
446 know. [3] Open my eyes to what the situation was perhaps.
447 T: [5] Something like that would be particularly painful if., you., .felt.. ."Oh, I wish I
448 hadn't gone in [inaudible]."
449 C: Mm., you see (sighs) last week, um.. I'm not saying that I never had any doubts or
450 any sort of rotten moments but, most of the week I was looking forward to actually going
451 in (T: mm) and say, feeling quite positive and thinking about the way I would organise
452 the time when I was in and what I would do and who I needed to see. And.. I don't think I
453 would have got much better than that if it'd had been next week or the week after or a
454 month's time or two month's time, I don't think so. Um.. [2] er.. [5] and I suppose if I'd
455 gone in in two month's time, I'd also been conscious about that it was two more months
456 of things happening and er.. perhaps the consequences would have been even., you know,
457 the., the size of the task would appear even greater than it did on Friday, although that
458 would have been difficult.
459 T: [5] Right.
460 C: [5] I Suppose what I'm thinking is, you know, I., today is the.. [4] that perhaps the
461 only way I'm going to be well again..
462 end o f  tape.
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On  ‘m u n ow c  hetejkjseosm’
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Adrian Coyle & Elizabeth Peel, Coeditors, Lesbian & Gay Psychology Review
Research in brief 
On ‘mundane heterosexism’
Mark Craven1
In a recent research article, Sizabeth Peel sised , are seen  a s  interlinked and as operating(2001) combined discourse analysis with lesbian within d ie confines of liberal ideology. The analysis
feminist politics in order to explore subtle forms that subsequently unfolds is  firmly grounded in the
of heterosexism in language -  a  feature which sh e  data, i.e., quotations are used to illustrate what is
refers to a s ‘mundane heterosexism' because of occurring in particular instances of talk. The
its everyday nature. As one might expect from analysis is successful in that it presents a persua-
discourse analytic research. Peel lays down a sive account of how the micro-inequalities of
persuasively comprehensive rationale for her study heterosexism are constructed in talk,
by looking in considerable detail at a range of A clear se n se  of reflexivity is in evidence a s  the  
issu es which include understandings o f subtle author positions herself in relation to the topic
sexism , gender and sexuality, and discursive being explored. I found the m ost noteworthy
psychology and prejudice. A cogent argument is aspect of this work to be its clear real world impli-
created, highlighting the need to focus upon and cations -  something that is rather unusual in
identify everyday, mundane forms of heterosexism discourse analysis, which has been accused of
in order to challenge prejudice stemming from lacking real-world relevance {Abraham &
heterocentric assum ptions. The performative Hampson, 1996), despite the contrary claims of
nature of language is established as the primary som e leading discourse analysts (Willig, 1999).
analytic focus in the research. Consequently, The aim of fostering beneficial social change -  by
discourse analysis is deployed in uncovering the considering how mundane heterosexism  is
linguistic resources and techniques involved in the constructed with a view to developing strategies
production of mundane heterosexism. for its eradication -  is obviously central to  Peel's
Taking data from lesbian and gay awareness intentions. She draws our attention towards two
training se ss ion s, Peel u ses  principles taken from potential ways of challenging h ie  oppressive
Potter and Wetherell's (1987) discourse analytic discourse of heterosexism, i.e., through interac-
approach alongside a lesbian feminist political tionai, ‘in situ' challenges and through broader
sensibility to  highlight how the ‘micro inequalities’ societal campaigns and activism. However, whilst
of heterosexism are constructed in talk. Three the analysis makes reference to the macro-level in
them es or ‘interpretative repertoires' are this respect, the main em phasis is  directed
presented, namely (i) prejudice against the hetero- towards the micro-level of language in terms of
sexual, (it) non-heterosexuality a s  deficit and (iii) theorising, analysis and suggested challenges,
refusing diversity. These categories, it is empha- What is not sufficiently explored perhaps is the
1 Mark Craven is a trainee on the Practitioner Doctorate Programme in Psychotherapeutic and Counselling Psychology in the 
Department of Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XH, UK.
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process by which a micro-level discursive analysis 
might provide u s with the tools to e ffect the sort 
of changes that Peel advocates -  and how these  
changes might b e effected . Of course, this 
criticism could also be levelled at many other 
discourse analytic papers which claim that a 
micro-level linguistic analysis can be used a s  a  
resource for meaningful social change -  and here 
I appreciate that my own preference for a more 
thoroughly socia l, Foucauldian version of 
discourse analysis is  showing. Whilst P eel’s  
research is commendable in that it uncovers the 
linguistic resources and techniques involved in the 
production of an oppressive social process, the 
emancipatory potential of this work might arguably 
be extended by a lso considering how the material 
context o f social relations -  including inequalities 
arising in the structural features of society -  
creates possibilities for and also  constrains the 
discursive production of mundane heterosexism  
and in turn its potential eradication. It is increas­
ingly being recognised that fruitful combinations of 
micro-level and more macro-level analyses may 
provide us with research that is maximally useful 
in political term s (Wethereli, 1 9 9 8 )  -  and, 
although both levels of analysis are readily
discernible in P eel's research, perhaps a little 
more of the latter might have been beneficial. But 
then, to paraphrase Mandy Rice-Davies’ famous 
observation, I would say that, wouldn’t 1?
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